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Abstract
Foreign direct investment, by definition, provides the host country with capital, 
supported by a package of knowledge and entrepreneurship. Such investment thereby 
makes a positive contribution to the economic growth and development of the host 
country; for instance, by complementing insufficient domestic mobilisable resources, 
such as savings, foreign exchange and tax revenue. This investment may also 
contribute to a rise in the host country’s technological level through technology 
transfer. Foreign direct investment has been recognised as a more efficient channel for 
technology transfer to developing countries than licensing and buying. However, the 
most significant contribution of foreign direct investment comes from externalities for 
local industry arising from spillover effects. These externalities are mainly due to 
foreign subsidiaries being unable to capture all the economic rent from their 
productive activities.
The spillover from foreign firms to the local market occurs through four main 
channels: increased competition in local markets, training of local workers, links to 
local industries, and the acceleration of technology transfer. This thesis analyses these 
specific contribution of foreign direct investment in Taiwan. The interest is in two 
particular points. First, the strategic behaviour of foreign subsidiaries in the presence 
of spillover effects is analysed to determine the possibility that these effects lead to a 
shrinkage of the technological gap between foreign and domestic firms. The findings 
are that spillover effects can shrink the technological gap between foreign firms and 
indigenous firms, but that the best strategy for foreign firms to maintain their 
competitive power and prevent the catching-up is to transfer technology dynamically.
Secondly, the effect that foreign direct investment has on the improvement of 
productivity efficiency— the rate of technological progress, and technical efficiency in 
Taiwan— is analysed. A study is made to ascertain whether variations in productive 
efficiency among local firms correlate to the presence of foreign subsidiaries in the 
economy. In addition, the mechanisms through which the spillovers from foreign 
direct investment are transmitted are also studied. Measures of the growth of total 
factor productivity are employed to represent productivity efficiency. A 
decomposition of total factor productivity is conducted to find the sources of growth.
Foreign direct investment is found to have an ambiguous effect on 
productivity in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector even though foreign direct investment 
and productivity are correlated. If spillover effects of foreign firms could force 
indigenous firms to reduce managerial slack or to adopt more efficient production 
processes, they would operate in a more efficient manner. More efficient operation
implies higher productivity growth. However, adjustment to foreign entry would also 
require some adjustment in indigenous firms’ production processes or the exit of 
inefficient firms. This could impose additional production costs and would be 
detrimental to productivity growth. These two effects might counteract each other 
and result in insignificant spillover effects.
Alternatively, scale economies appear to be a more important factor in 
explaining productivity growth in most Taiwanese industries than the spillover effects 
of foreign direct investment. The underdevelopment of Taiwanese firms in technology 
and information, as well as the relatively small size of Taiwan’s domestic market, 
means that links to the world market are critical if scale economies are to be 
exploited. On the other hand, foreign direct investment is one of the most efficient 
channels for obtaining production knowledge and access to world markets, and the 
inflow of foreign capital has probably contributed to the achievement of economies of 
scale in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. Its contribution to productivity growth is 
mainly seen through a scale effect.
At the firm level, the analysis shows that local firms have improved cost 
efficiency over time and that there is a trend towards a shrinking of the technological 
gap between local and foreign firms in the Taiwanese electronics industry. The 
evidence also shows that foreign direct investment provides a spillover effect through 
which an improvement in labour quality is passed on, leading to greater cost 
efficiency in production. Better labour quality can be achieved in many ways; for 
instance, though education, leaming-by-doing, or labour turnover. Education has 
long-term effects which need a relatively long time series analysis to examine 
thoroughly. Leaming-by-doing can result in improved technical efficiency, as can 
labour mobility, particularly when accompanied by a positive and significant scale 
effect. The opportunity of leaming-by-doing comes from expansion in the market 
which, in turn, can be attributed to the beneficial effect of foreign direct investment— 
providing information and knowledge about relevant markets.
The inflow of foreign capital contributes to the upgrading of technical know­
how and a narrowing of the technological gap between local firms and foreign firms. 
This might suggest that developing countries should adopt preferential foreign 
investment policies. Preferential foreign direct investment policy is certainly 
welcomed by foreign firms, but it also leads to distortions in resource allocation and 
reductions in the national welfare of the host economy. An alternative policy 
concentrating on the creation of a favourable investment environment is preferred, 
particularly one with an emphasis on raising labour quality.
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1 Introduction
The role of technological change has long been recognised as a key factor in 
stimulating economic growth; for instance, Solow (1957) estimated the average rate 
of technological change in the non-farm US economy from 1909 to 1949 at about 1.5 
per cent per year. Based on these findings, he concluded that about 82 per cent of the 
increase in output per capita during that period was attributable to technological 
change, whereas only a minor percentage of the increase was due to increases in 
capital-labour ratio. Denison (1974) attempted to include many qualitative variables 
— such as changes in labour quality associated with increases in schooling— that had 
been omitted by earlier studies. He concluded that technological change was 
responsible for about 47 per cent of the total increase in gross national product 
(GNP) in the United States, and about 76 per cent of per capita income, between 
1929 and 1969. Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) estimated that the average rate of 
technological change was about 6.8 per cent per year, contributing about 70 per cent 
of the increase in output per capita from 1955 to 1961 in Japan. Maddison (1970) 
used the same approach to estimate the contribution of technological change in 23 
developing countries, finding that Taiwan had the largest proportion of gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth, with 38 per cent that could not be accounted for by 
an increase in labour and capital. Kuo (1983) estimated that an even higher 
proportion of growth in Taiwan was attributable to technological change. Yet these 
earlier studies appear to be contradicted by Kim and Lau’s (1993) recent findings that 
technological change contributed little to the economic growth of the East Asian 
newly industrialised countries when compared with five industrialised countries: US, 
UK, Germany, France and Japan. Despite this, many findings imply that technological 
change has a significant impact on economic growth.
The role of technology transfer
Technology consists of three principal elements: (i) product design, (ii) production 
techniques, and (iii) management systems. Changes in technology take place as a 
consequence of innovation, invention and imitation. In turn, these changes are 
followed by a diffusion of the new technology, either nation-wide or internationally, 
which changes the technological level in domestic or overseas markets.
Since ‘technology’ embraces all forms of know-how or technical information, 
as well as organisational and managerial skills, it may affect not only the productive 
level but also productive efficiency. According to the classification of Mansfield et al.
1
(1982), there are three major categories of knowledge: general, industry-specific, and 
firm-specific. General knowledge refers to information commonly applicable across 
all economic activities; industry-specific knowledge refers to the know-how of special 
solutions or procedures acquired in previous manufacturing experience with a related 
product or process; and firm-specific knowledge refers to information that is specific 
to a particular firm’s experience and activities, but that cannot be attributed to any 
specific item the firm produces. This knowledge may be in the form of written 
materials, or embodied in technical assistance or on-the-job training, or built into 
fabricating or processing equipment.
From the above definition, there are real difficulties in measuring the 
technological level of a market. It is even harder to measure the international gap in 
technology, but the existence of such a gap creates scope for a continual process of 
technological diffusion.1 In general, the process of transferring technology is more 
prominent in developing countries, because of the substantial technological 
differences between developed and developing countries. Production technology that 
is capable of converting inputs into consumable output at competitive costs is not as 
widely available in developing countries. In addition, creating new technology 
through research and development (R&D) is enormously costly and risky, and the 
necessary skilled labour may also not be available. Importing technology not only 
bypasses the risky invention and innovation stages, but also allows a high degree of 
freedom in the choice of technologies, enabling the recipient to cut short the 
development path. Hence, developing countries represent a quite substantial share of 
world technology demand and only a tiny part of the supply.2
Vernon’s (1966) product cycle theory suggests that developing countries will 
be the beneficiaries of technology transfer, due to relatively restricted market demand 
which is constrained by low national income or shortage of capital for investing in 
R&D activities. Even though developing countries generally lack the resources and 
incentive to develop new technology, it would be inappropriate to conclude that they 
invest nothing in R&D activities. Since their markets tend to be smaller, and factor 
prices, consumer tastes, capability, and cost and quality requirements are not the same
* Monkiewicz (1989, ch. 7) notes that there are two great obstacles in measuring the technological 
gap internationally: that of methodology and that of statistics. However, he suggests that a 
multidimensional evaluating approach, which covers scientific research activities, inventive 
activities, and investment activities provides a more objective assessment of a country’s 
technological position. Therefore, he suggests that this is a better method for identifying the gap 
than the frequently-used imitation lag method.
2 This trend has changed significantly since 1980, however, because of the improvement in the 
performance of less developed countries (LDCs) which has made the Newly Industrialised 
Economies (NIEs), such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea, new technology 
exporters.
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as in the countries which generate new technologies, recipient countries usually have 
to adapt the transferred technology to their own needs. Hence, a large proportion of 
their R&D expenditure goes toward adaptation.
Although technology is a part of human knowledge and it is convenient to use 
the term ‘technology transfer’, it is not simply a matter of assuming that there is a 
blueprint and that all one has to do with applying imported technologies is follow 
instructions. Much of the core of technology is not written down, and publications 
and reports may be much less effective in transfer than the movement of engineers or 
skilled workers. Because of the variety of ways of transmitting knowledge, only a 
little information is available on how rapidly a technology can spread from one 
country to another.
The rate of international technology diffusion depends on the age of the 
technology being developed and the channel of transfer. Vernon and Davidson (1979) 
found that the speed of new innovations transferred abroad rose significantly after 
1955 in the United States, with more recent innovations tending to diffuse faster than 
earlier ones. McFetridge (1987) found that transfer is faster in the early stages of 
international diffusion, later slowing down. A few studies have attempted to 
determine whether the industrial characteristics of early-adopting countries differ 
systematically from those of late adopters. As for the channel of technology transfer, 
Mansfield et al. (1982, ch. 2) estimated that the mean age of technologies transferred 
to developed countries through foreign subsidiaries was 5.8 years, significantly less 
than that for developing countries (9.8 years). Technologies transferred through 
licensing or joint venture took much longer (13.1 years). On the basis of this study, 
foreign direct investment appears to be a more efficient channel for technology 
transfer.
A variety of institutional arrangements can be employed to transfer technology 
internationally. Apart from non-commercial forms of transfer, such as the exchange of 
books and journals, and the migration of workers, three principal channels are 
commonly used:
(i) Export of goods and services. Exports can provide information to importers, 
and the role of exporters in improving the efficiency of usage of products is also 
a form of technology transfer. Moreover, reverse engineering provides an 
opportunity to acquire technology.
(ii) Foreign direct investment. In many cases, firms become multinationals because 
they want to exploit a technological lead. Freight costs and tariffs may hasten 
decisions to invest abroad. In establishing foreign subsidiaries, multinational 
firms transfer technology in a variety of ways. They train administrative 
personnel and managers; communicate information and capabilities to engineers
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and technicians; help the users of their products to use them more effectively; 
and help suppliers to upgrade their technology. A joint venture may also be a 
form of foreign direct investment. A joint venture is generally an operation 
owned jointly by a firm with technology and a firm in a host country lacking 
technology. Joint venture agreements are often made by smaller firms that need 
capital to complement their technology.
(iii) Licensing agreements. Licensing agreements cover matters such as patents, 
trademarks, franchises and technical assistance. They may require the licensee 
to pay a certain percentage of its sales to the licensor, or to buy certain inputs. 
Another type of ‘licensing’ arrangement is sale of technology— a lump-sum 
purchase which involves the granting of a licence allowing the purchaser to use 
the technology.
A firm can employ many channels simultaneously at different operation sites, 
the combination of which is determined by the characteristics of the parties involved 
and the structure of their motivations and interests.
Role of foreign direct investment in technology transfer
The decision of technology owners as to which channel provides the best arrangement 
through which to market their technology depends on the realisable stream of benefits 
and costs, given the characteristics of the technology and the nature of the market. 
The costs are mainly calculated from the loss due to market competition that the 
technology owners may face in the future. Therefore, if the innovators believe that 
licensing or selling will give away valuable know-how to foreign producers who are 
potential future competitors, or if they want to maintain the quality of their products, 
they will prefer to produce abroad. But if they cannot obtain the necessary resources 
or if the nature of the particular technology market is competitive, they may prefer 
licensing. The policies of the host country’s government may also affect technology 
transfer. A policy of detailed screening or restriction of foreign direct investment can 
increase the cost of technology transfer through the direct investment channel. 
Foreign investment was discouraged in the past by the Japanese, Korean and Mexican 
governments, but encouraged by Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. In addition, the 
stage of industrial development of the host country may influence the firm’s decision.
Many theories of foreign direct investment attempt to explain the incentives 
for firms to internalise their international technology transfer. Dunning (1988, ch. 4) 
states that foreign direct investment is associated with ownership-specific advantages 
in enterprise, where these are derived from technology and marketing skills, relatively 
cheap financial and monetary factors, and so on. Technology transfer through foreign
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direct investment is likely to result in different patterns of resource usage and 
allocation from those which would accrue from an arm’s-length transaction. This is 
because direct investment always involves the transfer of a package of interrelated 
technologies and it saves transaction costs through internalised sales or purchases.
Teece (1977) indicates that the costs of technology transfer are more 
significant than is commonly thought, because market failure may be greater across 
borders than within a country, and the cost of international technology coordination 
between independent firms is extremely high. These costs can be reduced where 
transfer takes place within the same enterprise; that is, where there is internalisation. 
Buckley and Casson’s (1976) internalisation theory stresses that internalisation can 
reduce transaction costs within multinationals. They identify few imperfect external 
markets3 which cause relatively high transaction costs to impede free trade and make 
licensing expensive. They conclude that high transaction costs lead firms to prefer to 
internalise technology transfer.
Meanwhile, Findlay (1978) suggests that internalising technology transfer can 
create demonstration effects within the recipient economy and strengthen local 
competition, thus contributing to local technological learning and innovation efforts. 
Therefore, the more foreign direct investment there is, the more rapidly the recipient’s 
technology will catch up. Rugman (1980) suggests that the rise of foreign direct 
investment is a response to failure in goods and factor markets throughout the world 
because of market distortions or specific technology, knowledge and other 
information owned by the firms.
Though these studies suggest different reasons as to why firms internalise 
technological transfer transactions instead of licensing or selling, they arrive at similar 
conclusions. First, technology is comparatively easily adopted, or there are cost 
savings to technology owners via foreign direct investment rather than via market 
mechanisms. Secondly, technology transfer proceeds more smoothly and brings more 
technological benefits to the receiving economy when internalised.
There are other advantages in firms internalising technology transfer rather 
than licensing. Foreign subsidiaries can utilise fully location-specific advantages by 
lowering production costs in host countries, for example through lower labour costs. 
Firms may also wish to provide better services to the host market via subsidiaries. 
This factor is especially important to industries where product differentiation, rapid 
model changes, advertising and retailing are of great significance, because exporting 
firms have to do their utmost to satisfy local tastes and requirements. Apart from
3 According to their findings, market imperfection occurs when there are costs of property rights, 
when discriminatory pricing is needed but is prohibited, when there is buyer uncertainty over the 
value of knowledge to be traded, or when products are perishable and the seller needs to protect 
quality.
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economic concerns, such as prospects for market growth, non-economic factors, such 
as political stability in the host country, may act as incentives in attracting firms to 
undertake international production.
From these studies, the choice between direct investment and licensing can be 
summarised as being influenced by the size of the market, the riskiness of the 
investment, the policy of the host government, the management and performance of 
the firm, industrial market structure, and the range of technologies and products 
involved. The more stable the market, the newer the technology, the larger and more 
international the firm, the larger the power of the firm in factor markets and the lower 
the absorptive capacity of the licensee, then the higher the propensity for a foreign 
firm to prefer direct investment over licensing.
Foreign direct investment and the host economy
Although foreign firms may prefer direct investment, the attitude towards such 
investment tends to be quite different among recipient countries, especially 
developing countries. The technological activities of foreign subsidiaries are often 
viewed with suspicion in these countries, because the subsidiaries want to maximise 
their profits. The host government may fear that, in pursuit of profits, foreign 
subsidiaries will engage in activities that are contrary to the host country’s interests 
and policies. The host country may also worry about multinationals ‘taking over’. 
Above all there is the fear of becoming dependent on foreign technology. This fear 
often makes host governments wish to retain as much control as possible in the hands 
of indigenous firms.
Costs to the host country
Even though new technology can save costs in material inputs or productive 
activities, its transfer may not always be beneficial. Since most new technology is 
developed in more industrialised countries, it tends to be geared to their factor 
endowment where labour is basically a relatively scarce factor in the market. The 
benefits to the host country therefore depend on the appropriateness of the 
technology to local factor endowments and other conditions. Developing countries 
generally have abundant unskilled labour, and if capital-intensive technology is 
transferred, not only are there employment implications, but diffusion of technology 
may be slower, as discussed later. In addition, it may be costly to adapt technology 
transferred to fill the gap between the technology supplier and the recipient in terms 
of the scale of production, available industrial materials, the capabilities of local 
supporting industries, product design and even the differences in industrial standards
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and specifications. How efficiently the technology can be adapted is a crucial issue for 
the recipient in evaluating the benefits of the process of technology transfer.
The obstacles associated with technology adjustment may be due to intrinsic 
factors in developing countries that work against technology adaptation:
(i) skilled labour may be scarce;
(ii) a small market and monopoly advantages may reduce the incentive to find new 
technology. A small market may limit the gains of adapting new technology, 
and monopoly advantages may keep firms profitable without their having to 
adopt new technology; and
(iii) distortions in the prices of goods and factors, such as capital subsidies and 
preferential interest rate policies, may encourage the use of more capital relative 
to labour.
For other reasons also, foreign direct investment may not be unequivocally 
beneficial to the host countries. For example, the repatriation of profits to parent 
firms may cause balance of payments difficulties in the host country, multinationals 
may use their monopoly power to exploit consumers in the host country, or the host 
country government may fear a loss of economic independence.
Because of these concerns, many developing countries adopted a nationalistic 
approach and tended to restrict the inflow of foreign direct investment during the 
1950s and 1960s. However, the importance of technology to economic growth and 
the fading of nationalism in foreign direct investment policy since the 1970s have both 
encouraged the growth of multinational firms, especially from Japan and European 
countries where domestic economies also faced industrial restructuring and led them 
to invest abroad. Foreign direct investment has become increasingly important in 
international technology transfer.
Benefits to the host country
Foreign direct investment appears to be an efficient channel for technology transfer to 
developing countries, and so these countries are seeking to attract foreign investment 
to gain the benefits perceived. Foreign direct investment, by definition, provides the 
host country with capital, supported by a package of knowledge and 
entrepreneurship. Such investment is thereby expected to make a positive 
contribution to the economic growth and development in the host country; for 
instance, to complement insufficient domestic mobilisable resources, such as savings, 
foreign exchange and tax revenue. This investment may also contribute to 
macroeconomic policy objectives, such as employment and balance of payments
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objectives. In addition, the entry of foreign firms may encourage entrepreneurship and 
provide information that would otherwise remain inaccessible to local firms. As a 
whole, the goals of multinationals and of host countries may coincide on certain 
issues, but there may also be conflict over a wide range of issues, such as tax 
avoidance, income distribution, anti-competitive behaviour and technology transfer.
In brief, the economic effects of foreign investment are directly associated 
with economic growth, output, employment, the balance of payments (foreign 
exchange, international trade), productivity, technological know-how and the training 
of labour and management. On the other hand, such investment may generate indirect 
effects which are critically associated with the inter-industry and intra-industry 
linkages to the local economy. These indirect effects involve the extent to which 
multinationals, through markets or other mechanisms, interrelate with locally 
produced materials and components suppliers or whether they prefer to set up new 
(supporting) firms and industries. Developing countries must pay considerable 
attention to these linkage effects. The economic impact of foreign direct investment 
on a host economy will be discussed further in Chapter 3, focusing on Taiwan’s 
experience.
Many theories seek to elucidate the contribution of foreign direct investment 
to host countries: for instance, the industrial organisation theory (Hymer 1960; 
Kindleberger 1969); the product-cycle theory (Vernon 1966); the currency-premium 
theory (Aliber 1970); the dynamic comparative advantage theory (Kojima 1973, 
1978); the intermediate-market internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson 1976); an 
eclectic theory (Dunning 1977); the risk-diversification theory (Rugman 1980); and 
the development-stage theory (Dunning, 1981). Apart from these theoretical analyses, 
many empirical studies focus on specific performance measures, such as R&D 
expenditures (Safarian 1969; San 1989), adoption of new technology (Globerman 
1979; Schive 1979), specialisation and efficiency (Caves 1974; Blomstrom 1989), and 
exporting and importing intensities (Safarian 1969; Schive 1981; Chen 1992; Tu 
1992), each providing partial analyses of the impact of direct foreign investment. 
Despite these studies, there is still little quantitative information available on the 
benefits of foreign capital inflows. A few models have been developed to evaluate the 
costs and benefits of foreign capital inflow into host countries. For instance, 
MacDougall's two-factor one-commodity partial equilibrium model, the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson general equilibrium model, and Caves' specific-factors 
model provide analyses of these effects. The first model concludes that foreign 
investment is always beneficial to the host country; the second finds that such 
investment is detrimental if there are no taxation levies on the profits of foreign firms;
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and the conclusion of Caves’ model lies somewhere in between. Conclusions about 
the impact of foreign direct investment on the host economy remain controversial.
A number of studies claim, however, that one of the most significant 
contribution of foreign direct investment comes from their externalities to local 
industry (which also called spillover effects), and these studies provide empirical 
evidence of their existence, despite much of that evidence being only weakly 
supported. Foreign firms generally possess property rights to technology and 
knowledge but, through the realisation of external economies or spillovers, host 
countries derive indirect gains. These externalities are mainly due to the foreign 
subsidiaries being unable to capture all the rents from their productive activities.
The spillover effect from foreign direct investment
In general, the spillover from foreign firms to the local market occurs through four 
main channels: increased competition in local markets, training of local workers, links 
to local industries, and the acceleration of technology transfer.
The first channel is increased competition in the host country’s market. 
Compared with local firms, foreign firms may suffer some disadvantages, such as lack 
of information about consumer tastes and factor market conditions, and unfamiliarity 
with local legislation and commercial rules. At the same time, they have advantages 
that help them overcome the entry barriers set by host countries— including relatively 
cheap capital costs, superior marketing ability, and high research and development 
intensity. With these advantages, a foreign firm may be expected to have the ability to 
enter markets where the entry barriers are relatively high. Foreign entry can therefore 
increase the degree of competition in host country markets, driving out inefficient 
local firms or forcing them to improve their productivity by investing in physical and 
human capital or by importing new technology. Overall productivity is thereby 
increased, thus changing the market structure of the host economy.
Several studies provide evidence on indirect productivity gains for host 
countries from the presence of foreign capital inflow (Dunning 1958; Brash 1966; 
Safarian 1966). Also, more direct tests of foreign investment and spillovers have been 
undertaken by Caves (1974), Globerman (1979), and Blomstrom (1989).
Another source of spillover is the training of labour and managerial personnel. 
Training may take place within the subsidiary or the parent firm, or even outside the 
foreign firm. Such training raises productivity in the host economy, thus creating a 
spillover benefit, which may be accelerated through the mobility of trained workers. 
Since managerial talent, scientists and skilled labourers are relatively scarce in 
developing countries, this type of spillover is important.
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The third potential source of spillover is the impact of links into the local 
economy. These links may take a variety of forms. For instance, foreign firms hire a 
certain amount of local labour and use a certain amount of local materials. The wages 
and interests they pay contribute to the domestic economy. Important linkages are 
created through purchasing and selling strategies. Foreign firms may buy materials or 
intermediate inputs from local suppliers or sell products to local processors, which 
create links into the local economy. Because foreign subsidiaries may insist on higher 
standards of quality control, reliability and accurate delivery time for their domestic 
purchasing to complement their global strategy in sales and marketing, local suppliers 
may be forced to improve their performance. This kind of spillover may be more 
likely to happen in countries where legislation requires domestic content in the 
investment. A number of case studies provide evidence on this type of spillover effect, 
for instance Dunning (1958), Brash (1966), Lall (1980), and Schive and Majumdar 
(1990).
The fourth kind of spillover comes from the effect of the presence of the 
foreign subsidiary on speeding up technology transfer. Technology transfer is not only 
a central activity of foreign firms, it also stimulates domestic firms to pursue access to 
a specific technology because of the leaming-from-watching effect. Without the 
presence of foreign firms, local firms may not be aware of the existence of new 
technology, or realise its profitability. There are also some studies on this type of 
spillover, such as Reuber (1973), Mansfield et al. (1982), Blomstrom and Wang 
(1989), and Blomstrom et al. (1992).
These spillover effects from the presence of foreign subsidiaries appear to 
constitute a major gain for a relatively backward country, especially through the 
dissemination of management, training and technical skills. The literature provides 
evidence of the existence of such spillovers; it does not, however, analyse the 
response of foreign subsidiaries in the face of these ‘leakages’ to indigenous firms. 
For instance, given the trade barriers imposed by host countries and potential 
spillover effects, the reasons foreign firms were motivated to undertake direct 
investments rather than exports has not been analysed. Similarly, when forced with 
the threat of indigenous firms catching up technologically, the strategies of foreign 
subsidiaries regarding technology transfer may vary.
Such externalities probably increase the recipient country’s welfare while 
reducing the profits of foreign firms, therefore making them reluctant to transfer 
technology in the long run. For instance, given the existence of spillovers, the output 
of foreign firms may decline because indigenous firms become more efficient in 
production. The profits of foreign firms may also be affected, depending on changes 
in market prices. What optimal choice in transferring technologies can a foreign
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subsidiary then make to maximise its profit and output? How does its behaviour in 
turn affect the output and profit of indigenous firms? How is the welfare of the host 
country affected? These questions are worth examining more carefully. A discussion 
of the strategic responses of foreign subsidiaries to show the importance of spillover 
effects and their effects on the decision-making of foreign firms may make up for a 
deficiency of analyses of this matter in the literature.
Background to empirical study
Foreign firms and host governments may react differently to spillovers, but is there 
any externality from foreign direct investment? This question will be explored in the 
empirical study, in which the contribution of foreign direct investment to the 
Taiwanese economy is analysed as a case study.
Reasons for choosing Taiwan
There are three principal reasons for choosing Taiwan as the case study:
(i) Data availability: because of the difficulties in collecting adequate data as well 
as in identifying the channels of diffusion, most empirical studies have 
concluded that spillovers have little impact. Nevertheless, the rapid economic 
growth of the Taiwanese economy, accompanied by a rapid inflow of foreign 
direct investment during the high growth period, provides a convenient case for 
testing the importance of spillovers. In addition, there is the relatively ready 
availability of two sources of firm-level economic survey data for Taiwan. The 
Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs has, since 1974, 
conducted an annual survey of foreign firms in Taiwan. The survey data cover 
firms’ production and financial statistics, providing the most reliable and 
comprehensive information available on the activity of foreign subsidiaries. The 
second source of data is the census data on the manufacturing sector, 
conducted every five years and providing information on each plant’s 
production, financial and assets statistics. These data sources can be used to 
examine the impact of foreign investment in Taiwan.
(ii) Lack of literature in this field: explanation of the rapid growth of Taiwan’s 
economy has been attempted in a number of studies focusing on the role of 
individual sectors in the economic development or the inter-sectoral analysis, 
and in more comprehensive studies covering trade, industry and the labour 
market. Some of these studies have analysed the process of technology transfer, 
but none has attempted to investigate the relationship between foreign capital
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inflow and technology transfer, or the spillover effect on Taiwan’s economy. 
Some of the studies in the field of foreign direct investment focus on its overall 
contribution to the early stages of Taiwan’s development— alleviating the 
shortages of domestic capital and foreign exchange, increasing employment, 
and raising tax revenues— while others concentrate on partial analysis, such as 
foreign firms’ strategic behaviour in relation to local purchasing, exports and 
technology transfer. Some observe the performance of different foreign 
subsidiaries, by the country of origin of capital. There are a few studies of 
linkage effects, through an analysis of local purchasing and local content, for 
instance Schive (1981), Schive and Majumdar (1990), and Chen (1992). To 
rectify this deficiency in the literature, this study attempts to analyse the 
existence of spillover effects from foreign direct investment to the Taiwan 
economy.
(iii) Important role of capital inflow in economic development: technology is a type 
of knowledge which is hard to measure and is generally embodied in capital, 
equipment or human beings, being particularly related to capital flow. Capital 
inflow reflects technology transfer. During the modernisation of the Taiwanese 
economy, three phases of capital import contributed to development. These 
inflows not only brought in financial capital but also provided technology and 
technical know-how.
Inflow of capital to Taiwan
Capital inflow is a means of technology transfer; it may, therefore, be advantageous 
to have a general idea of the inflow of capital to Taiwan before undertaking an 
empirical study of its relation to technology transfer.
The first phase of capital inflow into the Taiwanese economy came with the 
immigration from the mainland in the late 1940s. Taiwan’s economy had suffered 
severe damage during the Second World War. Ports, electricity supply and 
communications were ruined by heavy bombing, and it was estimated that three- 
quarters of its industrial capacity was destroyed. The supply of chemical fertilisers 
dried up and agricultural production by the end of the war was probably back to the 
level of 1910. In addition, about 30,000 Japanese technicians, administrators and 
professionals, who accounted for a significant share of the human capital resources as 
well as the bulk of the large-scale industrial resources, left Taiwan in 1945.
Under colonial rule the Taiwanese had not been permitted to occupy any 
senior government or managerial positions, and there was little education beyond the 
primary level. This created a vacuum which was then filled by the mainlanders. 
Informal estimates indicate that around two million of mainland Chinese entered
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Taiwan between 1946 and 1965, accounting for one-third of the Taiwanese 
population in this period. Although nearly half of the mainlanders evacuated with the 
government were military forces, there was also a small group of experienced and 
educated personnel, as well as capitalists who were unwilling to remain under 
communist rule on the mainland. By 1950, the mainlanders had 35 per cent of the jobs 
in the public service sector. Their entry helped to reduce the requirement for 
investment in human capital and to establish good conditions for economic growth in 
the following period.
The textile industry was the most significant industry in the immediate 
postwar period. Lin (1969) reviews the development of Taiwan’s textile industry 
which was strictly banned by the Japanese rulers before the war, with nearly 90 per 
cent of demand being serviced by imports from Japan. During the vacuum period, due 
to the lack of physical and human capital, the textile industry remained 
underdeveloped. However, the establishment of Chinese government in Taiwan led to 
increased demand, which stimulated the revival of the textile industry. Fortunately, 
with the aid of US cotton and the immigration of former owners and mainland 
technicians who brought in capital, experience, and management know-how, the 
bottleneck of economic development was removed. The share of the textile industry 
in total industrial output grew from 4.7 per cent in 1949 to 14.3 per cent in 1950 
(Huang 1952), and was the fastest growing industry till the 1970s. Even nowadays, 
firms managed by mainlanders still form a significant proportion of Taiwan’s textile 
industry.
The second phase of capital inflow was US aid. The main program of US 
economic aid to Taiwan began in 1951 and, although new commitments ceased at the 
end of 1964, aid in the pipeline continued to be disbursed to 1967. During this period, 
US economic aid totalled US$1.5 billion, averaging about $90 million per annum or 
around $6 per capita per annum. Compared with other developing countries in Asia, 
Taiwan was one of the largest recipients of US aid (Jacoby 1966).
Almost all of the aid was in the form of grants, or soft loans repayable in local 
currency. It covered most of the savings gap during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
accounting for over 30 per cent of gross capital formation and 90 per cent of the 
trade deficit.4 In addition, non-project aid in Taiwan consisted of a large commodity 
import program, hence the aid program could be viewed as a series of inputs of 
resources into the economy. These resource inputs included:
(i) imports of industrial materials for domestic processing,
4 Data from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, yearly, Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, ROC.
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(ii) imports of capital goods,
(iii) imports of human capital, knowledge, skills, and technology via US technicians 
and the training of Taiwanese, and
(iv) imports of consumer goods.
A large proportion of these resources involved technology transfer. In 
addition, aid to education constituted a large amount of project funds. The major 
projects included trade and industrial education, vocational agriculture education, 
science education, and American technicians transferring their expertise through pilot 
demonstrations and teacher training. Trade and industrial education was one of the 
most effective projects. It led to greater emphasis on the teaching of practical skills, 
more cooperation with industry, and better public attitudes towards vocational 
training. The training program and US technicians working in Taiwan were the best- 
known forms of aid in 1960 (Jacoby 1966, p. 165).
The third phase of capital inflow was foreign direct investment. It would be 
more accurate to use the actual basis of foreign capital inflow in accounting for the 
contribution of foreign direct investment, but it is impossible to ascertain the actual
amount of foreign capital in a host economy.
Foreign direct investment in Taiwan between 1952 and 1992 on an approvals 
basis is charted in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 Foreign direct investment in Taiwan (approvals basis), 1952-1992 
(semi-logarithmic scale)
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Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs (1993), Statistics on 
Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment, Technical Cooperation, Outward 
Investment, Outward Technical Cooperation, Republic of China, Taipei, Taiwan.
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As shown on figure, foreign direct investment was negligible in the 1950s with 
only about US$35 million for the period 1952-60, averaging US$3.9 million per 
annum, and it remained at a low level during 1961-66, averaging about US$21 million 
per annum. However, there has been an upward trend in foreign direct investment 
since 1966, due to the establishment of the first export processing zone in that year.* 5 
From 1952 to 1992, accumulated foreign direct investment approved was about 
US$164 billion, averaging US$0.4 billion per annum. This represented 2.4 per cent of 
average fixed capital formation in the whole economy, and the foreign capital share in 
the industrial sector was about 6 per cent. This percentage would be higher if account 
was taken of the contribution of the manufacturing sector.6
Economic impact of foreign direct investment on Taiwan
Apart from its role in capital formation in Taiwan, foreign direct investment has also 
been associated with the country’s successful export growth. The influence of foreign 
direct investment on Taiwan is reviewed comprehensively in Chapter 3, with an 
emphasis on those effects which relate to technological change; for instance, the 
contribution to exports, employment, linkage to domestic industry and technology.
Foreign firms' exports represented about 27 per cent of Taiwan’s total exports 
in the 1970s, and 19 per cent in the 1980s. Their contribution to manufacturing 
employment was also significant, averaging 15.4 per cent from 1975 to 1980 and 
dropping to 10.7 per cent in the 1980s. These figures underline the active and 
important role of foreign direct investment during Taiwan's development, particularly 
in the area of exports and employment.
At the same time, foreign direct investment also played a role in encouraging 
technology transfer from abroad. Unfortunately, there are only limited data on 
technology transfer available in the literature and statistical data, most of it based on 
individual surveys. Schive (1983) undertook a survey in Taiwan in 1973 and found 
that foreign direct investment had encouraged technology transfer, and that 
adaptation of the technology depended on foreign capital participation and the 
characteristics of the industry. He concludes that foreign firms played an important
 ^ There are five Export Processing Zones (EPZs), and three of them were set up during the 1960s
—  Kaohsiung in 1966, Nantze and Taichung in 1969.
6 The arrival figures of foreign capital can only be obtained from the balance-of-payment which is 
reserved by the Central Bank of ROC, hence, not only the manufacturing sector but the actual 
inflow of foreign capital are not available in the publications. An accurate ratio for 
manufacturing section is unobtainable. Schive (1979) had attempted to estimate the average 
contribution of foreign direct investment to capital formation in the manufacturing sector and 
found it around 6 per cent from 1952 to 1975, and up to 8.6 per cent in the early 1960s based on 
estimated arrivals.
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role in introducing new products and technologies in the automobile, electronics and 
plastics industries, but less significantly in the machinery and textile industries. 
Another survey, by Yen (1989), found that 57.4 per cent of the products produced by 
US firms in Taiwan were new products in the market, and nearly 60 per cent of them 
were copied after a lag of only five years. These findings indicate that foreign direct 
investment accelerates technology transfer.
Another benefit from foreign direct investment in Taiwan has been its effect 
on training. Scott (1979) pointed out that some of the products in export processing 
zones require a high degree of engineering and manual skills to produce. Hence, 
foreign firms not only have to train the operatives but also the managers and 
technicians, some of whom are also sent abroad to be trained. He also observed that 
American firms, in particular, prefer hiring Chinese managers and technicians because 
they are much cheaper and have no language problems in communication. The 
managers and technicians who are trained in this way earn higher salaries.
Furthermore, there is a certain turnover of personnel, who often subsequently 
work for local firms or establish their own business.7 The phenomenon of labour 
mobility is indeed rather common in Taiwan. The average separation rate of 
employees in the manufacturing sectors is around 3-4 per cent. Unfortunately, there 
are no available data to verify turnover rate between foreign firms and indigenous 
firms. Yen (1989) found that newly established foreign firms preferred to hire 
managers and technicians who had had experience in other foreign firms. This fact 
implies that there may be high mobility among foreign firms. Despite the paucity of 
data, mobility from foreign firms to local firms is often considered to be higher than 
among foreign firms. Assuming this is to be the case, labour turnover is an important 
channel for disseminating new technology and know-how in the Taiwanese economy.
According to the theory of human capital, human capital accumulation 
involves the whole range of formal schooling, post-school training and on-the-job 
training. In general, more investment in human capital increases productivity and 
thereby earnings, if wages are paid in accordance with productivity. The observed 
differentials in earnings among individuals are the result of differences in human 
capital acquisition. According to this theory, a worker in a foreign subsidiary has the 
opportunity to accumulate higher human capital because of intensive on-the-job 
training programs which are commonly underwritten by foreign subsidiaries. In this 
sense, labour turnover from foreign subsidiaries to local firms can accelerate the 
diffusion of knowledge and the growth of industry. An industrial level estimation of
7 Businessweek March 3 1986 (p. 63-70) reported that General Instrument Corp.’s Taiwan 
subsidiary competes with 11 companies founded by the former employees.
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the Mincer type (Mincer 1974) on wage profiles8 in the preliminary study provides 
evidence. The estimation shows that labour mobility is higher in industries with higher 
foreign capital participation in Taiwan, as indicated by the returns to experience being 
higher than the returns to tenure in industries with high foreign involvement.
There is also some transfer of technology as a result of foreign firms’ 
purchasing local materials through linkage to the local economy. The most common 
indicator for measuring the linkage effect is the behaviour of foreign firms in respect 
of local procurement. The average local procurement ratio in Taiwan remained rather 
steady during 1975-89, ranging from 50 per cent to 55 per cent. A study by Schive 
(1990) indicates that Taiwan Singer Co. provided a variety of services to supporting 
firms; for instance, opening up their tool room to parts suppliers to help them make 
tools and fixtures, and solving technical problems.
These studies all suggest the existence of spillovers from foreign direct 
investment into the Taiwanese economy. However, indigenous firms may also 
generate a similar contribution to the economy. The literature suggests that the 
impact of foreign direct investment on development would be minimal if foreign 
subsidiaries simply behaved in a similar way to indigenous firms. A comparison of the 
performance of foreign subsidiaries and local firms is therefore made in Chapter 4. If 
foreign subsidiaries are superior in their utilisation of scale economies, advanced 
technology, or marketing know-how, there is a gap and potential catch-up by 
domestic firms to foreign firms. The differences in performance between foreign and 
local firms are tested in Chapter 4.
If foreign subsidiaries do perform differently from local firms, then- 
contribution to the host economy may also be different. No systematic study has 
previously been attempted to assess this question for Taiwan. This study therefore 
attempts to provide evidence of the existence of spillovers by testing productivity 
efficiency among industries and firms.
Firstly, industrial level analysis is undertaken in Chapter 5. The hypotheses 
that spillovers raise the productivity of indigenous firms, and that the productive 
efficiency in an industry is a function of foreign capital participation, are examined. It 
is hypothesised that the higher the proportion of foreign capital in an industry, the 
higher productive efficiency will be. An index number approach is used to measure 
total factor productivity (TFP) across industries. A Spearman’s rank correlation is 
used to test the relationship between TFP and the inflow of foreign capital, following 
a decomposition of TFP into scale and foreign spillover effects to identify the sources 
of TFP growth. The second part of the empirical analysis tests for spillovers across
 ^ Mincer-type human capital earning functions assume that wages are a quadratic function of 
education and experience.
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firms in an industry. The firm-level analysis is presented in Chapter 6, comparing 
productivity differences over three periods in the same firm as a function of spillovers. 
The analysis is based on decomposition of TFP growth into scale, cost efficiency, 
technological progress and price effects.
The industrial level and firm-level productivity analyses provide evidence that 
the spillover effects from foreign direct investment are a source of the growth of total 
factor productivity, and thereby information helpful to policy makers in their attempts 
maximise national welfare by optimising resource allocation. Summaries of the major 
findings and their policy implications are included in Chapter 7. This chapter also 
suggests some directions for further work on the subject.
The thesis seeks to analyse a specific contribution of foreign direct investment 
— in the form of spillover effects— in a developing country. The interest is in two 
particular points: first, the strategic behaviour of foreign subsidiaries in the presence 
of spillover effects is analysed to determine the possibility that these effects lead to a 
shrinkage of the technological gap between foreign and domestic firms. Secondly, the 
effect that foreign direct investment may have on the improvement of productivity 
efficiency, the rate of technological progress, and technical efficiency in the host 
country is analysed. An attempt is made to ascertain whether variations in productive 
efficiency among local firms correlate to the presence of foreign subsidiaries in the 
economy. An attempt is also made to identify the mechanisms through which the 
spillovers from foreign direct investment are transmitted. Measures of total factor 
productivity are employed to represent productivity efficiency, and two approaches—  
the index number approach and the production frontier approach— are employed to 
measure the growth of total factor productivity. Throughout the thesis, the empirical 
evidence is drawn from data on the Taiwanese manufacturing sector.
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2 Analytical Framework
Traditional trade theory predicts that a country will enjoy comparative advantage in 
the export of goods which embody its relatively abundant factors of production and 
import goods embodying its relatively scarce factor of production, on the assumption 
that the same technology is available across countries. For instance, Ramaswami 
(1968) demonstrates that, in trade between two countries sharing the same 
technology, a country can gain more through monopsonistic imports of a relatively 
scarce factor than through monopolistic export of one that it has in relative 
abundance. This may explain why some developing countries strongly encourage the 
inflow of foreign capital, which is scarce in most of these countries. Yet some 
countries impose strict limitations and control over foreign capital inflow, as noted in 
Chapter 1. The Ramaswami model is recognised as far too simple to yield ‘real world’ 
answers.
Theories of foreign direct investment have tried to clarify its net impact on 
host countries. Tsai (1990) focuses on three of the models developed to study the 
costs and benefits of foreign capital inflow on a host country and to evaluate the 
impact of foreign direct investment; namely MacDougall's (1960) two-factor one- 
commodity partial equilibrium model, the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
general equilibrium model, and Caves' specific-factors model (1971). However, these 
models leave important questions unresolved.
These theories concentrate on evaluating the net effect of foreign investment 
without taking into account the learning effect and other externalities which 
indigenous firms may gain from the foreign subsidiaries. This may result in 
underestimation of the impact of foreign direct investment on the host country. The 
presence of such externalities may raise the welfare of the host country through the 
growth of local enterprises or the diversification of consumer choice. This may lead 
the foreign firms to make different decisions from those they would otherwise, 
especially when they face competition in the local market. The different managerial 
strategies of foreign firms may in turn affect the output and profit of local enterprises 
and the welfare of the host country if there are spillover effects.
In what follows, the implications of foreign direct investment for host 
countries in the presence of spillover effects will be examined and the various sources 
of spillovers as well as their potential impact on the host economy will be reviewed. 
In general, local markets can gain efficiency in production via the absorption of 
spillovers, thus improving economic performance. Investigation of the possibility that
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local firms can catch up with foreign firms in production technology and performance 
via the absorption of spillovers is of interest. The benefits of the inflow of foreign 
capital may lead the host government to introduce incentives to encourage inflow, but 
the threat of local firms’ catching up may affect the decision-making of foreign firms. 
Their response to the presence of spillovers is then examined. Firstly, the decision to 
export or undertake foreign direct investment is examined by incorporating the tariff 
protection of the host country and the presence of spillover effects. Secondly, the 
response to technology transfer in the presence of externalities is investigated. 
Assuming profit maximisation by the foreign subsidiary, is there any incentive for it to 
transfer better technology continually even in the face of spillover effects? Does the 
technology transfer benefit indigenous firms? And, does the transfer increase the 
welfare of the host country? In general, if the transfer is beneficial and the impact is 
positive, it is possible for policy makers to decide whether to encourage inflow or 
leave it to market forces to produce an optimal allocation of foreign direct investment 
among countries. For instance, a policy maker can enact preferential financial 
treatment for foreign investors to encourage capital inflow.
As a disseminator of information and technology, as a supplier of new or 
better quality products, and as a stimulator of competition and entrepreneurship, 
foreign direct investment can play a role in improving the economic performance and 
the competitiveness of local enterprises in the host country. Some may argue that 
information or technology transferred by foreign firms only leads to geographical 
diffusion without diffusion to local users, because ownership and control of the 
technology or information remain in the possession of the foreign subsidiaries. 
However, knowledge, to some extent, is a public good; there is no absolute way to 
limit its use to one firm or person once it has been dispersed. Hence, the host country 
can, in principle, gain indirect benefits through the diffusion of know-how via the 
presence of foreign firms. The spillover effects of foreign firms in host countries are 
commonly divided into two categories: the influence on the efficiency of host country 
competitors; and the influence on local suppliers and consumers— that is, linkage 
effects.
The contribution of spillovers to productive efficiency
The spillover effects of foreign direct investment on the efficiency of domestic firms 
have been studied by Caves (1974) for Australia, Globerman (1979) for Canada, 
Blomstrom (1989) for Mexico, and Haddad and Harrison (1993) for Morocco. Each 
hypothesise that spillovers should stimulate the productivity of rival firms by 
increasing competition, enhancing human capital formation, and speeding up 
technology transfer. More specifically, they postulate that if there is a positive
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Statistical relationship between the level of productivity of the domestically owned 
sector in an industry and the share of foreign subsidiaries in that sector, then foreign 
direct investment may be assumed to be a productivity-raising force. It is further 
suggested that, over time, the productivity of domestic and foreign firms would tend 
to converge. Labour productivity, or changes in labour productivity, is taken as the 
variable to be explained in most of these studies. The productivity variable is then 
regressed on a number of explanatory variables which might influence it, including the 
presence of foreign firms: capital intensity, labour quality, degree of concentration in 
the industry, and the extent of scale economies. The relationship between the 
presence of foreign firms in a particular industry and the labour productivity of that 
industry is weakly established in the Australian and Canadian studies, but is stronger 
in the Mexican case.
Blomstrom and Wolff (1989) also find notable productivity spillovers within 
industries. They find strong evidence that foreign firms acted as a catalyst to 
productivity growth in Mexico’s manufacturing sector and that foreign direct 
investment speeded up the productivity convergence process between Mexico and the 
United States.
There are four channels by which the entry of foreign firms affects their local 
competitors. First is the increased competition in the local market; second is the 
enhancement of human capital (via more or better training of labour and management, 
or through recruitment of such resources from foreign-owned subsidiaries); third is 
the speeding up of technology transfer; and fourth is the linkage to the domestic 
economy via their purchasing or sales strategies.
Increased competition
The first potential effect is on competition in the host market. Probably the most 
widely acknowledged externality of foreign direct investment on a host country’s 
industry is its impact on the competitive position and performance of individual rival 
firms. In general, the influence of a new entrant on the producers in a particular 
industrial sector will depend on the existing characteristics of that sector, namely:
(i) the number and size of firms;
(ii) the composition of their output and market;
(iii) their innovatory capacity;
(iv) their existing and potential economic performance, that is profitability, 
productivity, and market share;
(v) their entrepreneurial ethos;
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(vi) the market prospects for the industry and whether or not existing firms are 
operating at surplus capacity; and
(vii) the extent to which the industry is protected from competition by import 
restrictions and subsidies.
The market competition is thus determined by these factors. However, the 
entry of foreign direct investment may increase this competition since they are more 
efficient than local firms. Their entry may induce those marginal inefficient firms to 
exit or force local firms to adopt more efficient ways in production. Their impact on 
market competition depends on the nature and extent of the ownership advantage of 
foreign firms. The greater the ownership advantages of foreign firms which can be 
effectively transferred or developed in a foreign location, the greater the potential 
impact on competitors. Aside from this, the form of entry may also affect its influence 
on the host market. The acquisition of local enterprises in a technologically advanced 
and fast-growing sector is likely to have a very different competitive impact on other 
firms in that sector than the setting-up of a completely new venture, or the purchase 
of a small firm in a traditional and declining sector. Also, the choice of joint venture 
or wholly-owned investment is likely to have a different effect on market competition.
From the perspective of local enterprises, it will be important to improve 
performance in the face of foreign firms’ competition by strengthening their 
innovatory capacity, productivity, marketing and so forth. Their ability to respond to 
competition depends on their capacity either to create or acquire competitive 
advantage similar to that of the foreign firms. However, in developing countries, 
domestic firms may be technically far behind foreign producers, and often they cannot 
hope to respond positively to the challenges of competition. Under these 
circumstances, local enterprises can put effort into making cooperative or technical 
service agreements with foreign competitors. In some cases, a patent may inhibit a 
local firm from producing an identical product to a foreign competitor. Yet, by 
reverse engineering and knowledge derived from R&D, an indigenous firm can try to 
develop substitutes or break into entirely different segments of the market. Domestic 
firms may also try to obtain some help from their own government to reduce costs of 
production or transactions via negotiation. The third option for local firms is to exit 
from the market. In all cases, the entry of foreign direct investment will either force 
existing inefficient indigenous firms to improve their productivity or drive them out, 
freeing the resources they had controlled to more productive companies.
The pressure of competition makes local firms modify and improve the 
product range or productive response, and introduce new marketing and distribution 
methods to reduce transaction costs. It appears that a most significant positive
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influence of foreign direct investment is the increase of competition in the domestic 
market.
Several studies provide empirical evidence of the impact of foreign investors 
on their competitors. Dunning (1958, 1992) found that the entry of foreign direct 
investment squeezed out many competitors and potential competitors in UK 
semiconductor and auto industries, as well as in the colour television industry in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Meanwhile, local enterprises enjoyed 
improvement in product quality, diversification of the range of products and a boost 
to research and development (R&D) expenditure, as well as the upgrading of 
managerial and marketing techniques. His studies conclude that foreign direct 
investment has acted as a stimulus to efficiency in host countries. He also concludes 
that the most beneficial aspects of foreign direct investment have occurred in those 
countries and sectors where the existing or potential innovatory and production 
capacity of the indigenous firms is the strongest.
A number of studies confirm the negative relationship between the entry of 
foreign subsidiaries and market concentration in the host economy (for instance, 
Dunning (1974) and Knickerbocker (1978)). Some econometric analyses also confirm 
this negative relationship in the presence of foreign direct investment (Caves (1974); 
Globerman (1979); Blomstrom (1989)). Thus it is possible to conclude that foreign 
direct investment tends to reduce the level of concentration and to increase 
competition in host country industries.
Training and recruitment
The second source of spillover to a host country is the training of labour and 
management which takes place in the foreign firms and then becomes available to the 
economy in general when trained workers change jobs. A worker who is trained in a 
foreign subsidiary may find it advantageous to exploit the human capital thus acquired 
by moving to a domestic firm or by becoming an entrepreneur. According to the 
theory of externalities, when a firm recruits trained workers, it usually will not pay the 
full costs of their training, particularly the cost of general training. However, the 
movement of labour from foreign firms to domestic firms brings both new skills 
(specific training) and experience (general training) which will increase the efficiency 
of the hiring firms. Moreover, a foreign firm has the privilege of accessing human 
resources throughout its global networks, and so the presence of a foreign subsidiary 
brings some of these advantages to local firms by offering a pool of differently trained 
and experienced labour through the external market.
The available evidence on spillovers from the training of employees by foreign 
firms comes mainly from developing countries where the stock of accumulated human
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capital in productive knowledge is relatively scarce, basically because of lesser R&D 
expenditure. Gershenberg (1987), using survey data on Kenya, found that joint 
venture firms made a significant contribution to the training of local management and 
the dissemination of managerial know-how throughout the society. Blomstrom (1989) 
finds that many managerial personnel in locally owned Mexican firms had started their 
careers in a multinational company. This led to a substantial improvement in the 
management practices within Mexican firms. Schive (1990) also finds that Taiwan 
Singer conducted numerous training programs, including the study of heat treatment, 
the inspection of finished products, the use of measurement instruments, and the 
introduction of new concepts and techniques of factory management. The efforts of 
Singer led Taiwan’s sewing machine industry to outstrip Japan’s within a short 
period, the training program being one of the major contributions to this success. 
Schive also finds that Singer transfers management technology through assistance to 
its local suppliers. This influence is also confirmed in other studies by Behrman and 
Wallender (1976), Lall (1979) and others. Yen (1989) finds that newly established 
domestic firms tended to recruit managers and technicians who had worked for 
foreign firms in Taiwan. This mobility strengthened over time. His conclusion is that 
labour mobility, especially from American foreign subsidiaries, enhanced technology 
transfer into Taiwan’s manufacturing sector.
The training spillover effect in developed countries may be less significant 
than that in developing countries, yet, as illustrated by Lorenz (1982) using the micro­
electronics industry in the United States as a case study, the diffusion of technology is 
greatly enhanced if there is a high mobility of engineering, scientific and managerial 
personnel.
Accelerated technology transfer
The third possible source of spillover from foreign direct investment is that foreign 
firms may speed up the transfer of technology. As noted in Chapter 1, technology 
transfer through foreign direct investment is absorbed relatively easily and reduces 
cost. The entry of foreign firms may also improve the productive efficiency of 
domestic firms and narrow the technological gap. The threat of catching up by host 
country firms accelerate the rate at which foreign subsidiaries import new technology. 
On the other hand, developing countries, with limited indigenous resources for 
research and development, are particularly dependent on foreign firms for accessing 
modem technology. It is also likely that the magnitude of spillover varies with the 
flows of technology to the foreign subsidiaries in the host country— the more 
technology that is available, the larger the spillover potential.
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Several studies stress this type of spillover effect. Mansfield et al. (1982), in a 
detailed study of technology exports by US firms, finds that the introduction of 
technology abroad speeds up the appearance of competing products or processes by 
at least 2.5 years in about one-third of their survey. Moreover, their study of British 
firms finds that over half of the American subsidiaries in the United Kingdom believed 
that at least some of their products or processes had been introduced to the recipient 
market more quickly than otherwise they could have been. Yen’s study (1989) finds 
that over half of American subsidiaries in the Taiwan manufacturing sector introduced 
new products to the market, especially in the fast-growing chemical and electronic 
industries.
Linkage effects
Apart from these three possible sources of spillover, there is another: the impact on 
local suppliers and customers or the linkage effect. There are two types of linkages: 
backward linkages, extending back from the purchases made by a firm; and forward 
linkages, extending through the inputs that it supplies to other processes and 
activities.
Backward linkages
The extent to which foreign subsidiaries may affect the economic welfare of suppliers 
of their raw materials and intermediate products depends on the quality of the goods 
and services they buy from them, the influence they exert on the terms of 
procurement and the impact they have on the technological capability and managerial 
initiative. The first two rest on decisions about the local content of each of the 
products produced by foreign subsidiaries. The lower the proportion of local content, 
the more dependent the firm will be on the open market for its purchases. Foreign 
firms’ strategies on local purchase depend on:
(i) whether products are intended for the local or the world market. If they are 
mainly oriented to the domestic market, they tend to have a higher proportion 
of local content in order to satisfy the specifications and tastes of local users.
(ii) whether activities are coordinated with those of the organisation of which it is a 
part. This decision often rests on comparative transaction costs between 
internalising or purchasing in external market. The costs of engaging in external 
transactions include many of the costs of market failure, such as the search 
costs for potential suppliers, the costs of negotiating with the chosen suppliers 
and conditions of supply, and a variety of costs associated with buyer 
uncertainty. However, the decision sometimes depends on the degree of foreign
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ownership in the subsidiary. Foreign subsidiaries with a higher proportion of 
foreign ownership tend to link to their parent firms more closely than otherwise. 
Because it is easier for them to access information and knowledge within their 
global network, they are commonly vertically integrated with their parent firms.
(iii) the stage of development of the host country. In some developing countries, 
foreign subsidiaries may have to engage in more manufacturing operations than 
they would normally wish, simply because of the lack of a domestic supplier 
capability or inadequate safeguards against the adverse effect of market failure.
(iv) government policy, which may also affect the sourcing decision. The main 
instrument used by governments to assist local suppliers is restrictions on 
imports of competitive components and raw materials for foreign subsidiaries or 
local content requirements.
Aside from these, the age and experience of foreign subsidiaries may also 
affect procurement decisions. Most foreign direct investment begins with newly 
established subsidiaries undertaking simple finishing operations and importing most of 
their intermediate products. Gradually, as and when domestic technological and 
productive capacity and the prices of indigenous intermediate products become more 
competitive, the ratio of local content will increase.
The impact of foreign firms on the quality of their purchases and the efficiency 
with which they are provided also creates linkages to the domestic economy.
The literature identifies seven main types of linkages which purchasers may 
form with their suppliers:
(i) information linkages: including exchanges of information on market
characteristics and trends, on future investment intentions, and on foreign 
suppliers of machinery, parts, materials, components and so on.
(ii) technical assistance: including help given or received on such matters as 
innovation and product design, proprietary product specifications, development 
processes, factory layout, tooling, quality control, labour training, inventory 
management, machine maintenance, inspection and testing procedures, 
provision of used machinery and specialised tools and equipment.
(iii) financial assistance: including loans, pre-financing of machinery and tools, and 
special price agreements and financial help to local suppliers in visiting 
companies in the home country of the parent company.
(iv) procurement assistance: embracing help in obtaining capital equipment, raw 
materials, and other intermediate products at competitive prices.
(v) location: giving advice on the siting of a new plant or an existing establishment.
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(vi) managerial and organisational assistance: giving assistance on a range of 
financial, accounting and general managerial control procedures, and also giving 
technical advice about the costing of products.
(vii) other assistance: helping to obtain market share in the open market, including 
the export market, advice on diversification strategies, dealing with foreign 
suppliers, and so on.
Foreign firms may only provide those linkage benefits which are to their own 
advantage. In order to maximise their own profits, foreign firms may assist domestic 
suppliers to upgrade intermediate inputs and improve productive efficiency and 
profitability, particularly in developing countries where supporting industries are 
underdeveloped. Numerous studies provide empirical evidence on this type of linkage 
effect. Brash (1966) examines the impact of General Motors in Australia on its local 
suppliers, through its insistence that they meet standards of quality control. Lim and 
Pang (1977) survey the electronics industry in Singapore and find that foreign firms 
are willing to assist in the establishment of local supplier firms, providing technical 
assistance, financial aid, managerial advice, and market information. Schive (1990) 
also finds similar linkages from foreign firms in Taiwan’s sewing machine industry. 
Reuber (1973), Cohen (1975), Lall (1979), Kumar (1989), and others also provide 
empirical evidence on this spillover effect. However, systematic analyses of the effects 
of foreign participation on industries outside their own are lacking; more research is 
needed to draw any strong conclusion about these effects.
Forward linkage
Some of the reasons for forward linkages are similar to those for backward linkage, 
although the nature of the costs and benefits of internalised and external transactions 
may be different The most commonly discussed forward linkage is the linkage 
established with buyers of technically complicated products. Foreign subsidiaries may 
advise their customers on how to use and maintain machinery and equipment to help 
them make the best use of their products. The subsidiaries may also provide 
information and offer functional guidance about the technical characteristics and 
usage of the products being sold and the servicing requirements.
Dunning (1958) gives examples of the way in which US firms helped their 
customers make the best use of their products. Schive (1990) also finds evidence of 
the same strategy. Blomstrom (1991) concludes that this kind of spillover might 
become more important in the future. Because newly developed technologies are 
generally knowledge- and research-intensive, small countries may have to accept a 
certain degree of dependence on the technology of multinationals. It is more
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important for small countries to have the capability to use advanced technologies than 
to produce them.
Strategic responses in the presence of spillovers
If host countries gain spillover benefits from foreign direct investment, the question is 
whether they should adopt policies to maximise these benefits. In the 1960s and 
1970s, many developing countries introduced various performance requirements or 
tried to frame an environment within which foreign subsidiaries would operate. These 
policies commonly paid special attention to encouraging foreign firms to foster 
technology transfer. This often took the form of requirements for local content. In the 
short run, these requirements may have some merit in protecting local production, but 
they may sometimes force foreign subsidiaries to buy products that are not economic 
and this increases the costs of production, especially where domestic firms are 
protected from external competition. The pressure on firms to use local products 
might impede the upgrading of quality standards and the innovation of more efficient 
production methods. Nonetheless, the economic rationale for such policies was clear.
On the other hand, with increasing technical competence and greater 
experience, local suppliers eventually become competitive with their foreign rivals, 
especially when foreign subsidiaries spill over benefits to the external market. It may 
be better if government policies focused on improving market conditions rather than 
on administrative controls and direct technology transfer requirements. Blomstrom 
and Wang (1989) conclude that, if host countries want to encourage foreign firms to 
transfer technology, they should concentrate on supporting indigenous firms to learn 
from foreigners, rather than stipulating performance requirements for the foreign 
subsidiaries. Blomstrom et al. (1992) examine technology imports by American 
subsidiaries in 33 foreign countries and find that imports are positively correlated with 
the income level of the host country and competitive pressure in the host country, 
while negatively correlated with the level of distortions and various host country 
performance requirements. This negative impact of performance requirements on 
foreign firms’ technology transfer activities is also confirmed by McFetridge (1987).
For host governments, these studies imply that policies to maximise inflows of 
technology and to foster spillovers should rely on creating a more competitive market 
environment. They may also mean putting effort into increasing domestic 
technological capability, such as through subsidies to education and training. Local
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firms may obtain dual benefits from these alternative policies.1 First, the foreign firm 
is forced to upgrade its production processes and import new technology in order to 
adapt to the competition in the host market, in pace with competitors’ productivity 
improvement. Second, the continuous inflow of technology increases the spillover 
potential, while the support to local firms increases the likelihood of actual spillovers.
Spillover effects improve the productive efficiency of host country 
competitors; however, such externalities may threaten the performance of foreign 
subsidiaries and affect their strategic technology transfer choices. The form of the 
‘catching-up’ threat and the response of foreign firms is a critical issue. It is 
commonly acknowledged that technology is a key determinant of economic growth 
and international competitiveness as well as trade performance, and foreign direct 
investment has become the most important actor in the generation, application and 
international transfer of technology. In addition, technology transfer via foreign 
subsidiaries produces spillover effects through the learning processes of indigenous 
firms. In reality, the transfer of new technology is generally at the discretion of 
foreign firms, especially when they have to face the cost imposed by the ‘leaming- 
from-watching’ of the indigenous firms. Such leakages sometimes become a threat to 
the foreign firms, as they spawn their own competition by creating a local pool of 
managers and skilled technicians. Watanabe (1980) investigates the Hong Kong 
electronics industry and finds that local engineers who worked in the US subsidiaries 
which assembled parts and components imported from the United States learned 
assembly line techniques. Many of them then started their own small firms, later 
competing with the American subsidiary. The same situation occurred in Taiwan’s 
electronics industry during the rapid growth era.
The catching up of indigenous firms
There is one theoretical model which can be employed to explain whether foreign 
firms face threat from domestic firms via continuous technology transfer— the North- 
South model. Ownership advantages allow foreign subsidiaries to accumulate higher 
human capital, either technology or management, and their products embody higher 
level techniques and quality than the products of domestic firms. By adopting new 
technology or by leaming-by-watching, indigenous firms have the chance to enhance 
their techniques and quality. This transmission process is similar to that described in 
the North-South model. Utilising this model exposes the possibility of the indigenous 
firms’ catching up to foreign firms in the presence of technology transfer.
1 Blomstrom (1991) indicates that there is possibly a ‘virtuous circle’ of productivity and 
technology growth in host countries, in contrast to the ‘vicious circle’ that happens when foreign 
firms are allowed to operate without any competition.
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The North-South model was developed by Krugman (1979), and extended by 
Dollar (1986) and others, and is basically a model of Vernon’s (1966) product cycle 
theory. In this approach, new products are generally assumed to be introduced 
continuously and produced in the North. With some time lag, the South— the less 
developed region— acquires some of the knowledge and begins to produce the 
products which were formerly produced only in the North. The North produces only 
‘new’ goods and the South produces only ‘old’ products. Complete specialisation in 
production is assumed in this approach,2 and the relative wage rate determines the 
products to be produced in each region. Higher per capita income in the North 
depends in part on the rents from their monopoly of newly developed products.
The implications of this model are relevant to the present study. Foreign 
subsidiaries may be considered as the ‘North’, with new technology being 
continuously transferred from parent firms to maintain competitive advantage in a 
host economy. The products produced by foreign subsidiaries are usually new to the 
host market. Meanwhile, indigenous firms— like the ‘South’— learn the production 
techniques after some ‘imitation lag’ and their products are ‘old’ compared with those 
of the foreign subsidiaries.
Krugman’s model assumes there is only one factor input,3 that is labour, and 
the only source of wage differential between regions is the ‘special ability’ of the 
North.4 The perfect competitive market assumption implies that relative wage rates 
are equal to the prices of goods produced in both regions. Meanwhile, the relative 
demand for goods in the North and South, which depends on the relative prices of 
these goods, is derived from a utility function.5 In addition, the demand for labour is 
equal to total output (total demand) for each of the goods times the number of each 
type of good. Hence relative wages can be expressed as a function of relative labour 
forces and the ratio of new to old goods in the world market. This implies that either 
region can improve its terms of trade by extending the range of goods that it 
produces. An increase in innovation will raise wages in the North, while an increase in 
technology transfer will raise wage rates in the South because of an increase in the 
number of goods produced.
2 This condition implies that the wage rate is equalised in both regions, otherwise it is a 
disadvantage for the North to produce old products because of its relative higher wage rate.
3 The model also assumes that the cost function is the same for all goods and that there is no 
labour productivity differential between regions.
4 Special ability implies an advantage for developed countries in producing new products, which 
Vernon and others suggest includes a more skilled labour force, external economies, and a simple 
difference in ‘social atmosphere’. These special abilities enable the North to gain the monopoly 
rent in its products and are reflected in the higher wage rate.
5 This assumes that all individuals in the North and South have the same utility function. This 
assumption is more convenient in this study because the individual is located within one country.
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The stock of new and old products is determined over time by two processes 
of technological change— innovation and technology transfer. Innovation is the 
process by which new products are created; technology transfer is the process by 
which new products are transformed into old products. Both of these are assumed to 
be taking place continually in the model. Because of these two processes, the world 
economy tends towards a moving equilibrium where relative wages are constant, with 
a fixed differential in favour of the developed country. However, this wage differential 
is an increasing function of the rate of innovation and a decreasing function of the rate 
of technology transfer. Beyond the steady state, the model also predicts that a higher 
rate of innovation benefits the developed countries, while the most striking conclusion 
is that technology transfer can actually make the developed country worse off. This 
model concludes that the monopoly of the developed countries is continually eroded 
by the higher relative rate of technology transfer but can be maintained by 
accelerating innovation.
On the other hand, it is widely acknowledged that there is a wage differential 
between foreign subsidiaries and local firms because workers in foreign firms own 
higher accumulated human capital through training programs. Therefore, continual 
technology transfer from parent firms ensures the differential of wage rates between 
foreign subsidiaries and domestic firms. However, the introduction of new technology 
and the mobility of skilled workers from foreign subsidiaries enhances the learning 
capability of domestic firms, which leads to a shrinkage of the wage differential. As a 
result, according to this model, local firms may have an opportunity to catch up with 
foreign firms if technology transfer from parent firms slows down or if domestic firms 
increase their technology capability. An application of this model obviously provides 
insight into the relationship between foreign subsidiaries and indigenous firms. 
Foreign subsidiaries have to adopt new technology continually from their parent firms 
in order to maintain their leadership in the host market when there are spillover 
effects.
The differences between foreign subsidiaries and local firms in technology, 
wages, profitability and other strategies will be tested in Chapter 4. Under this model, 
if foreign subsidiaries enjoy performance superiority, there would be a catching-up 
process indicated by higher productivity growth of local firms.
If foreign subsidiaries face a potential catching-up threat from domestic firms 
with or without these externalities, then how does the host government react to 
attract the inflow of foreign capital and enlarge such externalities? How do foreign 
firms react when they face spillovers: export or internalise? Is there incentive for them 
to transfer technology continually? The latter two questions refer to the cost-benefit
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evaluation of strategies that foreign firms may make, while the reaction of host 
governments is based on consideration of the welfare of the whole economy.
The response of foreign firms
Exports versus foreign direct investment
Since spillover effects have the potential to shrink the technology gap between 
foreign subsidiaries and indigenous firms, the host government tends to initiate 
favourable policies to attract the inflow of foreign capital. The major tools that host 
governments have commonly used are tariff policy, tax policies and other financial 
treatments. Tax deductions, tax holidays and preferential interest rates have been 
widely implemented in developing countries. In general, the contents of these policies 
are roughly the same across countries. From the viewpoint of foreign firms, it is hard 
to discriminate between one country and another in deciding on location. In this 
sense, tariff policy may be a major concern for foreign firms, since particularly high 
tariff rates have commonly been levied in the early development stage of developing 
countries. But tariff and other trade barriers are likely to decrease with the growth of 
a country, because a growing economy requires increasing interdependence with 
outside world. Increased openness flows from two factors: one is pressure from 
international organisations, mainly the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade); the other is internal pressure from the offset of high tariffs in distorting the 
resource allocation and reducing national welfare. Nowadays, tariff barriers have 
become less and less important in foreign firms’ location decisions, but compared 
with other instruments, tariff policy is still a potential tool for influencing foreign 
firms’ strategic behaviour. Cost considerations determine the site of overseas 
production; however, if domestic firms benefit from spillover effects and catching-up, 
how are foreign firms’ decisions affected? The trade-off between cost reduction and 
the threat of catching-up is a critical issue for foreign firms.
In general, tariffs affect foreign firms’ investment decisions in two ways: via 
direct and indirect effects. An industry protected by tariffs makes larger profits or 
potential profits, so this policy can lead to a movement of capital and labour into this 
industry— either via domestic or foreign factors. Furthermore, tariffs may induce 
‘defensive investment’, because foreign firms may seek to restore their export market 
and profits which were shrunk as a result of host markets being protected by tariff 
barriers. Furthermore, foreign firms may also wish to utilise their production 
techniques, distribution channels, goodwill and other know-how, and so they tend to 
invest in the same industry in which they operate in their home countries.
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Aside from these direct effects, there are some indirect effects which work to 
counteract the favourable direct effect. For instance, a tariff may encourage one 
industry but discourage other industries which are located downstream or upstream of 
the protected industry. A tariff is like an export tax on these industries and will lead to 
a reduction of foreign capital inflow into them. In addition, when the host country 
reaches full employment, the protected industry squeezes other industries as factors 
crowd into this industry and distort factor prices. The distortions increase costs and 
make industries less profitable, discouraging foreign capital inflow.
Taking into account both direct and indirect effects, the tariff effect in 
attracting foreign capital inflow is ambiguous. Nevertheless, according to the pure 
theory of international trade, if capital is homogeneous and mobile among industries, 
general protection through import tariffs will induce foreign capital inflow when the 
imported products are on the whole the capital-intensive goods, because tariffs raise 
the rate of return on capital. The simple Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes no ‘factor 
reversals’, so a country is likely to import goods which are intensive in the country’s 
relatively scarce factor. If capital-intensive products are imported, then presumably 
the scarce factor is capital. A net capital importer will import capital-intensive 
products. This suggests that tariffs may indeed induce foreign capital inflow.
Many empirical studies have found that foreign firms believe that it is more 
profitable to establish or expand subsidiaries behind tariff barriers than to export. 
Wilkins (1974) observes that many US enterprises withdrew their overseas 
investments due to domestic depression in the 1930s, but some were compelled to 
expand their production abroad because higher tariffs were imposed by host 
governments. The high tariffs forced firms to undertake direct investment to supply 
foreign markets behind the customs walls that once were the export markets.
Similar evidence has been provided by other studies. The survey by Toyo 
Keizei (1985, 1992) of Japanese enterprises’ foreign investment activities also reports 
that high protection of the domestic market was one of the major motivations for 
Japanese firms undertaking investment abroad. Brash (1966) also reports that 
bypassing tariff barriers was an important motive for American companies in setting 
up subsidiaries in Australia. Saham’s (1980) survey of British firms established in 
Malaysia in the 1960s finds that overcoming tariff barriers stands out as the most 
important motivating factor in deciding on international production. Nevertheless, 
Chen and Wang (1990), surveying Taiwan’s electronics firms in Southeast Asia, find 
that trade barriers are one element but not a major one in motivating investments.
The influence of tariff structure on the location decisions of foreign direct 
investment is also confirmed in empirical studies. Horst (1971, 1972) tests the data of
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Canadian two-digit manufacturing industries in 1963 and finds that Canadian tariff 
policy has had a definite impact on the choice between exporting and Canadian 
subsidiary production. The higher the Canadian tariff, the smaller the share of US 
exports and the larger the share of Canadian subsidiary production in total US sales to 
the Canadian market. Reuber (1973) finds that a substantial proportion of foreign 
investors benefited from tariffs on their outputs. Other studies (Streeten (1962); 
Balassa (1965); Schmitz and Bieri (1972)) also support the hypothesis that foreign 
direct investment can be induced through high tariffs.
In theoretical analysis, the tariff rate is commonly modelled as an exogenous 
given in examining the optimal behaviour of foreign direct investment. For instance, 
Horst (1971, 1972) explores the profit-maximising strategy of foreign firms selling in 
two national markets. He finds that the choice of producing and selling in each 
country depends on the barriers to trade and the differentials between the two 
countries in the real costs of production. Rugman (1980) and Smith (1987) also take 
the tariff rate as an exogenous variable in their studies. Brander and Spencer (1987) 
extend Horst’s study by treating the tariff as an endogenous variable, assuming 
unemployment in the host country. The host government, which needs to maximise 
national welfare, is therefore influenced by the employment consequences of tax and 
tariff policy. They find that a higher tariff on imports rather than taxes on local 
production leads to foreign direct investment if there is unemployment in the local 
market. These studies show that tariff structures appear to be a major influence on 
foreign firms’ investment decisions. However, these studies take no account of the 
response by domestic firms.
In contrast to these studies, Liu (1991) incorporates spillover effects to 
examine the strategic response of foreign firms and the optimal choice of the host 
government in tariff policy. In the beginning, he assumes that the foreign firm has to 
pay the same tax rate6 as domestic firms when a subsidiary is established. The 
subsidiary will disseminate the externalities to the domestic market which can be 
acquired without cost by leaming-by-watching. On the other hand, the foreign firm 
has to pay a tariff when it exports to the host country and the tariff rates are designed 
to maximise the interests of the host government. The welfare function of the host 
government is measured by the sum of consumer surplus, domestic firms’ profits and 
the revenue received by the government.
In this game theoretic model, the foreign firm possesses better production 
technology and has the option to export or to establish a subsidiary in each period.
6 The tax rate is an exogenous variable in his model, which cannot be adjusted systematically due 
to administrative difficulty in changing policy or the existence of precommitment.
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The host government first declares the tariff level in each period and, in each stage, 
each player will act in its best interests given previous decisions and future 
expectations. The spillover that the domestic firms acquire is assumed to be positively 
correlated with the subsidiary’s output in the previous period. That means the more 
the foreign subsidiary’s output in the previous period, the larger the spillover effects 
in relation to domestic firms in the current period. The model also assumes decreasing 
returns on the leaming-by-watching effect, that is, spillovers are a decreasing function 
to the accumulated learning opportunities. An increase in the spillover effects would 
increase the domestic firm’s output in the second period and narrow the technological 
gap between it and the foreign subsidiary, thereby reducing the output of the 
subsidiary in the second period.
The model concludes that the foreign firm will invest directly when the tariff is 
higher than the tax rate. The foreign firm may establish a subsidiary to overcome a 
high tariff. However, the establishment of a subsidiary is at the expense of losing 
relative cost advantage, and reducing the subsidiary's profit. In addition, due to the 
leakage of spillovers, the exposure of the foreign technology to domestic firms will 
reduce the subsidiary’s cost advantage and profits. When there is strong learning 
ability among domestic firms, the minimum tariff required to induce foreign direct 
investment is higher than that without the learning effect. For the host government, 
the larger the learning effect, the higher the tariff needed to attract foreign investment. 
On the other hand, the larger the spillovers, the lower the output level of the foreign 
subsidiary. The effect of a decrease in the output of the subsidiary on tax revenue and 
consumer surplus, to some extent, will not compensate for the domestic firms’ gain 
from learning. Under these circumstances, a high tariff rate may encourage foreign 
firms to export instead of undertaking direct investment, if there are strong spillover 
effects.
This result, which suggests that tariff policy is not certain to attract foreign 
direct investment when there are strong learning effects by domestic firms, appears 
different from the traditional analysis of trade protection and investment theory— a 
static analysis which takes no account of the existence of spillover effects and 
concludes that a tariff is a motivation for foreign direct investment. By referring this 
analysis to other preferential policies on foreign direct investment, the protection and 
incentive policies may not be as effective as expected in attracting foreign capital 
inflow, and an alternative policy is preferable. Taiwan’s case is an example. The 
transformation of Taiwan government’s attitude towards foreign direct investment 
and its effectiveness in attracting foreign capital inflow are discussed in the next 
chapter.
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The response of foreign firms on technology transfer
After deciding to invest overseas, foreign firms’ major concern in respect of 
technology transfer will be in response to strong learning ability in the host economy. 
Under the assumption of a fixed stock of technology, foreign subsidiaries may lose 
their technological edge in the presence of spillover effects, and so may be cautious in 
making their investment decisions. Where a foreign firm has undertaken investment 
and established a subsidiary, the best response to offset the erosion of its advantage in 
production is to try to transfer technologies continually in order to increase the stock 
of technology in subsidiaries, as per the North-South model. For foreign firms, this 
strategic response should be able to compensate for losses— otherwise there is no 
incentive to keep transferring technology. Two studies are relevant here: one is Das’ 
(1987) study on the optimal behaviour of a foreign subsidiary in a host country when 
there is indigenous firm learning ability; the other is the study by Blomstrom and 
Wang (1989) in which they emphasise the importance of this learning effort in 
increasing the rate of technology transfer from parent firms to subsidiaries.
The Das study simulates the strategic behaviour of foreign firms in the 
presence of spillovers. Following his assumption, market structure incorporates 
dominant firms (the foreign subsidiaries) with a competitive fringe (the indigenous 
firms). Because of their foreignness and their superiority to the indigenous firms, the 
foreign subsidiaries have a strong incentive to coordinate their actions to maximise 
their profits. The assumption is that foreign subsidiaries form a cartel with collusive 
price leadership,7 (although this is a strong and debatable assumption), because cartel 
theory indicates that, to persist and raise prices, a cartel must
(i) be able to detect and prevent cheating by members;
(ii) have a substantial share of resources; and
(iii) face a relatively inelastic supply response from non-members— low substitutes 
for the products and inelastic secondary market supplies.
In reality, all of these conditions are not easily met among a group of foreign 
subsidiaries. However, it is convenient to use this general analysis to highlight the 
special character of foreign subsidiaries and their relationship with local firms in host 
country markets.
The character of foreign subsidiaries makes them able to play the dominant 
role in the host market. Industrial organisation theory indicates that a firm or a group
7 It is possible for an industry to have a price leadership role in markets without a single large 
firm. Markham (1951) describes three types of price leadership: (1) dominant-firm price 
leadership; (2) collusive price leadership; and (3) barometric price leadership. It is the second 
type that is discussed here. Barometric price leadership occurs when one (typically large) firm is 
thought by other firms to have superior information, so they attempt to duplicate its behaviour.
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of firms with a large share of the market, and which can affect market price by 
varying output, is called a dominant firm, whereas the competitive fringe consists of 
many smaller firms, each with a trivial share of the market. There are several reasons 
why some firms gain substantial market power, while others do not:
(i) a dominant firm may have lower production costs than fringe firms, because it is 
more efficient than its rivals, it has better management or better technology, it 
owns the experience in leaming-by-doing, or its production has economies of 
scale.
(ii) a dominant firm may have a superior product in a market where each firm 
produces a differentiated product. This superiority may be achieved through 
advertising or through goodwill generated by its having been in the market 
longer. This factor can be distinguished more in investment in developed 
countries; it is of minor importance in the case of investment in developing 
countries.
(iii) a group of firms may collectively act as a dominant firm. Firms have the 
incentive to coordinate their production and pricing activities in order to 
increase their collective and individual profits by restricting market output and 
raising the market price.
It has been stressed that foreign subsidiaries own firm-specific advantages in 
production, technology and management, and there is no doubt that they can produce 
at lower costs. Kumar (1989) and others find that foreign subsidiaries have higher 
advertising expenditure, providing evidence that they often achieve a higher brand 
reputation in a product differentiated market. However, identical products are 
assumed by Das (1987) to emphasise the cost-saving technology transferred by the 
foreign firms.
The Das model provides a well known and neat model of the response of 
foreign firms to technology transfer to the host market in the presence of spillover 
effects, and discusses its potential impact on the domestic firms and host country 
welfare, it is worth examining the model in detail.
According to the price leadership theory, the dominant firm sets the market 
price and is followed by fringe firms. Fringe firms are price takers in the market. They 
can sell as much as they want at the going market price but they cannot affect the 
price through their actions. The following assumptions are made in the model:
(i) a quadratic cost function is used;
(ii) the spillover is costless to indigenous firms;
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(iii) the cost to indigenous firms is inversely related to the spillover which can 
increase the efficiency of production;
(iv) the rate of efficiency growth in indigenous firms is positively related to the 
output level of the foreign subsidiary; and
(v) there is no exit or entry of firms.
Das first derives the aggregate supply of domestic firms in the market from 
the defined cost function which satisfies assumptions (i) and (iii). That is,
Q,=nbP + n ( A - A )  (1)
where Qt is the total output of the competitive fringe, n is the total number of firms 
in the fringe, P is the price, b is the slope of supply curve, A is the upper boundary 
on A required to guarantee positive cost for all levels of output, and A represents the 
efficiency of the indigenous firms. According to assumption (iv), the change in 
efficiency of the indigenous firms in any period, A,  is directly related to the amount of
output of the foreign subsidiary during that period. Das defined A to be linear in 
output of the foreign subsidiary Qf , ie. a constant ratio ( a ) to Qf . Hence,
A = a Qf , a  > 0 (2)
The residual demand faced by the foreign subsidiary is derived by subtracting 
the output of the competitive fringe. Assuming the unit costs of the foreign subsidiary 
as given, then the problem for the foreign firm is to maximise the discounted sum of 
profits for the whole continuous period T subject to the constraint of the indigenous 
firms’ improving in efficiency, that is,
max je "  ( P - Q c ) [ D ( P )  -  nbP -n A  + (3)
0
s.t. A = aQf  A(0) given,
where Qf = D(P) -nbP - n A  + nAmd D(P)  = a + D P is the linear market demand
function, r is the discount rate and 0c is the unit cost of foreign subsidiary. 
Variations in 0 reflect changes in technology for the foreign subsidiary. This implies
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the technology transferred is the cost-saving process technology. A fall in 0 indicates 
a flow of new cost-saving techniques from the parent firms.
Setting the Hamiltonian and solving this dynamic optimisation, the optimal 
pricing policy for the foreign subsidiary is derived in equation (4):
_(Qc-X)(D - n b ) - a  + n A - n A  .
(° ”  2 (D -nb )
Where X = \iaen , X may be interpreted as the shadow price of marginal 
increase in spillovers by the indigenous firm.8 The market price determined by the 
foreign firm is negatively related to the level of the indigenous firm’s efficiency, and 
its shadow price, but positively related to the variable 0 , which implies that the more 
cost-saving technology used by the subsidiary, the lower its unit cost and thus the 
market price.
From the first order conditions and the given initial condition of A(0) as well 
as the transversality condition X(T) = 0, A(t)and X(t) are explicitly solved:
A{t) = A’ - - — ^ - [ k e ^ 7 - I e ’,'r+,v]
L k
X(t) = - ^ ( 0 ) ] n  ) (5)
L ( D - n b )
where r\2,r\l =-^[r±(r2+2arn)^2] are the eigenvalues of the system. Defining
k -  l + 2 r |2/a f l ,  L = ke^lT ~(l/k)e^lT > 0 , and A* = — (nA + a + Qc(D -nb)) ,9 it can
n
be noted that r |2 = r ~ fii = eT1l,+lh7’ -  e^ T+1]2t > 0  for 0 < t < T . By
differentiating this equation, the influence of both A and X along the optimal time
8 With X being negative, the magnitude of (-X,) can also be interpreted as a ‘markup’ over the 
static market price. A rise inX indicates a fall in the ‘markup’ and the market price. Since a fall 
in the market price tends to raise the output of the foreign subsidiary, which in turn increases the 
rise in efficiency of the indigenous firm, the profits of the foreign subsidiary then tend to decline.
9 For an equilibrium to exist, 0C must always be less than the price at which Qf  = 0. This price 
can be calculated to be equal to —(a — nA + nA) / (D  —nb). Therefore, 
0c < - ( a - n A  + nA)/ (D  -  nb) implies A* > A(t) > A (0).
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path is increasing.10 These results imply that the efficiency of the competitive fringe is 
always increasing over time due to the positive output of the subsidiary, and thus its 
adverse effect on foreign subsidiary’s discounted profits due to a marginal increase in 
A , measured by (-X), is declining over time (X being negative).
Since a decline in the market price tends to raise the foreign subsidiary’s 
output, and a rise in the efficiency of the competitive fringe tends to lower it, how
does the foreign subsidiary’s output shift over time? Differentiating foreign 
subsidiary’s output Qf with respect to time t,
d Qf ,
-=*- = (D - n b ) P - n A  
d t
pip
= ( D - n b ) ( A —  + X—  )-n 'A  (6)
oA ÖK
= - (A ~ A (0 ))[(ti, +Ti2)(e’1'7'+%' - e n"+n!T)] < 0
The output of the foreign subsidiary tends to decline monotonically. Since the 
efficiency of the indigenous firm is increasing over time, the best response of the 
foreign subsidiary is to lower the rate of increase in the indigenous firm’s efficiency, 
that is, by lowering its output over time. The decline in price and output of the 
foreign subsidiary indicates that its profits decline over time.
On the other hand, a fall in the market price indicates an increase in market 
demand, D(P),  and the sales of the foreign subsidiary declining over time suggest 
that the output and sales of the indigenous firm increase over time. However, this 
does not imply that the profits of the indigenous firm increase over time. The profits 
of the local firm,^, , are subject to two opposing effects: the rise in A tends to raise it
on the one hand, whereas the fall in market price tends to lower it on the other hand. 
In equilibrium, local firms produce till the marginal cost is equal to the market price, 
therefore,
10 x
X [A*-i4(0)]w
L ( D - n b )
[T|1e'll'+,hr
^ 2  c r\J+r\7t
k
- r \2eT \J + T }2t
]>0
] > o
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(7)
Ki = PQl ~^\^Q-  -  {A -A)Q]~  fixed cost 
1 2
= —  Qi -  fixed cost
As shown, the profits of the competitive fringe rise over time as long as Q. rises over 
time.
Finally, how does the welfare of the host country change along the optimal 
path? Welfare can be measured by the sum of consumers’ surplus and the profits of 
domestic firms. Since the market price goes down over time, it suggests that 
consumers’ surplus rises with time. In addition, the profits of the indigenous firms 
also rise. Both effects increase over time, suggesting rising of welfare in the host 
country.
The study concludes that the dynamic market price in the presence of the 
spillovers by the indigenous firm is higher than in its absence.11 Along the optimal 
path, the price of the product, market share and the profits of the foreign subsidiary 
all decline over time. However, the market share, the profits of the indigenous firms 
and the welfare of the host country increase over time.
This conclusion is the same as that in a study by Liu (1991). Under these 
circumstances, how may the foreign firm respond to keep its competitive advantage in 
the host market? Will it keep on transferring technology or will it suspend the 
subsidiary? A profit-maximising foreign firm will evaluate the costs and benefits 
before making any strategic response. It is necessary to examine how technology 
transfer from the parent firm affects the optimal paths of market price, and the output 
and profits of the foreign subsidiary as well as the effects on the indigenous firms and 
the welfare of the host country.
The technology transferred by a foreign firm is assumed to be cost-saving 
technology. Thus technology transfer to the foreign subsidiary is indicated by a 
decline in 0 . The impact of changes of 0 on the optimal time paths of the efficiency 
level of the indigenous firm and the shadow price can be examined by differentiating 
the optimal time paths given in (5):
11 The first-order necessary conditions for the Hamiltonian shows 
D ( P ) - b P -  A+ A+ (D -b)(P-Qc+X) = 0
In the static case (with X= 0), D{P)—bP — A+ A+ (D —b){P —0c) = 0, but in the
dynamic environment (X being negative), D{P) — bP — A+ A+ (D — b)(P-Qc+X) < 0. 
Therefore, the market price in the presence of learning by the local firms is higher than that in its 
absence.
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(8a)04 (0
(-dB)
dX(t)
(-dB)
-  C(P n/?) [ke"lT(1 -  e"1' ) + -  e"‘T(e"1' - 1)] >  0 
nL
_ £ ( e ihT-HU._e H,T«b<) < 0 (8b)
A fall in 0 , which is due to new technology transfer from the parent firm to its 
subsidiary, implies that the indigenous firm becomes more efficient and the ‘markup’ 
rises in magnitude with time, that is, X falls. How a fall in 0 affects the market price 
and output of the foreign subsidiary can be investigated. Totally differentiating 
equation (4) obtains,
dP{t) 1 1 dA(t)
(-dB) ~ 2 \D  -nb) (-dB) 
1  1 04(Q
~ 2  ^(D -  nb) (-dB)
dX(Q
(-dB )
-c ]
+ £ [^ r(T -e ’’2') + e%V ‘' -* )]}  < 0 L k
(9a)
dQ f(0  _ 1 nb)c{\ k) 1 ^j+r\2t _^ er\2T+^ \it\ > q 
(-d0) 2 L k
that is, the market price falls and the output of the foreign subsidiary increases. A fall 
in the market price increases market demand and, at a given level of technology used 
by the foreign subsidiary, its sales decrease. The reduction of unit cost due to new 
technology transferred maintains the competitiveness of the foreign subsidiary and 
thus its output grows. This suggests that the positive effect of savings in costs from 
technology transfer outweighs the negative effect on the foreign subsidiary’s output 
of the higher efficiency of the local firm. The implication of this result is that the 
foreign subsidiary allows the rate of increase in efficiency of the indigenous firms to 
rise as a consequence of technology transfer from the parent firm.
As for the profits of the foreign subsidiary along the optimal paths when new 
technology is transferred,
dK,(t) = £ .  -nbXP-ec ) ( l - i i ) ( - e  +e ^^ T+n•')
(-dB) 2 k
+ Q. 0  + k)(e''-‘T*"'‘ - -e " '7*"1’)] > 0 
k
( 10)
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the profits of the foreign subsidiary are higher in every period. The subsidiary 
apparently benefits from the technology transfer in spite of the leakage of knowledge 
to the host country. Intuitively, when cost declines due to technology transfer, the 
foreign subsidiary can make more profits in each period if and only if it achieves to 
the same price and quantity path as before. Hence, the discounted profits along the 
optimal path can never be lower if new technology is transferred continuously.
On the other hand, the effect of a reduction in the foreign subsidiary’s unit 
costs on the indigenous firm’s output tends to decline with the decrease in market 
price and increase with the increase in efficiency, as given by
dß ( 0  u dP(t) , dA(t)
(-d0) (-d0) (-d0)
The net effect remains ambiguous, as indicated by the following equation; the first 
term is greater than zero, but the second term is less than zero:
= —  [2D ( -  e"'T (1 -  ev ) + ke"‘T (e"'’ -1 ))  
(-d0) 2 L k
+ (er,‘T*v  + ke"'1* ''')]
( 1 1 )
Owing to this ambiguity, the profits of the indigenous firm are also ambiguous.
dn,.(Q = f l  d fi (Q 
(-d0) b (-d0)
The effect of technology transfer on the discounted profits of the indigenous firm 
turns out to be ambiguous. This result implies that technology transfer is not 
necessarily favourable to the local industry. The more elastic the market demand and 
inelastic the domestic firms’ supply curve, the more benefit indigenous firms may 
enjoy, because elastic demand indicates a greater rise in the output of the foreign 
subsidiary when market price falls, and hence the more efficient the indigenous firm 
is. On the other hand, the lower the slope of the indigenous firm’s supply curve, the 
greater the chance that it benefits because its output does not go down much as 
market price falls, due to the technology transfer.
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Given that the indigenous firm does not necessarily gain from the technology 
transfer of the foreign parent firm to its subsidiary, what is the welfare change along 
the optimal time path? Since
dW(t) _ D dP(t) | dJC,(Q 
(-d0)  ^ \ - d 0 )  (-d0)
substituting (7) and using dQ = QdP + iQi/fydA,  obtains,
dW(t)
(-d0)
= [Qt ~D(P)\ dP(t) 
(■d0)
+ f i d MO 
b (-d0)
>0 (13)
that is, technology transfer by foreign firms can still improve the welfare of the host 
country. This is because a fall in 0 leads to a rise in the efficiency of the indigenous 
firm which has positive effects on the host country’s welfare. Furthermore, a fall in 0 
also leads to a fall in market price which can raise welfare, since D{P) - Q i > 0 .
The above analysis tries to model the choice for foreign firms in deciding their 
international technology transfer strategy given the existence of spillovers from 
subsidiaries to indigenous firms in the host country. This analysis concludes that 
market price is higher when there are spillovers and, along the optimal time path, the 
output and profits of the foreign subsidiaries decline, whereas the output and profits 
of the indigenous firms increase. The model also predicts that, even if the foreign 
firms are unable to appropriate the whole of the rent on technology transfer due to 
spillovers, it is still beneficial to transfer new technology into the host country. While 
the indigenous firms do not necessarily benefit from the better technology used by the 
foreign firms, the welfare of the host country increases.
In contrast to this analysis, Blomstrom and Wang (1989) emphasise the 
learning effort made by indigenous firms. Indigenous firms can improve their 
efficiency by capturing larger spillover effects through their investment decisions 
when foreign subsidiaries appear. Learning technology is not free to the indigenous 
firms. An indigenous firm’s technology level is an increasing function of its learning 
investment and diminishing returns occur as the learning effort scales up. Another 
characteristic of the learning process derives from the hypothesis of Findlay (1978): 
the rate of technology progress in a relatively ‘backward’ country is an increasing 
function of the gap between its own level of technology and that of the ‘advanced’ 
country.
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Besides the inclusion of costly spillovers, Blomstrom and Wang (1989) also 
assume that technology transfers from the parent firms to the subsidiaries involve 
some costs. The cost of this transfer is assumed to be a monotonically decreasing 
function of the age of technology being developed, following the hypothesis of Teece 
(1977).
Since both the foreign subsidiary and the indigenous firm can make their own 
investment decisions to maximise their profits, there is strategic interaction between 
them. In this sense, the model breaks down each firm’s decision into two steps 
(Blomstrom and Wang 1989; p.6):
At every moment each firm chooses its output to maximise its momentary profit, given the 
status quo of both firms’ technology levels and its competitor’s current output. Intertemporally 
each firm chooses its technology investment to maximise the present value of its profit stream.
This model predicts the following:
(i) In equilibrium, the strategic response of the foreign firm in the face of learning 
effort by the indigenous firm is to invest in more advanced technology. On the 
other hand, the domestic firm’s investment in learning depends on the marginal 
benefit of the first unit of resource spent on such activities exceeding the loss in 
current profits. If the cost is very high, the domestic firm will not invest in 
learning at all because technology can be gained from learning-by-watching.
(ii) The higher the operation risks— for example, political instability or low 
potential economic growth— the more reluctant foreign firms will be to transfer 
technology.
(iii) Technology transfer is positively related to the level of the indigenous firm’s 
learning effort. The more rapid and the more advanced is the technology 
transfer, the lower the domestic firm’s discount rate, the more efficient the 
learning activities, and the higher degree of substitution between the competing 
products.
(iv) The more costless technology spills over from the foreign firm to the domestic 
firm, the faster the technology transfer.
(v) The learning investment of the individual domestic firms decreases if there is a 
positive externality in their learning process; that is, the social rate of return to 
learning is higher than the individual rate of return.
The model traces the closing up of the technology gap between foreign firms 
and domestic firms if the growth rate of the innovation falls short of the rate of 
imitation. The possibility of a shrinking technology gap depends on the actions taken 
by the indigenous firms through their learning investment.
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In summary, these studies indicate that the profits of foreign firms in the 
presence of spillover effects are lower, and made lower still when indigenous firms 
put effort into learning. To keep their competitive advantage in the host country, it is 
necessary for foreign firms to transfer technology continually. In addition, for the host 
government, there are limitations to influencing the choice of production location by 
foreign firms, so that the optimal policy is to support indigenous firms in learning 
from the foreigners. Since the ability to learn is related to the stock of technical 
knowledge, government policy should put effort into vocational training programs, 
education, collecting information on new technologies, encouraging efficiency in 
learning, and so forth.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most important incentive for a host country in attracting foreign direct 
investment is the possibility of accessing modem technology. This involves the by­
product of the establishment of foreign subsidiaries. Local firms can obtain indirect 
productivity gains when the entry of foreign firms creates external economies. These 
benefits are generally referred to as ‘spillovers’.
In general, there are four sources of spillovers which may affect indigenous 
firms’ productivity. One source of spillover effect is that the entry of relatively 
efficient foreign firms may affect the market structure of an industry by increasing 
pressure on its competitiveness. The second source is that indigenous firms may gain 
training for workers and management—training which has been underwritten by the 
foreign subsidiaries but which is shared by the indigenous firms when those workers 
become available to the whole economy. The third source is the hastening of 
technology transfer through the demonstration effect and the learning effort on the 
indigenous firms. Another source of spillovers, the linkage effect, either backward or 
forward linkage, may be the most significant but the most difficult to measure. New 
technology accompanied by foreign direct investment may stimulate local suppliers of 
the intermediate products to improve product quality and lower costs in order to 
compete for the foreign market. New products introduced by the foreign firms may 
also stimulate productivity improvements in local firms who use these products as an 
input.
These spillover effects are beneficial to the host countries, but to the foreign 
firms they perhaps threaten their advantage in technology and profits over time. The 
North-South model, which takes no account of spillover effects, predicts that the 
South will catch up if the North stagnates in R&D investment. Hence, if foreign firms 
slow down technology transfer to their affiliates, they may lose their advantage in the 
host market. Apparently, the learning ability of indigenous firms, which is accelerated
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by the spillover effects, may make the threat more than an abstract one for foreign 
firms. Foreign firms’ investment decisions may, therefore, be affected if they find it 
less profitable to open subsidiaries behind tariff walls than to undertake export 
activity, in the presence of the spillover effects.
In the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade framework, it is well understood that 
high tariffs can stimulate foreign capital inflow. However, in the presence of spillover 
effects, high tariffs may not be as effective as expected in encouraging capital 
movement. Foreign firms may find that, even with high tariffs, the loss of 
technological edge cannot be compensated for by the gain arising from tariff-jumping. 
They will then tend to expand export markets instead of producing internationally. 
Hence, tariff policies may be ineffective in inducing foreign direct investment in the 
presence of spillover effects. Other policies are therefore preferable.
On the other hand, the best response for foreign firms in maximising their 
profits in the host country is to transfer technology continually. In static conditions, 
the profits of foreign firms in the presence of spillover effects is lower than otherwise, 
and made worse when the indigenous firms put effort into absorbing the spillover 
effects. The dynamic transfer of technology is the best way for them to keep their 
leadership in host markets. Since the entry of foreign firms can increase national 
welfare, the best policies by host governments in extracting such externalities involve 
encouraging domestic firms to do their best in learning. Learning ability depends on 
the accumulated human capital, which, according to human capital theory, can be 
enhanced by education, leaming-by-doing, vocational training and absorption of new 
information. It appears best for policy makers to think of improving the efficiency of 
learning than to interfere in the private sector, through preferential financial and fiscal 
supports.
The decisions of foreign firms vary when there are spillover effects to the host 
market. Meanwhile, the existence of such effects also recommends foreign direct 
investment policy designed to attract foreign capital inflow and to gain the 
technological benefit in developing countries. Although it is suggested here that 
foreign firms’ advanced technologies in one way or another are transferred to 
domestic firms through spillover effects, the difficulty of measuring these effects 
means that there have been few empirical tests of spillover effects of foreign direct 
investment, and only one study of a developing country— Mexico. The growth of 
East Asian economies over the past four decades and the contribution of foreign 
direct investment to their growth have been highly appraised, but no one has 
attempted to study spillovers from foreign direct investment in these countries 
econometrically. This thesis will attempt to fill this gap by taking Taiwan— a model
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with rapid growth and large foreign capital involvement— as a case study, particularly 
focusing on the electronics industry.
Furthermore, in contrast to the partial productivity analysis in other studies, an 
overall measurement of productivity growth, total factor productivity (TFP) growth, 
is employed in this thesis. Partial productivity analysis restricts previous studies to an 
industry level analysis. The concept of TFP growth not only allows industry analysis, 
but also makes firm-level analysis possible. In this thesis, the industry level analysis 
examines the significance of foreign penetration (representing the impact of foreign 
capital on technical change) and economies of scale for TFP growth. Firm-level 
analysis decomposes TFP growth into technological progress, technical efficiency and 
economies of scale factors to examine whether domestic firms gain technological 
benefit through spillovers from foreign direct investment and whether there is a 
catching-up process in progress.
The structure of the empirical study in this thesis is as follows. Chapter 3 
describes Taiwan’s policies in attracting foreign direct investment and the 
contribution of, as well as the strategic behavioural changes of foreign direct 
investment in Taiwan. Chapter 4 examines the differences in performance between 
foreign firms and domestic firms. Following this chapter, TFP growth is measured for 
each industry in the manufacturing sector of Taiwan and then decomposed TFP 
growth is used to examine the contribution of foreign capital across industries. The 
last chapter in this empirical study provides a firm-level analysis. Frontier productivity 
analysis is employed to assess the significance of technical efficiency, technological 
progress and economies of scale in TFP growth. Then the effect of labour quality 
change on technical efficiency is examined, because the improvement in labour quality 
is one of the major sources of spillover efficiency from foreign direct investment.
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3 Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan
Foreign firms are said to possess superior financial techniques, marketing, and 
technology. The entry of these firms can create spillover effects into a domestic 
market through their demonstration effect, or domestic firms’ leaming-by-watching 
processes, as described in Chapter 2. Other than these spillovers, economic 
development theory also suggests that foreign capital inflow can complement the host 
country’s shortage of savings and foreign exchange, accelerating economic 
development. The contribution of foreign direct investment to a host economy should 
be evaluated by adding up these two effects. This chapter focuses on the contribution 
of foreign direct investment in Taiwan, the case under study. A positive contribution 
by foreign firms to the Taiwanese economy does not automatically imply positive 
spillovers, but is suggestive of the interest in exploring their effects.
The contribution of foreign investment also depends on the scale of capital 
inflow. It is necessary to examine how a host government may influence the mode and 
magnitude of the movement of foreign direct investment by means of specific foreign 
direct investment policy. A host government’s expectation of the contribution of 
foreign direct investment will affect the policy approach. Following the discussion in 
Chapter 2, it may be more effective to establish a favourable investment environment 
— as Taiwan’s government did— than to formulate and enact specific foreign direct 
investment policy. Hence, the Taiwanese government’s policies towards foreign 
direct investments are discussed in the next section to explain how the economic 
environment can affect, for example, the location decision of foreign capital. A review 
of the impact of foreign direct investment on Taiwan’s economy, particularly the 
effect on technology, capital formation, employment, and linkages, follows in order to 
evaluate the contribution of foreign direct investment to the development of Taiwan’s 
economy more generally.
Policies towards foreign direct investment
Growth theory stresses that the progress of labour and capital influences the rate of 
economic growth. The significant contribution of technological change to economic 
growth is also highlighted in many studies, such as Solow (1957) and Denison (1974) 
in America, Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) in Japan, and Kuo (1983) in Taiwan. 
Foreign direct investment appears as an important channel for the diffusion of 
technology internationally, alongside direct purchasing and licensing of new
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technologies. Hence, foreign firms are potentially an important means of economic 
progress. However, some countries take a hostile attitude towards foreign capital 
inflow, while others take a positive view. There are many possible explanations for 
host government caution towards foreign direct investment. Fears about technological 
dependence on foreign countries and companies tend to lead to host government 
restrictions on foreign capital inflow. Japan may be taken as a typical case of this 
response. The Japanese government promulgated a restrictive policy towards foreign 
capital inflow during the 1950s, with severe limitations on the proportion of foreign 
equity that could be held in different industrial sectors. Only US$2.9 million foreign 
direct investment flowed into Japan during 1950-55. These restrictions were lifted 
after the liberalisation of trade and foreign exchange in the 1960s, yet licensing 
agreements have remained the dominant form of technology inflow into Japan.
Besides the pursuit of technological independence, foreign exchange concerns 
may also encourage host governments to enact restrictive policies. India, for example, 
initially proposed an open policy towards foreign direct investment, with no 
restrictions on the remittance of profits and dividends, tax concessions, fair 
compensation in case of acquisition, and so on (Kumar, (1989, ch.l)). When the 
outflow of remittances grew sharply and became a significant burden on the foreign 
exchange reserves, leading to the foreign exchange crisis in the late 1960s, the 
government adopted a more restrictive policy. The amount of foreign direct 
investment and the proportion of foreign ownership were subject to strict screening 
by the Foreign Investment Board, foreign investments unaccompanied by technology 
transfer were not welcomed, royalty payments were restricted to five years, and a 
number of other conditions were attached to foreign direct investment. By the end of 
the 1970s, stagnant export growth of manufactured products led the government to 
realise that India’s lack of international competitiveness was due to technological 
backwardness, inferior product quality and high costs. These could be partly 
attributed to the highly protected local market. The Indian government became 
committed to the liberalisation of policies regarding foreign direct investment.
Other host country governments viewed foreign direct investment as inputs to 
complement the savings, foreign exchange and budgetary revenue gaps in the 
economy, and enacted policies to encourage foreign capital inflow. Taiwan enacted 
the Statute for Encouragement of Investment in 1960; South Korea enacted the 
Foreign Capital Inducement Law in 1966; and Singapore passed the Economic 
Expansion Incentives Act in 1967. The broad features of these laws are similar: 
exemption for five years from taxes on profits, duty free import of capital equipment 
and of materials used in exported commodities, and no restrictions on either the 
percentage of equity that the foreign firm can own or on the remittance of profits and
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dividends. These laws generally set out the criteria for the inflow of foreign capital. 
For example, the Korean law gave priority to capital-intensive industries, industries 
using foreign technology, industries enjoying foreign tariff preference, and heavy 
chemicals. The Taiwanese government also pursued a selective policy towards foreign 
direct investment in accordance with its development objectives after 1950,1 
discussed in more detail below.
In addition to providing an inclusive tax incentive package to attract foreign 
capital inflow, the Taiwanese government also developed industrial, financial, trade 
and other policies in order to establish a favourable investment climate for both 
domestic and foreign capital. These policies interacted with each other and played a 
crucial role in encouraging both domestic and foreign investments. Instead of a 
specific foreign direct investment policy, a favourable economic environment was 
built by these comprehensive economic policies which succeeded in attracting foreign 
capital inflow, thereby enhancing the contribution of foreign direct investment. A 
review of the Taiwanese government’s policies is essential to explain the growth of 
foreign capital inflow and to the evaluation of foreign firms’ contributions to 
Taiwan’s economy.
Taiwan government policy
The first efforts to encourage the inflow of foreign capital by the government of 
Taiwan were in 1954 (Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals) and 1955 (Statute 
for Investment by Overseas Chinese). These statutes provided general guidelines for 
directing foreign direct investment towards those industries which would contribute 
to economic growth, towards the improvement of existing industries, and the 
promotion of exports.
Despite these intentions, foreign capital inflows remained modest in 1950s; 
less than US$35.6 million on an approvals basis. On an arrivals basis, foreign capital 
inflow was even lower, according to the report of Council for Economic Planning, 
merely about NT$8 million.2 Another characteristic of foreign direct investment at 
this stage was the large number of investments from overseas Chinese.3 From Table
1 Nevertheless, Schive’s (1990) study finds that these policies had only weak and insignificant 
effects in guiding foreign direct investment to the desired industries.
2 The data come from the Four Year Economic Plan and are reported in New Taiwan dollars. 
Since multiple and floating exchange rate systems continued till 1959, no appropriate exchange 
rate can be applied to compare the two data sets directly.
3 The investments made by overseas Chinese were generally regarded as different from those of 
other foreigners in some aspects. For instance, they were relatively small in scale, were 
concentrated in service and light industries, and had similar technology to that of domestic firms.
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3.1, it can be seen that 58 cases of overseas Chinese investments were approved 
during 1950s compared to 28 cases of investments by other foreigners.
From an historical point of view, it is obvious that policies other than foreign 
direct investment policy affected the inflow of foreign capital more substantially 
during the 1950s. These policies and other factors included domestic market-oriented 
economic policies, the multiple exchange rate system, severe import restrictions and 
control, the instability of the foreign exchange rate, the precarious political situation, 
difficulties in obtaining land for industrial planting, lack of investment incentives, high 
inflation rate and social instability.
Table 3.1 Foreign direct investment in Taiwan, 1952-92 (on approval basis) 
(US$1,000)
Overseas Chinese Foreign Investment Total FDI
Cases Amount % Cases Amount % Cases Amount
1 9 5 2 -6 0 58 1 0 ,4 4 0 2 9 .3 28 2 5 ,2 1 2 7 0 .7 86 3 5 ,6 5 2
1 9 6 1 -7 0 6 43 1 5 2 ,5 7 6 29.1 5 5 9 3 7 1 ,0 0 2 7 0 .9 120 2 5 2 3 ,5 7 8
1 9 7 1 -8 0 7 7 4 8 0 1 ,6 7 1 37.1 6 7 5 1 ,3 5 7 ,5 0 2 6 2 .9 1449 2 ,1 5 9 ,1 7 3
1 9 8 1 -9 2 851 1 ,5 2 0 ,7 0 1 11 .0 2 9 8 5 1 2 ,2 5 2 ,3 0 8 8 9 .0 3 8 3 6 1 3 ,7 7 3 ,0 0 9
T otal 2 3 2 6 2 ,4 8 5 ,3 8 8 15.1 4 2 4 7 1 4 ,0 0 6 ,0 2 4 84 .9 6 5 7 3 1 6 ,4 9 1 ,4 1 2
Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Statistics on Overseas Chinese & 
Foreign Investment, Technical Cooperation, Outward Investment, Outward Technical 
Cooperation, Republic of China, 1993, Taipei, p. 1.
By the 1960s, Taiwan's political situation had stabilised with the assistance of 
US aid and military defence. Improvements in the economic environment made 
Taiwan more attractive to foreign investors. These improvements included currency 
reform, industrial policy reform, an expanded domestic market (owing to the growth 
of national income), lower protective customs duties, a tightening of credit and public 
expenditure, and the channelling of private savings into bank deposits for industrial 
use, as well as improved transportation, power supply and education facilities.
The termination of the use of exchange certification and foreign exchange rate 
devaluation were the main elements of currency reform, which began in 1958. A fixed 
exchange rate of US$1 = NT$40 was established by 1963. A pegged US dollar 
exchange rate not only sustained the economic growth of Taiwan, but also provided 
incentives to foreign direct investment by reducing the risk of investments. The size of 
the domestic market also expanded. Average income growth was 7.2 per cent in the 
1950s, although high population growth— a natural rate of population growth in 
excess of 3 per cent per annum— meant that per capita income grew at only 2.9 per 
cent per year. However, by the 1960s, population growth had slowed to 2.2 per cent
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and, with annual economic growth (as high as 9.9 per cent), the growth rate of real 
per capita income rose to 6.4 per cent, which raised purchasing power and expanded 
the domestic market. Taiwan’s economy had broken out of Nurkse’s (1953) vicious 
cycle of poverty by this stage and taken off.
The adverse effects of industrial policy directed at import substitution began 
to emerge. The high cost of production under protection led inefficient firms to drive 
out efficient firms and hinder industrial competitiveness. The import substitution 
policy came to an end, leading to a slowing-down of growth as a whole. Outward­
looking industrial policy reform was necessary if high industrial growth was to be 
sustained. Export-oriented policies saw a reduction of protective customs levies in 
order to lower production costs and increase international competitiveness. The 
production and export of manufactured products was also promoted via the provision 
of preferential interest loans to export industries.
Economic reforms established a good environment for foreign investors. 
However, the most influential government policy was the issuing of the Statute for 
Encouragement of Investment in 1960, which provided a large variety of incentives, 
including a five-year exemption from corporate income tax for new investors, or 
acceleration of asset depreciation; a maximum of 25 per cent corporate income tax 
after the completion of the five-year tax holiday; exemption from or reduction of 
stamp, deed and business taxes for export transactions; and acquisition of plant sites 
on government-designated industrial land or in industrial districts. The government 
also set up an ombudsman’s office to assist foreign investors, and designed a 
simplified approval procedure.
A further stimulus to foreign direct investment was provided by the 
establishment of export processing zones (EPZs) in 1966. EPZs were designed to 
provide a complete set of facilities for foreign investors to establish plant, but one 
other important purpose was to complement export-oriented industry policy by 
encouraging exports via foreign investments. Around the same time, US, European 
and Japanese firms faced rapidly rising labour costs at home, and a number of 
marginal firms were trying to relocate their operations overseas. EPZs were set up 
just in time to attract multinationals to establish off-shore plant for the production of 
labour-intensive parts or for assembly operations. Taiwan’s EPZs not only provided a 
huge employment opportunity to absorb the abundant labour force, but also 
contributed to economic growth through their payments for local purchases and to 
employees. The high export ratio of EPZs’ firms, nearly 100 per cent in the early 
period, also created a value-added effect in the domestic economy.
In addition to EPZs, the Taiwanese government also established a number of 
industrial districts around the whole island after 1964. Private enterprises, foreign or
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local, could get assistance for the acquisition of land and the provision of 
transportation and other public facilities in these industrial districts. The facilities were 
similar to those in EPZs except that EPZs were off-shore operations. As a result of 
these initiatives, the Taiwanese government created a relatively attractive climate for 
foreign investors and foreign capital dramatically increased from that time. Riedel 
(1975) and Ranis (1979) both found that policy changes by the government of Taiwan 
greatly influenced the flow of foreign direct investment during the 1960s.4
By the 1970s, the desire to upgrade the economic structure to produce more 
sophisticated manufactured products led the Taiwanese government to carry out ten 
big construction projects: six in the improvement of transportation and harbour 
facilities, and four in the establishment of basic heavy industries. These improvements 
produced an even better investment climate. As a result, foreign investment in Taiwan 
continued to grow, except for a short period between 1974 and 1975 associated with 
the establishing of political relations between the United States and mainland China, 
and with the world economic recession.
Another surge of foreign capital inflow into Taiwan has taken place since 
1986. The main push has come from the continuous liberalisation of the domestic 
market, trade, financial, and foreign exchange markets. Most of the new foreign 
capital flowed into relatively underdeveloped industries, such as banking, insurance, 
transportation, and services, which were heavily capital-intensive and highly protected 
before liberalisation. The lack of know-how, technology and physical capital usually 
made it disadvantageous for domestic enterprises to enter into these sectors and the 
liberalisation of the domestic market attracted many multinationals to exploit these 
uncultivated fields with their abundant capital and wide experience. Another factor 
promoting this recent increase in foreign direct investment was the reconnecting of 
the economic ties between Taiwan and mainland China after 40 years' separation. 
Many multinationals attempted to utilise the experienced and skilled labour force in 
Taiwan to gain access to the mainland Chinese market, because of the same language, 
and historical and social background. The government’s 1991 Six Year Economic 
Plan also encouraged foreign investors to join the market.
The distribution of foreign direct investment reveals that the electronics and 
electrical appliances industry ranks at the top in the manufacturing sector, as shown in 
Table 3.2. Up to 1990, there were 648 projects approved, with a total amount of 
US$3 billion invested in this industry, accounting for 27 per cent of the total foreign 
capital inflow. The chemical industry ranks next and then machinery equipment and
4 Riedel (1975) found that investments from the United States were attracted by the relatively 
cheap labour in Taiwan, while Japanese investments were mainly encouraged by government 
policy.
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instruments, basic metals and metal products, food and beverage processing. As the 
electronics industry appears to be most affected by foreign direct investment, the 
development and the impact of foreign direct investment on this industry is therefore 
examined later in this study.
Table 3.2 Statistics on approved foreign investment by industry, 1952-91, (US$1,000)
Food Textile Clothing & footwear Timber
Cases Amount Cases Amount Cases Amount Cases Amount
1952-79 39 13,702 30 31,947 62 15,328 25 5,233
1980 3 5,613 - 1,635 - 748 - -
1981 3 15,947 1 1,186 1 1,866 - -
1982 2 16,712 - 1,387 1 2,710 - 112
1983 1 7,701 1 285 - 332 2 1,223
1984 6 7,014 - 838 1 1,108 1 21
1985 10 18,673 1 1,835 1 1,861 2 1,565
1986 8 6,346 1 3,376 - 677 2 538
1987 8 75,649 2 5,447 4 3,826 2 6,939
1988 15 56,860 1 18,185 3 3,647 2 3,587
1989 15 214,164 5 43,972 3 5,033 2 11,934
1990 11 108,527 1 15,560 1 3,287 3 13,159
1991 6 37,478 2 39,168 2 13,332 - 13,320
1992 9 54,021 1 15,218 - - 1 8,613
Total 136 635,407 45 168,545 79 53755 43 66,244
M
Pulp & paper Leather & fur Plastic & rubber Chemical
Cases Amount Cases Amount Cases Amount Cases Amount
1952-79 12 4,400 18 2,991 81 35,655 152 228,523
1980 - 332 - - 5 9,087 9 55,218
1981 - - - - 4 15,797 11 38,835
1982 2 6,825 - - 3 1,841 14 33,667
1983 2 3,664 - - 7 12,043 11 33,817
1984 - 189 1 1,098 1 21,776 21 122,930
1985 - 235 4 2,777 6 5,692 11 2123,88
1986 - 433 2 250 9 19,149 19 133,669
1987 1 1,573 1 2,372 13 68,163 41 167,272
1988 5 6,772 - 798 9 54,519 22 97,811
1989 1 20,049 1 288 16 78,349 20 519,301
1990 - 7,073 2 1,979 2 23,110 17 502,472
1991 - 1,245 1 166 1 16,823 16 194,597
1992 - 1,485 1 1,767 4 70,088 7 105,014
Total 23 54,275 31 14,487 161 432,091 371 2,445,515
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(Ill)
Minerals Metals Machinery Electronics
Cases Amount Cases Amount Cases Amount Cases Amount
1952-79 46 36,603 165 132,101 103 139,690 309 725,308
1980 9 10,415 14 29,040 5 11,747 16 106,026
1981 6 5,014 9 43,727 7 38,462 13 79,484
1982 2 4,553 16 44,330 9 14,846 12 67,704
1983 3 6,951 12 12,648 14 141,455 22 102,981
1984 1 802 7 17,335 11 39,385 35 265,916
1985 3 6,454 12 50,767 9 85,841 16 133,919
1986 7 11,565 19 27,742 25 109,847 59 228,225
1987 10 47,452 47 120,704 36 74,390 74 371,559
1988 8 34,738 24 62,154 20 136,854 33 222,143
1989 6 29,431 30 168,679 18 88,272 26 381,234
1990 5 32,789 22 183,175 13 126,590 33 345,437
1991 2 30,797 11 90,391 19 174,866 38 561,716
1992 4 10,490 6 29,921 21 95,973 40 309,199
Total 112 268,054 394 984,237 210 1,278,218 726 3,900,850
Note: industry classifications:
Food = food and beverage processing industry 
Textile = textile industry
Clothing & footwear = garment and footwear industry 
Timber = lumber and bamboo products industry 
Pulp & paper = pulp and paper products industry 
Leather & fur = leather and fur products industry 
Plastic & rubber = plastic and rubber products industry 
Chemical = chemical industry 
Minerals = non-metallic minerals industry 
Metals = basic metals and metal products industry 
Machinery = machinery equipment and instrument industry 
Electronics = electronics and electric appliances industry 
Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Statistics on Overseas Chinese & 
Foreign Investment, the Republic of China, 1992
Taiwanese government policies appear to have provided incentives to foreign 
investors, although there is no way to test the effect of policy changes on the 
magnitude and pattern of foreign direct investment The case of Taiwan suggests that 
a good investment environment is more effective than direct interference in attracting 
foreign direct investment. A liberalised market appears to be particularly important to 
foreign investors.
The contribution of foreign direct investment
Foreign investment provides not only capital, but also the transfer of a package of 
technology, management know-how and other techniques from the investing country 
to the host country. From the viewpoint of the host country, such investment can help
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in filling the gaps between economic plans or policy targets and domestically 
mobilisable resources. In economic development theory, foreign direct investment is 
seen as the strategic factor filling the savings gap, the foreign exchange or trade gap, 
the budgetary gap, and the management and skill gap in the host country.
Apart from these roles, foreign direct investment may also assist in the 
attainment of macroeconomic policy objectives. For instance, it can create jobs, 
reducing unemployment. Foreign direct investment can also generate micro effects in 
the form of inter-industry and intra-industry linkages. Through these effects foreign 
firms interrelate, via local markets or other mechanisms, to locally produced materials 
and components, as well as helping to set up supporting industries. Information which 
foreign firms pass on to indigenous firms regarding, for example, world market 
outlets and sources of supply, may otherwise remain unknown to local firms.
It is difficult to quantify the effects of foreign direct investment precisely, or 
even to predict their direction. For example, a high export ratio generates a positive 
effect on foreign exchange, but a low local content of the product and remittance of 
profits reduces its impact. Moreover, each foreign subsidiary has its own response to 
the economic environment, which increases the difficulty of aggregating all 
information unless a complete census is available. It is impossible to evaluate how the 
economy would have behaved in the absence of foreign capital inflow. It may be hard 
to give the exact quantitative effects of foreign direct investment on the Taiwanese 
economy, but it is possible to examine whether the impact of foreign direct 
investment is favourable, and to examine strategic changes in technology transfer, 
material sourcing, and sales over time caused by foreign direct investment. There are 
various channels through which foreign direct investment may affect the host 
country’s economy. Among them, the strategies of foreign firms on technology, 
capital formation, employment, linkages, and export performance can lead to 
technological changes. For instance, an effect of foreign direct investment on capital 
formation may raise the capital-labour ratio of production. High employment may 
induce labour quality changes through training programs. (See Chapter 2 as a source 
of spillovers). Therefore, the contribution of foreign direct investment to Taiwan’s 
economy is examined in respect of the effect on technology, capital formation, 
employment, linkages, and export performance in this chapter.
Effect on technology
For a developing country, technology transfer via foreign investment is thought to be 
crucial because the process of creating technology through R&D can be enormously 
costly. In addition, the necessary skilled labour may be insufficient in a host’s labour 
market. Hence, by adapting existing technologies, the host country can avoid the risks
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of invention and innovation, and at the same time can promote economic growth via 
the relocation of resources. It is now widely accepted that foreign direct investment, 
particularly from multinational corporations, is an efficient channel in transferring 
technology to the developing countries, along with licensing and buying technology. 
There are some obstacles to the transfer of technology through licensing or selling; 
for instance, the difficulty of maintaining control over business secrets, patents, or 
trademark rights. Furthermore, negotiating a proper price for the new technology, 
taking into account the interests of both licenser/seller and licensee/buyer (for the 
former, evaluating the transaction cost; for the latter, forecasting the potential 
market) is a task full of uncertainty. Licensing agreements were only a minor channel 
of technology transfer in Taiwan, according to the statistical data. From 1952 to 
1992, a total of 3,783 projects of technical cooperation between local and foreign 
enterprises were approved by the government. However, 2,465 of these were 
approved during the 1980s, and rather fewer before then.
There are several reasons why Taiwanese firms were hesitant to engage in 
licensing agreements: one was lack of awareness by Taiwanese firms of the 
importance of technical know-how patents and other industrial properties. Even when 
they understood the importance of property rights in using new technology, they did 
not know the right party to negotiate with in arranging the terms of licensing. They 
were also not adequately informed of the availability of new technology. Another 
important reason, as noted by Schive (1986), was that some Taiwanese firms which 
had experience in contracting licensing agreements complained that some licensers 
were retaining the core of the technology being transferred, which made them rely 
more heavily on importing technology and materials than they would have otherwise.
Although new technology may be able to save costs in material inputs or 
productive activities, this does not mean that technology transfer by foreign direct 
investment is absolutely beneficial. Benefit depends on the appropriateness of the 
technology, the efficiency in adapting it, and the speed of transferring new 
technologies from foreign firms. In most cases, adaptation is required to take into 
account conditions in the host country. The most frequent adjustment in technology is 
to scale down the plant and equipment to adapt to the smaller market size of the host 
country. Adaptation is sometimes adjusted to the requirements of the local customs 
and legal regulations. For example, local content is requested on a case by case basis 
as a criteria of approval in Taiwan. Sometimes, adaptation is required to take 
advantage of low labour costs or to make up for the absence of skilled labour. Since 
foreign firms usually carefully select product lines ex ante, adjustment to the low 
labour cost may not happen as frequently as expected.
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Apart from these factors, some intrinsic factors in the developing countries 
may also work against adaptation, such as a shortage of skilled labour, a small 
market, monopoly advantages, and distortions in the price of goods and factors.
However, these intrinsic unfavourable factors were minimised in Taiwan. For 
instance, the government realised at an early stage that the shortage of skilled 
workers might hinder economic development, and so it has provided vocational 
training programs since 1966. These programs are mainly concentrated in the pre­
employment stage. According to Chang (1985), there are around 200,000 to 300,000 
workers per year being trained through such programs, accounting for 3-5 per cent of 
total employment. In addition, some workers receive vocational education in private 
industrial or commercial training schools, and local enterprises are also beginning to 
place emphasis on follow-up vocational training after employment. The government 
has also initiated a skills test as a way of providing an equitable guideline for 
determining a worker’s pay, and also recognition of the worker’s skills. Furthermore, 
the high mobility in the labour market may also partly counteract the shortage of 
skilled labour, particularly the turnover of trained workers from foreign firms.
Secondly, in order to overcome small-market restrictions, the Taiwanese 
government promoted export-oriented industrialisation in the 1960s. It sought to 
sustain a highly interdependent relationship with the world market; there is no border 
between domestic and world markets. In order to maintain competitiveness in the 
world market, Taiwanese firms have to put effort into continuously improving 
products and quality. A monopoly advantage usually can last only for a short period.
Thirdly, the Taiwanese government enacted some industrial policies, such as 
preferential financial supports for the development of selected products, which indeed 
distorted factor markets to some extent. However, the complicated procedures and 
tough criteria commonly made small and medium firms hesitant or unable to apply for 
support. Over 90 per cent of Taiwan's firms are small or medium size, and they have 
been relatively neglected by the government’s policies. The lack of attention by the 
government has reduced the distortion in factor markets because only a small 
proportion of firms can obtain subsidies and produce those products selected by 
industry policy. The allocation of factors is essentially decided by the market in the 
case of small and medium sized firms.
High labour quality, export-oriented policies, and lesser distortion in factor 
markets demonstrates that the economic environment in Taiwan has overcome the 
intrinsic disadvantages in absorbing transferred technology. Since technical 
cooperative projects have been relatively negligible, the Taiwanese economy has 
relied heavily on foreign direct investment to transfer technology, even though such
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investment gives less autonomy in the process of production and decision making 
than licensing and buying technology.
Improved quality of labour has attracted foreign firms to invest. The inflow of 
new technology and foreign capital has further raised the level of labour quality, 
which in turn has attracted an inflow of new investments and technologies. At the 
same time, the knowledge of domestic firms in technology, marketing and information 
has improved. A more competitive environment was established in Taiwan through 
technological changes, a process which demonstrates the relationship between foreign 
direct investment and accelerated technology transfer. Schive (1983) studied whether 
foreign direct investment encouraged technology transfer into Taiwan and concluded 
that:
(i) foreign firms were more likely to use foreign technology than indigenous firms;
(ii) firms with majority foreign ownership tended to use imported technology; and
(iii) the minority ownership foreign firms used less foreign technology, but still more 
than indigenous firms.
His study suggests that foreign direct investment has encouraged technology to 
transfer across borders, but that the adaptation of new technology depends on the 
degree of foreign participation.
In the 1980s, licensing agreements became relatively attractive as a form of 
technology transfer to Taiwan; contracted cases increased very fast. One explanation 
for them may be that the property and patent right of newly developed technology has 
been strictly scrutinised; to imitate is no longer permitted. Under these circumstances, 
the owner of technology usually prefers to contract a licensing agreement that would 
maximise profits from franchising and reduce the risk of disseminating technology. 
Another explanation is that many Taiwanese firms have realised the importance of 
R&D and now have the ability to invest in R&D.5 Import of technology is no longer 
restricted to obtaining new skills or know-how in the production process. Developing 
new products which closely match local consumers' preferences and promoting 
quality are now the major concerns of Taiwan's firms. Licensing agreements preserve 
independence of management and production processes, and prevalent technology in 
the market, which may be seen as preferable at this stage. A possible third explanation 
is that Taiwanese firms tend to prefer a period payment of royalties or fees to foreign
5 The total R&D spending as a percentage of GNP rose from 0.85 in 1984 to 1.70 in 1991. R&D 
expenditure in the manufacturing sector also rose, from NTS9 billion in 1981 to NTS44 billion in 
1991.
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firms. These are usually paid according to the quantity of products marketed.6 The 
global economic environment changes make licensing agreements preferable to 
foreign direct investment.
Although the importance of transferring technology via foreign investment is 
decreasing in Taiwan, foreign investment has played a large role in technology 
transfer over the past three decades. The operations of foreign subsidiaries diffused 
technology to the local industries, and the mobility of trained or skilled workers from 
foreign subsidiaries to the local market also expanded the capacity of Taiwanese firms 
to absorb new technology.
Effect on capital formation
Since capital formation is an aspect of industrialisation and a developing country 
usually suffers a savings gap (domestic savings falling short of intended investment), 
foreign direct investment is generally regarded as a source of funds to supplement 
domestic savings efforts. According to Nurkse’s proposition (1953), a country is 
poor because it is stuck in ‘the vicious circle of poverty’; that is, trapped in a circular 
problem in capital formation.
Nurkse proposed that both demand and supply sides of capital formation have 
a circular chain. On the supply side, low savings result from the low level of real 
income which is a reflection of low productivity. A low level of productivity again is 
largely due to the lack of capital which in turn is a result of the low savings.
On the demand side, the inducement to invest may be low because of low 
consumption levels due to the low level of real income resulting from low 
productivity. The low level of productivity is a result of the small amount of capital 
used in production caused partly by the small inducement to invest.7 In order to break 
out of this vicious circle, Nurkse suggests, a massive injection of capital from abroad
6 Taiwanese firms’ dislike of making lump sum payments for the purchase of once-and-for-all 
patents or know-how results from two factors. One is that most firms are small, and lacking in 
capital. They can not afford to buy the once-and-for-all patents and know-how. The other is that 
they lack foresight in product markets and complete information on new technology; since a 
large percentage of the market and technology information lies under the control of Japanese 
general trading companies or Western multinationals.
7 The supply side circle:
low income ->  low savings —» low investment —» low productivity
T i
The demand side circle:
low income —» low consumption -»  low induced investment —» low productivity
t  <r~ <— <r~ i
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is necessary. Foreign capital can help to pull developing countries out of this low level 
equilibrium trap.
Taiwan experienced a savings gap in the early developing period. Fortunately, 
with a huge inflow of US aid, it succeeded in breaking out of the vicious circle of 
poverty. After the termination of US aid, Taiwan continued to raise its gross savings 
ratio8 and to mobilise internal savings from households, agriculture and enterprises, as 
well as from the public sector, to cover the gap. In addition, the increasing inflow of 
foreign capital filled the savings gap. On the whole, a favourable saving-investment 
process was constructed in Taiwan at quite an early stage. Table 3.3 sets out the 
trend in gross fixed capital formation in Taiwan.9 Gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) as a proportion of GNP continued to expand from around 13.6 per cent in 
the 1950s, reaching a peak around 27 per cent during the 1970s and falling to 21.7 
per cent in the 1980s. Continuous investment is obviously one of the engines to the 
development of the Taiwanese economy.
Table 3.3 Average gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), 1952-92 (NT$ million)
GNP GFCF GFCFby 
manufacturing
FDI
(b)/(a) (d)/(b) (d)/(c)
(a) (b) (c) (d) % % %
1952-60 36,401 5,217 2,021 88 13.6 2.3 6.6
1961-70 131,074 25,426 11,164 882 18.4 3.2 7.5
1971-80 732,682 203,486 96,605 2,920 27.0 1.6 3.4
1981-92 3,239,583 695,234 274,928 19,117 21.7 2.6 6.5
Average 1,166,883 260,460 107,195 6,542 20.4 2.4 6.0
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book,
1992, Taipei, ROC.
With regard to Taiwan’s capital formation, as shown in Table 3.3, foreign 
direct investment played a minor role compared to the fast expansion of the domestic 
economy. The contribution of foreign capital inflow to gross fixed capital formation 
was often below 4 per cent over the past 40 years, with a few exceptions, and the 
average from 1952 to 1992 was as low as 2.4 per cent. Foreign capital inflow affected 
gross fixed capital formation only insignificantly, but its contribution to capital 
formation in manufacturing has been higher, as seen in the last column of Table 3.3. 
The average percentage for the whole period was 6 per cent, while during the rapid
8 The gross savings ratio to GNP increased from 10 to 15 per cent in the first half of the 1950s to 
over 30 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s, and to about 30 per cent recently.
9 It should be noted that the FDI figures in Table 3.2 are based on the actual arrival value which is 
more realistic than the approval basis in reflecting its impact on the Taiwan economy.
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growth period of the 1960s it was as high as 7.5 per cent. This ratio would be even 
higher if it referred only to the manufacturing sector,10 because foreign capital mainly 
flowed into the electronics and electronic appliances, chemical, machinery and 
equipment and basic metal industries, some of these investments being heavily capital 
intensive. The inflow of foreign capital into industry on an approvals basis, either 
money flow or projects, conforms basically with the growth pattern of the 
manufacturing sector, as noted in Table 3.2. This tendency can be explained by the 
demonstration effect of investment and the high growth of an industry which creates 
expectations for future growth and attracts capital inflow.
In spite of the greater importance of foreign capital in the manufacturing 
sector’s capital formation, these figures might also underestimate the contribution of 
foreign direct investment to capital formation because some cash remittances and 
importation of equipment by foreign firms are not reported to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, and so do not appear in their figures. In addition, expenditure of 
foreign firms is accounted for as a part of the national income, but part of the 
payments made by foreign firms are retained as household savings, which functions as 
investment through the financial system. This part is also excluded from the above 
accounting.
The contribution of foreign capital to capital formation in Taiwan may not 
appear to be as important overall as expected but, while its exact contribution is not 
easy to measure, it has played a significant role in key sectors of the economy.
Effect on employment
Developing countries commonly experience high unemployment rates, hence job 
creation is one of the crucial issues in setting up economic policies. There are three 
types of economic policies which can significantly influence the employment effects of 
foreign direct investment: foreign investment policies (for instance, local sourcing 
requirements); policies aimed at creating greater backward and forward linkages of 
foreign firms; and localisation requirements, especially the hiring of local technical, 
professional and managerial staff. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of foreign 
firms, to utilise cheaper labour in order to reduce production costs and enhance 
competitiveness is a major reason for undertaking international production. The 
requirements on both sides (investor and recipient) lead to employment creation. The 
contribution of foreign direct investment to employment is unambiguous.
Due to the lack of actual arrival figures in the manufacturing sector, the ratio is unobtainable. 
However, Schive (1979) estimated that the average contribution of FDI to capital formation in 
the manufacturing sector was about 6 per cent from 1952 to 1975, with the highest being 8.6 per 
cent in the early 1960s.
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In general, foreign direct investment creates direct and indirect employment in 
the host economy. The direct employment effect is determined by the characteristics 
of the foreign firm, such as size, technology embodied in production, foreignness and 
other factors. A large firm (relative to the local market) tends to use technology with 
a higher capital/labour ratio and to procure a relatively low wage expenditure share to 
total output value-added. However, its foreignness usually increases its import 
propensity, thus minimising domestic technological development potential which then 
limits the creation of jobs in the domestic market. The direct effect on employment 
also depends on the choice of techniques and the composition of output. The more 
capital-intensive the technology, the fewer the jobs created. At the same time, the 
composition of output depends on the objective of the investment, that is, whether 
investment is import-substituting or export-oriented. Some evidence shows that when 
a foreign firm produces import-substitution goods, it is indifferent to whether capital- 
intensive or labour-intensive methods are used in production, whereas it tends to 
utilise cheaper labour when the investment is intended to expand its world market 
share.11
There are also some indirect employment effects, which by their nature are 
more complex and difficult to quantify. Figure 3.1 depicts the major conceivable 
indirect effects that can lead to indirect employment repercussions, including the 
backward and forward linkages to the rest of the local economy, the multiplier effect 
of the wage bill, and the feedback of these effects on the local economy. For instance, 
a foreign firm which engages in import-substituting activities, generally sourcing 
higher local inputs than in export-oriented production, may create more indirect 
employment opportunity in the local economy. The employment effect also emanates 
from the creation and expansion of distribution and marketing facilities in the host 
country, especially where investments are oriented to local markets.
The degree of the foreign firm's impact on employment also depends on the 
availability of local inputs (that is, raw materials, parts and components, and various 
services). The employment effects of a foreign firm can be considerably constrained 
by the capacity of material suppliers and user industries in the country where it 
operates. Without an adequate supply of parts, components and raw materials, a firm 
cannot operate efficiently; and without growth of forward consuming industries, a 
firm cannot expect to grow. The entry of foreign firms, therefore, does not only 
provide intermediate products to local markets and thus facilitate the development of
H An ILO (International Labour Organisation) study (1981) indicated that the major incentive for 
multinationals investing in EPZs has been the comparatively low wages in the countries 
concerned. On the other hand, for many of the host countries, a major consideration in 
developing EPZs has been the potential that labour-intensive production seems to offer for rapid 
employment creation.
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forward user industries, but also its demands for materials and intermediate goods can 
improve those supporting industries. These forward and backward linkages obviously 
create employment opportunities in the local economy. However, it is practically 
impossible to isolate and evaluate these indirect employment effects, hence the total 
employment effect of foreign direct investment is generally underestimated in the 
literature. In brief, the strategies of foreign firms in production, marketing, technology 
and even repatriation can affect job creation and thereby the contribution to 
employment in the host country.
Many studies, such as Riedel (1975), Schive (1990) and others, have found 
that a large proportion of foreign investment in Taiwan takes advantage of the cheap 
and good quality labour. Many of the investments are export-oriented and embody 
labour-intensive technology. In addition to this, foreign investment in Taiwan is 
relatively small, compared with investment in other countries like Korea,12 especially 
the investment in the latter from Japan. Under these circumstances, foreign 
subsidiaries in Taiwan tend to be relatively labour-intensive. On the other hand, an 
ILO (International Labour Organisation) report (1981) indicates that when foreign 
investment engages in extracting industries (eg minerals and agriculture production), 
the employment effect is negligible and limited, whereas investment in manufacturing 
industries (eg textile or electronic production) in the export-promoting sector can 
create considerable employment through linkages. The manufacturing sector has 
undoubtedly shared the largest proportion of foreign investment among all sectors in 
Taiwan’s economy,13 particularly among those with export-oriented industries. With 
all these characteristics, foreign direct investment can create employment 
opportunities in the Taiwanese market.
Table 3.4 shows that foreign firms employed around 247,000 workers in 
1975, representing 4.5 per cent of Taiwan’s total employment. This percentage 
remained rather steady till the mid-1980s, when some foreign subsidiaries ceased 
their operations. As a whole, the percentage is not significant, if indirect employment 
effects are excluded. However, without employment by foreign firms, the 
unemployment rate in Taiwan might have been as high as 6 to 7 per cent, above the 
natural unemployment rate in full-equilibrium (4 per cent). Foreign capital has 
definitely mitigated the unemployment problem of Taiwan. This effect was more 
remarkable in the early stages when there was huge unemployment hidden in the 
agricultural sector.
12 This is based on a comparison of the data in Lee (1980) and Investment Commission (1993).
13 The manufacturing sector shared around 90 per cent of total foreign capital till the mid-1980s, 
when the Taiwanese government began to open the service sector to foreigners.
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If the manufacturing sector alone is considered, the average employment 
percentage would have been near 15 per cent during the 1970s, and 8 to 10 per cent 
in the second half of the 1980s. Foreign firms had a more profound effect on 
employment in the manufacturing sector than other sectors of the Taiwanese 
economy. The decreasing trend implies that foreign direct investment tends to employ 
more capital-intensive technology in later stages. This may be attributed to the 
strategic responses of foreign subsidiaries to catching-up by indigenous firms.
Table 3.4 Employment effect of FDI (1,000 persons)
All
industries
(a)
Manufacturing
(b)
Foreign
firms
(total)
(c)
Foreign firms 
(manufacturing)
(d)
(c)/(a)
%
(d)/(b)
%
unemployment
rate
exclude include 
FDI FDI
1975 5,521 1,518 247 222 4.5 14.6 6.8 2.4
1976 5,669 1,628 290 263 5.1 16.2 6.8 1.8
1977 5,980 1,767 298 273 5.0 15.5 6.7 1.8
1978 6,228 1,892 319 295 5.1 15.6 6.7 1.7
1979 6,424 2,084 357 334 5.6 16.0 6.8 1.3
1980 6,547 2,138 330 309 5.0 14.5 6.2 1.2
1981 6,672 2,146 322 298 4.8 13.9 6.1 1.4
1982 6,811 2,169 326 288 4.8 13.3 6.8 2.1
1983 7,070 2,305 267 237 3.8 10.3 6.4 2.7
1984 7,308 2,494 339 308 4.6 12.4 7.0 2.4
1985 7,428 2,488 262 230 3.5 9.3 6.3 2.9
1986 7,733 2,614 298 271 3.9 10.4 6.4 2.7
1987 8,022 2,810 306 263 3.8 9.4 5.7 2.0
1988 8,107 2,798 283 242 3.5 8.6 5.1 1.7
1989 8,258 2,803 291 244 3.5 8.7 5.1 1.6
Source: Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1975-1989, Taipei, Taiwan.
Another interesting issue is the relationship between the employment effect 
and the export strategy of foreign firms. The literature suggests that export-oriented 
investment tends to utilise labour-intensive technology (Caves 1980), implying that 
foreign firms which export more will employ more labour. Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient test statistic is used to test this hypothesis in Taiwan during the 
1975-89 period. Firstly, testing the relationship between employment and export ratio 
across firms year by year, the estimated coefficients are in the range which leads to 
the rejection of the null hypothesis before 1986 and approaches the critical value in 
later years. When the test is applied to the whole data set (10,075 observations), the 
coefficient is 0.31; the null hypothesis is also rejected. The results confirm that foreign 
firms with higher exports create more job opportunities. These results are in line with
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Schive (1979) who estimated that the jobs created could be attributed to exports by 
weighting employment per firm with its export ratio, and found that the weighted 
employment of foreign firms was about 75 per cent of the total labour employed by 
them, higher than the average export ratio: 50 per cent.
Secondly, the test is applied at the industry level, the estimated Spearman’s 
rank coefficients were insignificant for some years, because of the domestic market 
orientation in industries, such as the non-metallic and metallic industries. The export 
ratio and employment in the chemical and pulp paper industry fluctuate vigorously,14 
which could also bias the estimated results. However, this result also conforms to 
Schive’s study. As a whole, export-oriented investment in Taiwan did indeed create 
job opportunities in the labour market.
In addition, the relationship between export and capital-labour ratio was also 
estimated. The capital-labour ratio is represented by the fixed assets per worker. The 
Spearman’s rank correlation test shows a negative association between the export 
ratio and the fixed assets per worker during the whole sample period. The estimated 
coefficients range from -0.34 to -0.5, with -0.45 the average for the whole 9,945 
observations, indicating that the lower the rank of the foreign firms export ratio, the 
higher the rank of its capital-labour ratio. The estimate suggests that foreign 
investment in Taiwan is inclined to be labour-intensive and export-oriented.
The strategies of foreign firms appear to tally with the pattern of comparative 
advantage in Taiwan’s economy, thus creating considerable employment. The 
contribution of foreign investment to the labour market in Taiwan is remarkable even 
if the indirect employment effect is excluded. The indirect employment effect, like the 
direct effect, also depends on the strategies of foreign subsidiaries.
Effect on linkages
Another important contribution of foreign investment, as suggested by Ranis and 
Schive (1985), are the linkage and learning processes. These include purchases of 
locally made raw materials, introduction of new industries and marketing techniques, 
and training of local skilled labour and management. Foreign firms' linkages to the 
host economy basically depend on their strategies in purchasing, managing, and 
marketing. Many host governments enact requirements which govern the behaviour 
of foreign direct investment under the approval entry system, thereby sharpening the 
response of foreign firms to the development of linkages to the host economy.
This fluctuation may be due to the sampling difference for the whole period, especially because 
these two industries have many heterogenous products or large scale deviations.
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Theoretically, there are two types of linkage effect: backward linkage, which 
extends back from the purchases made by a firm; and forward linkage, extending 
through the inputs that it supplies to other processes and activities. No matter which 
kind of production process is used, there may be incentives to develop downstream or 
upstream industries in the host economy with the encouragement of a specific demand 
for outputs or a concrete supply of inputs by foreign firms, unless the production 
processes of products need only the inputs of primary factors (capital and labour), as 
in the extraction industries.
Of these two effects, forward linkages are more diversified and concealed in 
the activities between foreign firms and local firms, making their effects more difficult 
to measure. Backward linkages, therefore, generally receive more attention, 
particularly when the host country promulgates import-substitution policies. The 
potential backward linkage effect may also differ considerably in terms of the 
activities undertaken by multinationals. For instance, Dietz (1985) finds that a 
multinational engaged in producing export-oriented, labour-intensive products and 
vertically integrated with its parent firm may induce relatively low linkage effects, 
because under the globalised production of multinationals, the subsidiary’s inputs tend 
to be imported from the parent company or parent suppliers, with a relatively small 
proportion of local purchasing. This phenomenon is generally recognised to be more 
prominent in the foreign firms located in EPZs,15 because these firms prefer to utilise 
their global production networks and cheaper labour costs.
The most popular and simplest indicator for measuring the degree of realised 
backward linkage effect is the extent of local procurement by foreign subsidiaries. 
Local procurement can be crudely calculated by the ratio of materials purchased from 
the domestic market to the total materials expenditure of a foreign firm. This ratio 
only represents the direct linkages of a foreign firms to the domestic market. The 
magnitude of indirect linkages depends on the input-output relationship of the 
products purchased. For simplicity, the indirect linkage effects are not included here. 
Figure 3.2 shows the time trend in local procurement by foreign subsidiaries in 
Taiwan.
The average local procurement ratio by foreign subsidiaries in Taiwan 
remained rather steady during 1975-1989, ranging from 50.7 per cent to 55 per cent, 
with a slight downward trend in the 1980s. This downward trend was mainly due to 
the reduction of local purchasing by foreign subsidiaries outside the EPZs. The 
average local procurement ratio of these non-EPZs’ subsidiaries declined from 58.1
An opposite argument suggests that this view overlooks the point that an export-oriented industry 
generally faces more severe competition in the world market. This pressure forces the firm to 
pursue and adjust production to lower cost, which is usually accompanied by higher local 
procurement.
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per cent in 1975 to 52.4 per cent in 1989. The trend for foreign firms located in 
EPZs, however, has been increasing: from 33.5 per cent in 1975 to 50.9 per cent in 
1989.
Figure 3.2 Trends in local procurement by foreign firms in Taiwan, 1975-89
(% )
60 t
non-EPZ firms
55 --
50 --
all firms
45 --
40 --
EPZ firms
Source: Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, 1975-1989, Taipei, Taiwan.
Nevertheless, local procurement by EPZ firms has always been lower than that 
undertaken by firms outside the EPZs until recent years. Relatively low local 
procurement by EPZ foreign firms could be due to:
(i) low labour costs being one of the major incentives for investing abroad. Firms 
in EPZs are usually attracted by the lower wage costs, and their production 
processes tend to be relatively simple in the context of their global production. 
They import most of their equipment and intermediate materials from other 
production sites;16
(ii) high export ratios. Compared with products for the domestic market, export 
goods generally contain more imported materials to maintain product quality 
and market competitiveness. Therefore, a high export ratio suggests that high 
importation by these firms is to be expected. Table 3.5 shows that a very high 
proportion of products are being exported by foreign firms in EPZs. The export 
to sales ratio of these firms remained above 93 per cent until 1986. Since then 
the export ratio has stayed as high as 50 to 60 per cent. The ratio was much
This type of investment, it has been argued, not only incurs low linkage effects with local 
industries, but the value-added of its products is also insufficient.
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higher than the average for foreign direct investment in Taiwan, around 50 per 
cent to 62 per cent with a drop to 33 per cent in 1989.
(iii) freedom to import materials into EPZs and convenient import processes. This 
has been an important incentive in foreign investors’ decision to locate their 
operations in Taiwan. However, this convenience tend to encourage firms in 
EPZs to use more imports in their production; and
(iv) a high percentage of foreign equity. Foreign participation may influence a firm’s 
sourcing strategy in respect of the use of local materials. Firms in EPZs 
generally prefer majority foreign ownership in order to hold management 
control,17 either out of concern for the globalisation of multinationals or for the 
convenience of practising transfer pricing.18
Table 3.5 Export ratios of foreign direct investment in Taiwan, 1973-89, (NT$1,000)
FDI sales 
(a)
FDI export 
(b)
Export ratio
(b)/(a) %
EPZ sales EPZ export EPZ export ratio
(c) (d) (d)/(c) %
1973 66,536 41,243 61.99 - - _
1974 - - - - - -
1975 96,089 55,218 57.5 13,757 13,602 98.7
1976 144,421 88,696 61.4 20,109 20,086 99.8
1977 169,133 102,916 60.9 21,142 21,069 99.6
1978 226,945 136,119 60.0 28,455 28,198 99.2
1979 292,119 164,215 56.2 30,628 30,537 99.1
1980 323,012 177,608 55.0 37,301 36,335 97.1
1981 361,486 202,384 56.0 35,067 34,737 98.5
1982 362,416 196,741 54.3 49,490 49,226 97.1
1983 321,662 172,876 53.7 53,068 52,527 96.3
1984 552,402 282,864 51.2 43,078 42,913 98.6
1985 421,086 220,520 52.4 32,810 32,620 98.6
1986 497,144 264,942 53.3 75,132 73,931 94.8
1987 590,664 297,343 50.3 100,518 98,002 93.3
1988 698,688 304,958 43.7 53,004 44,661 67.1
1989 873,911 288,608 33.0 153,916 72,172 51.9
Source: Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1975-1989, Taipei, Taiwan.
Nevertheless, the upward trend of local procurement by EPZ firms suggests 
that they now link more closely to the domestic economy. As a whole, the hypothesis
The average percentage of foreign participation has always been above 80 per cent in EPZs 
which is higher than the average of firms outside, 50-60 per cent.
18 Lall (1973) indicated that transfer price is one key factor affecting the decision making of foreign 
firms.
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that foreign investment forms an economic enclave in the host economy is apparently 
rejected in Taiwan, even for the EPZs.
On the other hand, the decreasing trend in local procurement by firms outside 
the EPZs might suggest that there is no strong linkage of these firms to the domestic 
economy. Yet this conclusion might not be warranted in Taiwan’s case. Schive 
(1979) studied the local procurement of foreign firms during the early 1970s, and 
found that there was an increasing trend towards using local materials from 1972 to 
1978. From these two data sets it can be concluded that there was an upward trend in 
local procurement before 1980, which turned downward later. The earlier upward 
trend might suggest that foreign firms indeed generated backward linkage effects in 
an earlier period. This is particularly important in the early development stage; the 
underdeveloped Taiwan economy required information and assistance from a variety 
of sources in establishing a broadly based industrial structure. This trend also suggests 
spillovers by foreign firms.
The subsequent downward trend in procurement might suggest that there was 
a strategic change by foreign firms in sourcing materials. This can be explained by 
increases in the price of importing materials around 1980.19 This implies that because 
of technological changes in Taiwan or new technology being transferred, foreign 
firms were forced to import new materials that could not be produced in the domestic 
market.
Furthermore, in personal interviews conducted with several EPZ firms, some 
pointed out that their production technology had seen only minor changes since 
establishment because of the globalised production of the multinationals. On the other 
hand, firms outside the EPZs facing severe competition from indigenous firms have to 
pursue products or technology innovation more intensively. Foreign firms outside the 
EPZs created larger linkage effects to the domestic market than EPZ firms. But in 
both EPZs and outside, foreign direct investment had indeed created backward 
linkages to Taiwan’s economy during the past four decades.
Effect on balance of payments
As for the influence of foreign direct investment on foreign exchange, the shortage of 
foreign exchange may act as a constraint to economic development, as the deficiency 
of savings does. When foreign direct investment is undertaken there is an initial effect: 
the balance of payments can benefit from the associated capital inflow. This may only 
be a one off effect. There may also be some effect over time if a foreign-owned
19 According to Taiwan’s statistical data, the unit value index of imports jumped to a very high 
level during 1981-85.
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enterprise can generate a net positive flow of export earnings. These effects can be 
examined from the following three perspectives:
(i) Whether the investment is domestic market or export-oriented. If the foreign 
firm has an export-oriented strategy, then most of its products will be exported, 
earning foreign exchange, which will improve the balance of payments.
(ii) The percentage of local content in the products produced bv foreign-owned 
firms. If the product has a high local content (which means it has a relatively 
low proportion of imported raw materials and intermediate imports), then there 
is a positive effect due to an expansion of domestic output.
(iii) The distribution of foreign firm’s profits between the host country’s factor 
inputs and the government: that is, tax revenue and the retained share. The 
remittance of dividends, interest, royalties or administrative charges to the 
parent firm generates adverse effects on the balance of payments of the host 
country.
These various effects on the balance of payments can be broadly classified into 
the export effect (related to (i)), the import-substitution effect and the import effect 
(from (ii)), and the remissions effect (from (iii)). The first two effects can improve the 
balance of payments, while the other two worsen it. Since these effects can only be 
evaluated on a firm-by-firm basis, the net impact of the operations of foreign firms on 
balance of payments should be examined empirically for the specific country.
In the case of Taiwan, foreign capital inflow mainly took the form of cash 
inflow, machinery and equipment importation, and retained earning reinvestment. 
Schive (1979) estimated that about 81 per cent of the capital inflow was in cash 
terms, while machinery and equipment accounted for 4 per cent, materials 1 per cent 
and reinvestment 14 per cent. There is no doubt that cash inflow contributed directly 
to the balance of payments. The importation of machinery and equipment that cannot 
be produced or supplied by the domestic market can also be seen as a contribution to 
the balance of payments. As to the retained earning reinvestment, since the profits of 
foreign-owned firms take no account of national income and there is also no 
restriction on remittances in Taiwan, the retained earning reinvestment can thus 
contribute to balance of payments only indirectly, in the short run.
There is no doubt that foreign investment has favourable export expansion 
effects; however, the net trade effect was of the most concern to the Taiwan economy 
in the early development period. To calculate the net trade effect, it is necessary to 
take account of the imported raw materials and intermediate inputs as well as exports. 
One way to examine this impact is through the percentage changes in the local
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content of the foreign subsidiary’s products, with a low proportion of import content 
generally leading to positive net trade effects.
The difficulty in the collection of data and the complexity in measuring the 
local content of products prevents accurate calculation of the net trade effect. 
However, a simple comparison of the exports from and imports by the foreign 
subsidiaries is calculated in Table 3.6 to give some insight into the net trade effect.
As shown in Table 3.6, the total exports of the foreign firms contributed a 
large proportion to Taiwan’s total exports, over 10 per cent and even above 20 per 
cent in earlier periods. Foreign direct investment contributes significantly to Taiwan’s 
exports. Meanwhile, foreign firms were responsible for a relatively low percentage of 
Taiwan’s total imports suggesting that the foreign exchange earnings of foreign 
subsidiaries are probably larger than their overseas payments, since Taiwan has 
accumulated foreign reserves from the 1970s. These data, better than a direct 
comparison of the value of foreign firms’ exports and imports, suggest that foreign 
direct investment might have had a positive net trade effect in relation to international 
trade in Taiwan.
Table 3.6 The effect of FDI on the Taiwan economy, 1973-89 ( NT$ million)
G N P
0 0
T otal
Export
0 0
(b)/(a)
%
F D I
S ales
(c)
FD I
Export
(d)
(d)/(b )
%
T otal
Import
te)
FD I
Import
(h)
(h )/(g )
%
1973 4 1 0 ,2 8 9 1 7 0 ,7 2 3 4 1 .6 6 6 ,5 3 6 4 1 ,2 4 3 2 4 .2 1 4 5 ,0 7 9 1 9 ,9 0 5 13.7
1975 5 8 6 ,3 0 7 2 0 1 ,4 6 8 34 .4 6 4 ,8 3 5 4 1 ,1 0 0 2 0 .4 1 41 ,611 2 2 ,5 3 9 15.9
1976 7 0 2 ,6 9 4 3 0 9 ,9 1 3 44 .1 8 8 ,2 2 0 6 1 ,0 4 1 19.7 1 8 6 ,9 7 5 3 1 ,9 2 7 17.1
1977 8 2 3 ,8 7 1 3 5 5 ,2 3 9 43 .1 1 0 3 ,7 5 0 6 8 ,2 9 2 19 .2 2 1 4 ,6 3 5 3 4 ,6 6 9 16 .2
1978 9 8 9 ,2 7 1 4 6 8 ,5 0 9 4 7 .4 1 3 8 ,8 5 2 9 0 ,3 4 4 19.3 2 7 1 ,8 4 0 4 5 ,7 3 3 16.8
1979 1 ,1 9 6 ,2 3 8 5 7 9 ,2 9 9 4 8 .4 1 7 7 ,7 2 9 1 0 5 ,9 4 5 18.3 3 6 7 ,3 9 4 5 7 ,5 1 6 15.7
1 9 8 0 1 ,4 8 8 ,9 5 3 7 1 2 ,1 9 5 4 7 .8 2 1 2 ,8 5 5 1 2 8 ,3 2 8 18 .0 5 0 2 ,9 8 4 6 8 ,2 4 5 13.6
1981 1 ,7 6 4 ,2 7 8 8 2 9 ,7 5 6 4 7 .0 2 3 2 ,4 8 6 1 3 5 ,2 1 7 16.3 6 1 7 ,1 1 0 7 2 ,0 1 0 11.7
198 2 1 ,8 9 9 ,2 8 9 8 6 4 ,2 4 8 4 5 .5 2 1 8 ,6 9 2 1 3 0 ,8 7 8 15.1 5 6 8 ,7 8 1 9 6 ,1 3 9 16.9
1983 2 ,1 0 3 ,2 6 1 1 ,0 0 5 ,4 2 2 4 7 .8 2 0 5 ,1 1 4 1 1 4 ,7 2 4 11.4 6 3 9 ,6 8 9 6 5 ,1 3 4 10 .2
1984 2 ,3 6 8 ,4 7 8 1 ,2 0 4 ,6 9 7 5 0 .9 3 2 4 ,3 2 0 1 9 2 ,5 3 2 16 .0 6 8 1 ,6 4 7 1 0 3 ,9 7 2 15.3
1985 2 ,5 1 5 ,0 4 9 1 ,2 2 3 ,0 1 9 4 8 .6 2 8 1 ,5 9 6 1 6 9 ,4 7 5 13.9 6 1 6 ,0 0 9 8 8 ,1 9 3 14.3
1986 2 ,9 2 5 ,7 7 2 1 ,5 0 7 ,0 4 4 5 1 .5 3 7 3 ,3 8 1 1 8 8 ,8 4 4 12.5 6 4 8 ,5 8 9 1 1 0 ,7 3 4 17.1
1987 3 ,2 8 8 ,9 7 3 1 ,7 0 7 ,6 0 8 5 1 .9 4 9 1 ,1 4 5 2 2 9 ,7 5 1 13.5 7 3 9 ,6 2 8 1 4 1 ,6 9 9 19 .2
1988 3 ,5 8 5 ,2 9 4 1 ,7 3 1 ,8 0 4 48 .3 4 9 3 ,3 2 4 2 5 1 ,6 1 1 14.5 1 ,0 3 0 ,9 6 8 1 3 1 ,7 8 8 12.8
1989 3 ,9 6 8 ,9 7 5 1 ,7 4 7 ,8 0 0 4 4 .0 5 8 5 ,4 4 7 2 3 1 ,3 3 5 13 .2 9 8 6 ,1 3 5 1 5 2 ,8 9 7 15.5
Source: Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1975-1989, Taipei, Taiwan.
The positive net trade effect of foreign direct investment in Taiwan suggests 
that foreign direct investment may also contribute to Taiwan’s balance of payment. In
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a developing country like Taiwan, the role of foreign investment in filling the foreign 
exchange gap is crucial to economic development. Taiwan’s balance of payments 
situation has shown great improvement, realising a sizeable surplus on the current 
account and huge foreign exchange reserves in the 1970s. It is necessary to examine 
whether this improvement can be attributed to the inflow of foreign investment.
According to Lall and Streeten (1977), the direct balance-of-payment effect, 
which they defined as the immediately effect on foreign exchange, can be calculated 
by taking a firm's exports plus the inflow of equity or loans from abroad, and 
deducting capital goods imported, remittances, and technical fees or royalties. 
Following their definition, Table 3.7 calculates the direct balance-of-payment effects 
of foreign direct investment in Taiwan.
Table 3.7 Direct balance-of-payment effects, 1975-89, (NT$ million)
Direct balance- 
of-payment 
effects
Contribution of component (%)
Exports Imports
Materials Machinery
Remittance
1975 2,754.73 39.0 28.2 - 3.7
1976 8,489.16 50.3 31.6 - 3.0
1977 10,868.54 50.9 31.1 - 3.8
1978 22,371.53 55.8 33.3 - 3.1
1979 14,915.08 48.9 32.9 - 2.6
1980 19,076.74 50.0 28.0 3.1 3.6
1981 23,216.02 48.9 29.5 4.4 3.5
1982 27,654.53 53.0 28.6 4.3 6.6
1983 17,734.20 53.0 30.5 3.4 8.2
1984 48,499.19 52.6 32.0 4.8 8.9
1985 33,194.88 48.4 57.3 7.0 26.4
1986 18,963.29 45.0 31.8 3.6 12.7
1987 294.44 43.6 34.7 44.5 13.6
1988 -10,458.96 40.6 32.9 7.9 12.3
1989 -16,668.04 42.4 30.7 3.6 23.6
Note: (i) Direct balance-of-payment effect is derived as:
Bd = X - ( C k+Cr +R + D)
where X is the value of exports; Ck represents the value of capital goods imported; Cr is 
the value of raw materials and intermediate goods imported; R is royalties and technical 
fees paid abroad after tax; and D is net after-tax profits and interest accruing abroad.
(ii) The contribution of components is calculated as percentage to sales to exclude the scale 
difference across firms.
Source: Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic
Affairs, 1975-1989, Taipei, Taiwan.
Table 3.7 shows that the balance-of-payment effect remained positive until 
1987. Total foreign direct investment earned close to NT$3 billion in 1975 and 
reached a peak of NT$49 billion in 1984. Thus, foreign direct investment appears to
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have contributed to the accumulation of foreign exchange in Taiwan, over the past 
few decades. Furthermore, the components show that the role of exports was the 
dominant factor determining this positive effect on foreign exchange, the average of 
the ratio of exports to sales being over 40 per cent. At the same time, imports of 
foreign material and machinery had an important negative effect, accounting for 
around 30 per cent of sales. Remittance of profits and other factors had a relatively 
low negative impact on the balance of payment. Overall, foreign direct investment has 
had a positive contribution to foreign reserves in Taiwan, particularly before 1985.
The positive direct balance-of-payment effects are entirely expected, since 
Taiwan has succeeded in export-oriented industrialisation since the mid-1970s, and 
since most foreign direct investment tends to be export-led. The statistical data show 
that the export share to GNP in Taiwan rose from 8.5 per cent during the 1950s, to 
20 per cent in the 1960s and further to 40-52 per cent from the mid-1970s, with only 
a few years recording an increase of less than 40 per cent (from Table 3.6). Export 
growth has been a leading factor in determining the economic growth of Taiwan. 
Furthermore, most foreign investment has maintained relatively high export ratios in 
their sales. As noted in Table 3.6, the nature of this trade-oriented investment led to 
Taiwan’s balanced trade and foreign exchange accounts. This phenomenon is more 
significant in those investments in the export processing zones, which averaged 
export ratios as high as 98-99 per cent until the late 1980s.
The direct ba\ance-of-payment effects are calculated using the export effect, 
the import effect and the remission effect of foreign investment. Another major effect 
which may influence the foreign exchange situation in the host country is the import- 
substitution effect. Although this effect is generally considered to have a positive 
impact on balance of payments, its influence remains uncertain because of 
measurement difficulties. It is impossible to estimate what Taiwan’s balance of 
payments circumstances might be without foreign capital inflow.
Indirect effects may be more significant. For instance, Schive (1979) points 
out that one of the major contributions of foreign direct investment to Taiwan’s 
exports was the dispersal of information about foreign markets to indigenous firms. 
Again, there is difficulty in measuring this indirect effect. Since Taiwan’s surplus can 
partly be attributed to the positive direct balance-of-payment effects, it is undisputed 
that foreign investment served to fill the foreign exchange gap, particularly during the 
country’s development period.
Apart from these contributions by foreign direct investment, there are other 
effects which are often discussed in the literature, such as the contribution to 
governmental tax revenues and foreign exchange. By taxing foreign firms’ profits and 
participating financially in their local operations, the host government is thought to be
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better able to mobilise public financial resources for development projects. On the 
other hand, some studies suggest that foreign direct investment can also diminish tax 
revenue as a result of liberal tax concessions, excessive investment allowance, public 
subsidies and tariff protection provided by the host government.
In Taiwan, most foreign investments were eligible for benefits under the 
Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals. This allowed them to enjoy a tax 
holiday, an investment allowance, and other preferential treatment. While there could 
be a loss of government revenues in the short run, considering their linkage effect to 
the development of industries, there could be a compensating expansion of the tax 
base in the long run. According to the survey data, corporate income tax paid by 
foreign firms is around 20 per cent of the whole country’s yearly revenues. In 
addition, foreign firms also raised governmental tax revenues by paying tariffs, and 
commodity, stamp and other taxes. Foreign firms therefore contributed to filling the 
Taiwanese government’s budgetary gap.
On average, the penetration of foreign direct investment into the Taiwanese 
economy had favourable effects, particularly before 1980. Strategic responses by 
foreign firms to economic changes began from 1980, when the Taiwanese economy 
matured and stabilised. Domestic firms had also developed the capacity to accept the 
challenge from the world market. Foreign direct investment had succeeded in playing 
the role of 'tutor' in dispersing technology, marketing, management and other 
techniques.
Conclusion
Government policy directed specifically towards supporting foreign firms appears to 
have had little influence on the location decisions of foreign firms. The belief that 
government policy can influence location and other decisions in foreign direct 
investment has led some host countries’ governments to enact preferential and 
favourable policies towards foreign direct investment. A variety of incentives is 
included in these policies, such as tax holidays, tax allowances, accelerated 
depreciation, and other preferential treatment. In the case of Taiwan, government 
policy directed towards supporting foreign firms appears to have had little influence 
on the location decisions of foreign firms. Policy has, however, had an impact on the 
magnitude, pattem and form of foreign capital inflow.
It is possible that Taiwan’s success in attracting foreign capital inflow was due 
to the establishment of export processing zones, where facilities were established for 
foreign investors to proceed with off-shore production. In addition, the establishment 
of a number of industrial districts around the island also induced some foreign direct 
investment by reducing search, plant and other pre-operational costs.
77
But the most important influence of government policy was the effort that the 
government put into providing a better investment environment for foreign firms, 
through simplifying application procedures for establishment, stabilising foreign 
currency exchange rates and the financial markets, and liberalising the trade market. 
Creating a good investment climate and a liberalised market appear to be the most 
important factors in inducing foreign capital inflow in Taiwan’s case.
One of the major reasons that a host government wishes to attract foreign 
direct investment is to access advanced technology. However, foreign direct 
investment also provides capital, management know-how and other benefits to the 
host market, which can help in filling the savings gap, foreign exchange gap, and 
budgetary gap, as well as the management and the skilled labour gap in the host 
economy. Foreign direct investment may also assist in attaining macroeconomic 
policy objectives, such as creating job opportunities and improving terms of trade. 
Foreign direct investment can also generate positive effects upon firms and industries 
via linkages to the domestic market. Foreign firms may disseminate information on 
technology, marketing, and other matters, thus helping the domestic firms to access 
the world market.
Five major contributions of foreign direct investment on the Taiwanese 
economy have been examined: technology, capital formation, employment, linkages 
and balance of payments.
The impact of foreign direct investment on technology mainly depends on the 
appropriateness of the technology, the efficiency in adapting it and the continuity of 
technology transfer. The first of these is closely related to the factor endowment in 
the host economy because the technology transferred may not be most efficiently 
employed if domestic factor inputs are used. The technologies employed by foreign 
subsidiaries in Taiwan have usually passed through selection by the parent firms; most 
of them tend to be labour-intensive and thus easier to adapt, which also permits 
efficiency in adaptation. At the same time, the high flexibility of Taiwan’s enterprises, 
the efficient training system and the high degree of labour mobility also ensure 
efficiency in adapting transferred technology. The speed of technology transfer is not 
easy to identify, but the continuous growth of the inflow of foreign direct investment 
provides, at least, some evidence. It also suggests the presence of spillover effects.
Compared with other factors, foreign direct investment did indeed play a 
major role in the transfer of new technology over the past three decades of Taiwan’s 
economic development. However, with economic growth and industrial upgrading 
since the 1980s, technology licensing agreements have become more prominent than 
foreign direct investment.
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Foreign direct investment provides the capital which can help the developing 
host country to break out of Nurkse’s ‘vicious circle of poverty’ and to push through 
the growth process. Taiwan was pulled out of this low level equilibrium trap with the 
assistance of US aid, and economic development began to take off with the inflow of 
foreign capital in the 1960s. Foreign capital compensated for the shortage of domestic 
savings in the early stages of development, but became relatively less important when 
domestic savings grew and were directed to productive activities. Yet the 
contribution of foreign capital to capital formation is undisputed, particularly in the 
early stages of development and in the growth of the manufacturing sector.
The third role of foreign direct investment is its effect in creating job 
opportunities. A high unemployment rate or under-employment is always a crucial 
issue for developing countries, and utilising cheap labour is one major motivation for 
foreign direct investment in the host country. The establishment of foreign 
subsidiaries absorbs abundant labour in the market. The contribution of foreign direct 
investment in job creation depends on the characteristics of the foreign subsidiaries, 
such as firm size, production technology, foreignness and linkages to the domestic 
market. In Taiwan, the electronics industry has the largest foreign participation which, 
according to the ILO, created a considerable number of jobs in the labour market. 
Without foreign subsidiaries’ employment, Taiwan’s unemployment rate is likely to 
have remained above the full-equilibrium unemployment rate. Hence, foreign direct 
investment definitely mitigated the unemployment problem in Taiwan.
Another important issue related to foreign direct investment are linkages to 
domestic firms. These include purchases of domestic materials, introducing new 
intermediate inputs and marketing techniques and training workers. Linkage effects 
are usually measured by the ratio of local procurement in the foreign subsidiary, 
indicating backward linkage. The local procurement ratio of foreign subsidiaries in 
Taiwan remained steady for several decades, eventually following a slightly 
downward trend. Firms located in the EPZs have an increasing trend in local 
procurement which is partly attributable to the success of domestic firms in producing 
better quality substitutes. The declining ratio for foreign subsidiaries outside the 
export processing zones may be explained by their technological characteristics which 
lead to the import of new materials and intermediate inputs. These firms generally 
face much stronger competition from the indigenous firms than firms in the export 
processing zones, so they have to import new technology to keep their competitive 
advantage in production and thus generate technological change. Firms outside EPZs 
might create larger linkage effects with the domestic economy than those inside.
The last issue discussed was the effect on foreign exchange. A shortage of 
foreign exchange may act as a constraint to economic development, just as a
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deficiency of savings does. The effect on the balance of payments depends on the 
behaviour of foreign subsidiaries in three respects: the percentage of local content in 
products, the markets for the products, and the distribution of the profits. The effect 
of these factors on the balance of payments is channelled through the export, import- 
substitution, import and remission effects. The first two effects can improve the 
balance of payments, while the other two effects worsen it.
The calculation of the direct balance-of-payment effect, developed by Lall and 
Streeten (1977) and comprising the export, import and remission effects, shows that 
foreign subsidiaries in Taiwan generated a favourable impact on the balance of 
payments. There is no completely appropriate measure to estimate the magnitude of 
the import-substitution effect because the economic environment cannot be simulated 
by assuming no inflow of foreign capital, but this effect is commonly regarded as 
being positively correlated to the inflow of foreign capital via linkages to the domestic 
economy. Nonetheless, the impact of foreign direct investment on the balance of 
payments in Taiwan appears to have been positive.
In addition, foreign direct investment may also contribute to the host 
government’s revenue through its payment of corporate income tax, tariffs, and 
commodity, stamp, and other taxes during its operations.
On average, the penetration of foreign direct investment into Taiwan could be 
seen as a positive factor in the country’s economic development. The high economic 
growth and upgrading of the industrial structure which accompanied foreign direct 
investment suggest that a domestic economy benefits from foreign direct investment 
through both of these effects. However, domestic firms may also contribute to these 
effects, and it is therefore necessary to distinguish the differences between foreign and 
local firms before arriving at any final conclusion about the benefit of foreign direct 
investment to a host economy. Foreign and domestic firms in Taiwan are compared in 
several important aspects of firm behaviour in the following chapter.
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4 The Comparative Performance of Foreign 
Firms and Indigenous Firms
Foreign direct investment had positive effects on Taiwan’s economic development, 
yet it is possible that local firms may have generated similar benefits to the economy. 
The impact of foreign direct investment on development would be minimal if foreign 
subsidiaries and local firms behaved in a similar way. Comparison of the performance 
of foreign subsidiaries and local firms is employed in this chapter to distinguish their 
characteristics in terms of scale, technology, employment, sales strategy and so forth. 
The hypothesis is that, if foreign subsidiaries and local firms perform differently, then 
foreign subsidiaries may generate externalities over and above those generated by 
their local counterparts. Better performance by foreign subsidiaries, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, suggests that there is a potential catch-up by local firms if local firms put 
effort into capturing spillovers, such as recruiting skilled workers from foreign firms. 
The assumption in this hypothesis is that foreign subsidiaries have superiority in all or 
some characteristics, because of their unique intangible assets, such as technology, 
management know-how, technical skills, and access to marketing and information 
networks.
There is little doubt that foreign subsidiaries and local firms perform 
differently— especially in developing countries— but it may be questioned whether 
this is due simply to the nationality of their ownership. Previous research such as 
Kojima (1973, 1985), Liu, Schive and Tsai (1990), and Chen and Wang (1992) has 
put much effort into comparative study of capital by origin of ownership.1
There are also many studies comparing the performance of foreign 
subsidiaries and domestic firms: Kumar (1989) in India, Blomstrom (1989) in Mexico, 
Willmore (1986) in Brazil, Riedel (1975) and Schive (1990) in Taiwan. On the basis 
of a survey of 445 Taiwanese manufacturing export firms in six industries, Riedel 
(1975) compared foreign subsidiaries and local firms’ factor intensities, factor 
productivity, import content, degree of export orientation, and other indicators.
1 Kojima posited that the market orientation of Japanese foreign direct investment is significantly 
different from that of other countries, especially American foreign direct investment, which leads 
to different performance by foreign subsidiaries of different national origin. Following Kojima, 
many studies have attempted to identify the features of Japanese subsidiaries distinct from those 
of US subsidiaries in various developing countries. For instance, Chou (1988) in Taiwan, Lee 
(1980) in Korea. Liu, Schive and Tsai (1990) and Chen and Wang (1992), in studying Taiwan, 
implicitly recognised differences in performance of different national origin, one being that US 
subsidiaries’ are more export-oriented and use more foreign materials.
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Schive (1990) compared the factor intensity of foreign firms and local firms across 
twelve highly aggregated industries. Riedel found that foreign subsidiaries differed 
significantly from local firms in scale of production, export performance and import 
dependence, but insignificantly in factor intensity. However, the absence of any 
significant difference in factor intensity might be because Riedel’s study only 
examined export-oriented firms. Schive’s study found that foreign subsidiaries, on 
average, used more capital-intensive technology than their local counterparts, but 
foreign investment tended to be concentrated in more labour-intensive industries. 
Foreign firms, on the whole, tended to use more labour-intensive technology. Both 
studies verified the difference between foreign-owned firms and local firms in Taiwan, 
but using highly aggregated levels of industrial data.
Since foreign subsidiaries in developing countries are often presumed to be 
different from their domestic counterparts in several important respects, the following 
study attempts to compare these characteristics by using the industrial census data of 
Taiwan in the year of 1986. The next section of this chapter presents the hypothesis 
and variables. The third part reports the results of tests of difference between matched 
pairs of firms by industry, followed by a description of the test results of matched 
pairs by size. The final section summarises the main findings.
Hypothesis and variables
In statistical analyses of the effect of foreign ownership and management on industrial 
performance, two approaches have often been used. One approach is to collect 
information for pairs of firms— one foreign-owned and one indigenous— carefully 
matched by industry or size. Any observed difference between the two types of firms 
is then ascribed to the effect of ownership rather than the effect of industry or scale of 
production, as has been done by Willmore (1986), Blomstrom (1989, ch. 2), Kumar 
(1989, ch. 4). This approach has the advantage of simplicity in assumptions, but the 
disadvantage of not making full use of the available data.
The other approach, such as that by Chou (1988), is to specify and estimate a 
regression model in which ownership characteristics are included as one of the 
explanatory variable. This makes better use of existing information, and observations 
are not wasted for lack of comparable firms, but the method is quite demanding in 
terms of the strong assumptions underlying a complicated theoretical model. If the 
two categories of firms (foreign and domestic) are poorly matched by size or by 
industry, fitting a common regression model to the sample amounts to extrapolation 
beyond the range of the available data, with all the pitfalls inherent in this procedure.
The ‘matched pairs’ approach is employed here. This approach has been used 
very little in comparative studies of foreign and domestic firms. The few studies that
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do exist are based on a very small number of observations2 or a highly aggregated 
industry level,3 which make it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the two types of firms at any reasonable level of statistical significance. The 
statistical information for Taiwan on the activities of firms of different ownership is 
among the most comprehensive data sets available at present. Data at a four-digit 
industrial level are matched in this section, followed by data matched by size of firm 
in the next section.
According to foreign direct investment theory, the specific advantages which 
foreign firms may possess are of two broad types: first, those based on the generation 
of new technologies, managerial skills, marketing know-how and product 
differentiation; and, second, those derived from scale economies. In order to find out 
whether multinationals have advantages that are specific to ownership, the advantages 
of foreign firms are compared in respect of scale economies, superior technology and 
marketing, high skills and more capital-intensity. R&D activity, export performance 
and profitability are also discussed. Linkage to the domestic economy is another 
important issue in these performance comparisons. As there are no data available 
from Taiwan’s census, this variable cannot be examined directly here.
Scale of production
Although there may be no a priori reason for expecting that foreign subsidiaries will 
set up a larger scale of production than local firms, many empirical studies find that 
foreign subsidiaries are on average larger than local firms, for example, Caves (1974) 
in the case of Canada and Australia, Blomstrom (1989) in Mexico, Lall and Streeten 
(1977) in India, Malaysia and Colombia, and Kumar (1989) in India.
There are several reasons why foreign subsidiaries may set up a relatively 
larger scale of production:
(i) The production processes of many foreign subsidiaries are vertically integrated 
with their parent firms in order to internalise the market. Their production is 
intended to serve world markets (at least, the home and host country markets), 
rather than just regional or local markets.
(ii) Foreign subsidiaries may be able to access cheaper or more varied sources of 
capital than their local counterparts because of the financial network of the
2 For instance, Mason’s (1973) data consist of fourteen pairs of firms: five from Mexico and nine 
from the Philippines; Chung and Lee’s (1980) data use only seventeen matched pairs in South 
Korea.
 ^ As in Schive (1990). He analyses data for twelve industries in Taiwan.
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parent firms. This advantage is particularly strong when foreign investment 
flows from developed countries to developing countries.
(iii) The products of foreign subsidiaries are differentiated products, which are often 
accompanied by extensive advertising and marketing campaigns. Since 
advertising activity usually enjoys significant economies of scale and is most 
cost effective if carried out on a large scale, the relative scale of production is 
thus likely to be larger.
Hence, the scale of production of foreign subsidiaries in Taiwan’s 
manufacturing industry is hypothesised to be larger than that of their local 
counterparts and the scale of production is proxied through average sales per firm. 
Using the sales of a particular year as the proxy for size may be misleading, because 
of the different rates of capacity utilisation and the influence of the business cycle. 
The other proxy often used is fixed assets per firm. This scale measure is at the firm 
level rather than the plant level. The problem with this indicator is that it does not 
take into account the depreciation method and inflation, both of which may greatly 
affect a comparison of firms that have been operating for different lengths of time. 
Nevertheless, these indicators may be used to serve as crude proxies for scale.
R&D intensity
One of the most important advantages of foreign firms is technological superiority 
based on their R&D activities. If the intangible R&D output can be transferred among 
the network of multinationals, R&D expenditure will simply be put down in the 
world’s most cost-minimising location. Decisions about locating R&D activities may 
be influenced by the need for close communication and exchange of information. Such 
activities are therefore most likely to be located in the headquarters of multinationals. 
Caves (1982, ch. 7) and Mansfield et al (1982) confirm that US multinationals 
concentrate their R&D activities at their corporate headquarters. The evidence also 
shows that overseas R&D activities tend to focus on development rather than on 
fundamental research; that is, on product and process adaptation and improvement, 
rather than on developing new products and processes. This implies a lower R&D 
expenditure made by subsidiaries. Nevertheless, Caves and Mansfield also find that 
there is an increasing tendency to decentralise R&D investment to subsidiaries’ 
locations, partly in response to pressures from host governments.
At the same time, there are also reasons for a local firm to undertake R&D. 
For instance, the local firm that obtains technology from abroad via other channels 
may be forced to undertake R&D to absorb, adapt and improve the imported 
technology. Moreover, the technology transferred by the multinationals is ‘know-
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how’ (production engineering), not ‘know-why’ (design, research and development). 
They generally do not transfer to the host country the capability to generate new 
technology. By contrast, local firms which generate their own technology (by 
imitation) generally develop greater know-why. Therefore, they may wish, as a 
strategy, to develop technological autonomy over time. Schive (1983) finds that in 
Taiwan, foreign firms rely heavily on external sources compared with local firms.
Both groups have their own target for R&D investment, and there is no 
obvious relationship between foreign ownership and R&D intensity, although it is 
frequently suggested that foreign subsidiaries undertake a lower proportion of R&D 
locally. For this variable, the ratio of R&D expenditure plus technical fees and 
royalties to total sales will be compared.
Profitability
Since foreign firms possess technology, management, and other advantages, the rents 
from these advantages imply that they will generally be more profitable than local 
counterparts. The empirical studies of Lall and Streeten (1977, ch. 6), Willmore 
(1986), and Kumar (1989, ch. 4) find that multinationals in a developing country are 
more profitable than those in a developed country, and also that foreign firms are 
more profitable than local firms.
According to the theory of industrial organisation, a firm’s profitability is 
determined by both industry and firm characteristics; for instance, the industrial 
concentration ratio, scale of production, industrial growth, and product 
differentiation. Since foreign control can only account for some of a firm’s 
profitability and the observed difference in profitability from firm to firm may not 
remain statistically significant when neutralised for all of the above characteristics, the 
hypothesis that foreign subsidiaries are more profitable than their local counterparts 
will not necessarily hold.
It should be noted that reported profits may be lower than actual profits, 
especially in the case of a developing host country, because of the incentive to 
transfer pricing and regulations.
The proxy variable of profitability is defined as the profit margin (total 
revenue minus total expenditure) on sales (before taxes).
Labour quality
It is common to expect that foreign subsidiaries will be more prominent in sectors 
requiring both advanced managerial and organisational skills as well as high levels of 
production and technical skills, because foreign firms from developed countries will
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tend to transfer advanced techniques. Foreign subsidiaries usually attract talented 
workers in the labour market and train them. Workers in foreign subsidiaries can 
expect to accumulate skills or knowledge quicker than those in local firms and expect 
to be paid higher wages than the local going rate. Some empirical studies provide 
evidence of this, for example, Reuber (1973, p. 175-6) found that the majority of 
multinationals pay the prevailing wage rate, but an appreciable minority pay more. 
Lim (1977) found that foreign subsidiaries in Malaysia pay higher wages than 
indigenous firms. Kumar (1989) also found that the proportion of high-income 
employees in India is significantly larger in foreign subsidiaries than in local firms. 
Although paying higher wages may reflect the preference of foreign entrepreneurs for 
recruiting better ‘quality’ workers, who are relatively scarce in developing countries, 
part of the higher wages paid by foreign subsidiary may be accounted for by 
differences in skills.
According to the theory of human capital, a standard measure of labour 
quality is the average wage paid by the firm. Hence, the average wage per firm will be 
employed here as an index of labour quality. The hypothesis is that foreign 
subsidiaries are likely to pay higher wages.
On the other hand, training being a method to accumulate human capital, the 
training expenses of a firm can be regarded as a form of improving labour quality. 
There is some evidence to show that most of the productivity gains from introducing 
a new technology come from making cumulative small modifications to it, essentially 
through a leaming-by-doing process. A trained worker copes with the production 
process and accumulates experience more quickly, and a more highly trained 
workforce increases the potential for invention, especially in modifications of the 
process. Since the training program of a firm improves the labour quality of its 
employees and so increases its productivity efficiency, the training expense per 
worker is also compared.
Another important difference between foreign firms and local firms is labour 
productivity. Many studies have attempted to compare differences in labour 
productivity between two groups of firms. Such comparisons raise complex issues 
and some studies find no significant difference between foreign firms and local firms, 
while others suggest that foreign firms enjoy higher residual productivity. In general, 
when all industries are lumped together, productivity between foreign and local firms 
is significantly different, but the differences are less significant on a disaggregated 
industrial level. Productivity difference has been interpreted in the literature as 
support for the existence of spillovers from foreign firms to domestic enterprises, and 
will be explored thoroughly in the analysis in the following chapters. Here, a crude 
proxy variable for labour productivity, output per employee will be compared.
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Choice of technology
Foreign firms develop an advantage in capital-intensive technology for reasons similar 
to those which encourage their utilisation of scale economies. It may be easier for 
them to transfer highly capital-intensive technologies from the home country without 
adaptation, and there may be an association between advanced technologies, skills, 
scale and capital intensity. Hence, foreign subsidiaries tend to be more capital 
intensive than their local counterparts.
The appropriateness of the technology transferred by multinationals to host 
countries is a subject of intense discussion in the literature, such as Mason (1973) and 
Lall (1978), because technology is developed in advanced countries where factor 
prices are significantly different from those of developing countries. The argument 
about the appropriateness of technology concerns not only its adaptability to the 
relatively labour-abundant conditions in a developing country, but also the degree of 
adaptation by foreign subsidiaries and whether they adapt technology better than 
indigenous firms.
Some studies have investigated foreign firms’ adaptation to the conditions of 
developing countries. Reuber (1973) reported that foreign firms make rather 
infrequent adaptations of technologies to the host developing country, and that the 
adaptations that occurred most were made to satisfy the smaller scale of the host 
market. Other studies, such as Wells (1973) in Indonesia and Willmore (1986) in 
Brazil, comparing factor proportions employed in firms, noted that operations of 
foreign firms were more capital-intensive than those of local firms. They explained 
this in terms of the tendency for foreign firms to predominate in capital-intensive 
industries. Schive (1990) found that foreign firms and local firms’ capital intensities 
differ in Taiwan when the industries are compared at a high level of aggregation, but 
are more similar when industries are more narrowly defined. Some studies suggest 
that labour-intensive production processes increase the cost of supervision and 
coordination (Strassmann, 1968) for foreign subsidiaries, and that they face different 
factor prices from local firms, such as higher wages (Wells 1973; Mason, 1973).
On the other hand, Cohen (1975, ch. 3), Riedel (1975), and Chung and Lee 
(1980) found that export-oriented investments tend to employ labour-intensive 
processes. When production is mainly directed to local markets, foreign firms tend to 
employ relatively capital-intensive technology, but they are not significantly different 
from their local counterparts when most output is directed to world markets. Since 
most foreign investments in Taiwan are export-oriented, according to other studies, 
the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous and depends on whether activities are 
domestic or export-oriented.
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A direct measure of choice of technique is the capital-labour ratio. The 
relationship between capital and labour is shown by the ratio of total workers per firm 
as a percentage of the net value of assets. Non-wage employees are also included as 
the data are available. The measure of labour input would be more accurate if 
working hours per firm could be accounted for. Unfortunately, such data are 
unavailable.
Some studies use fixed assets as a measure of capital input; however, this 
measure may underestimate capital input in Taiwan, especially for the EPZs’ foreign 
firms, because of the misreporting of equity value, and because firms in the EPZs 
usually rent buildings and plant. Schive (1990) suggests using machinery and 
equipment per worker as the capital-labour ratio to avoid this deficiency. Therefore, 
machinery plus equipment is used as another measure of capital input here.
Export performance
The theory of international investment suggests that foreign firms will be a vehicle for 
a host country’s export growth. Foreign firms directly access world market 
information networks, and foreign firms are generally world leaders in innovation and 
product differentiation. Therefore, many developing host countries turn to foreign 
investors to lead them into the international market.
Foreign firms may not, however, have a higher export ratio than local firms. 
The export performance of foreign firms can be expected to vary greatly among 
developing host countries, because of differences in industrial structure, level of 
technology, closeness to export markets, the global strategy of multinationals and 
other factors. For instance, Wu (1989) finds that the high export ratio in Taiwan’s 
electronics industry was due to export-oriented strategies, but the low export ratio in 
chemical industry was mainly local market oriented.
Findings based on comparisons of the export performance of foreign 
subsidiaries and local firms in different countries are rather controversial. Cohen 
(1975) concludes that local firms are more likely to export than foreign firms, 
whereas Lall (1985) finds that foreign firms in India have better export performance 
than their local counterparts. Riedel (1975) finds no significant difference in export 
propensity between the two groups of firms in Taiwan. Lall and Streeten (1977) also 
find no evidence for foreign subsidiaries’ promoting exports.
This section examines whether foreign subsidiaries in Taiwan’s manufacturing 
industries export a higher proportion of their sales than their local counterparts. Since 
a high proportion of investments in Taiwan are export oriented, it is expected that 
foreign firms will export more than their local counterparts.
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Other strategies which foreign subsidiaries may adopt are different from those 
of their local counterparts; for instance, local procurement, advertising expenditure 
and financing strategy. Foreign firms are good at differentiating products; their entry 
may promote non-price competition in the host market through their advertising 
strategy. Kumar (1989) finds that foreign subsidiaries in India spend a higher 
proportion of sales revenue on advertising than their local counterparts. 
Unfortunately, as there are no available data for Taiwan, the advertising variable is 
not analysed in this study.
Linkages are a good indicator of the contribution of foreign direct investment, 
and local procurement is one index reflecting the extent of linkages. In general, 
foreign subsidiaries can be expected to import a higher proportion of their raw 
materials or intermediate goods than local firms, because of their familiarity with 
foreign suppliers and because of the unavailability of some local inputs, as well as to 
provide markets for their global production network. The empirical studies of Cohen 
(1975), Riedel (1975) and Mason (1973) all find that foreign subsidiaries make few 
local purchases of inputs. Riedel finds that import dependence (imported raw material 
and intermediate inputs as a percentage of total output value) is consistently higher 
for all foreign firms in Taiwan than for local firms. Similarly, Cohen indicates that 
Korean firms tend to import less than foreign subsidiaries. It is often hypothesised 
that foreign subsidiaries will have a higher dependence on imported raw materials; 
however, the lack of data on Taiwan’s census prevents a test of performance in this 
respect.
Although financial management relates to firms’ production costs, and some 
data are obtainable, it will not be analysed in this context. The major reason for this is 
that firms’ financial reports in Taiwan are incomplete and unreliable, especially those 
of small local firms, because of the incomplete tax and bank loan systems.
Empirical analysis— matched by industry
The empirical analysis compares foreign subsidiaries and local firms in Taiwan in 
terms of the variables defined above.
According to the census data of 1986 in Taiwan, there are 169 manufacturing 
industries at four digit level. However, only 111 pairs of foreign subsidiaries and local 
firms can be matched. A foreign subsidiary is defined here as a firm with foreign 
capital, regardless of the proportion of foreign capital. There is no foreign 
involvement in 38 of the four-digit industries, and only one observation for 20 
industries. These industries were excluded from the analysis. In addition, as there are 
no foreign firms with fewer than ten employees but over 30,000 domestic firms of this 
scale, a comparison will be misleading if it tries to account for all observations,
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therefore, these small scale firms are also excluded. Total observations turned out to 
comprise 932 foreign subsidiaries and 32,352 domestic firms. A number of firms 
which did not report some variables were deleted from the estimation, and the number 
of observations for those variables is stated in the lower bracket under the 
coefficients. A simple comparsion of the performance obetween foreign subsidiaries 
and local firms are presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 shows that foreign firms had a larger scale of production, a higher 
export propensity, and created more job opportunities than their local counterparts. 
Foreign subsidiaries also had a higher wage expenditure, for which there may be two 
explanations. One is that foreign subsidiaries pay higher wages than the ongoing 
market wage rate; the other is that foreign subsidiaries hire more skilled labour or a 
higher quality of labour. The average wage rate paid by local firms was NT$ 140,000 
per year which accounted for only two-thirds of payments made by foreign 
subsidiaries (NT$222,000). As for the labour quality measure, no data on skilled 
workers and unskilled workers are available, instead ‘staff’ data is used as the proxy 
for skilled or higher quality labour, whereas ‘worker’ represents unskilled or lower 
quality labour. In this way, the two indicators can be used to compare the labour 
quality of the two groups: the ratio of wages paid to staff and workers, as well as the 
ratio of number of staff to number of workers. From the table, both indices show that 
foreign subsidiaries have nearly twice the mean values of local firms, suggesting that 
foreign subsidiaries use more skilled labour than their local counterparts.
The means of the variables measuring choice of technique indicate that foreign 
subsidiaries use more capital-intensive technology, either measured by net asset value 
per employee or by machinery and equipment per employee.
All three measures of R&D intensity revealed that foreign subsidiaries paid 
close attention to adapting new technology. These results seem to contradict Schive’s 
(1990) findings in Taiwan. The variable of training per worker is contrary to the 
prediction, showing that local firms put more effort into increasing workers’ skills 
than foreign firms. The results relating to these variables might not accord with the 
prediction; however, it should be noted that the mean difference of these variables 
might not represent the population, because many firms provided no data. The 
percentage of local firms reporting these variables was much lower than the 
percentage of foreign subsidiaries, so there is a strong possibility that biased 
estimation results were obtained. On the whole, the results of most of the variables 
concord with many other studies and with the main hypothesis. But it can be seen that 
the main differences in the parameters are not entirely in accordance with the 
prediction.
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Table 4.1 Parameters for discriminating between foreign and local firms in Taiwan 
manufacturing (matched by industry)
Prediction Mean (standard deviation)
Foreign subsidiary (FS) 
vs
Local firms (LF)
FS LF
Scale o f production (NT$1,000)
(a) sale FS greater than LF 702981 67916
(2233354) (1084944)
(b) net value of assets (nässet) FS greater than LF 344000 24718
(3230650) (566376)
Profitability (profit) (%) ambiguous 1.95 (33.08) 4.45(66.20)
((total revenue-total expenditure)
*age/sale)
Export ratio (exp) (% )
FS greater than LF 53.97 (43.42) 29.44 (42.09)
(export/sale)
Em ploym ent and labour quality
(a) employee (emp) (persons) FS greater than LF 385 (935) 55 (200)
(b) wage + fringe benefit (wage) FS greater than LF 85006 (245185) 9254 (55568)
(NTS1,000)
wage rate (wage/emp) (NT$i,ooo) FS greater than LF 222 (108) 140 (74)
(c) wage of staff/ wage of workers (wlb) FS greater than LF 1.22 (3.76) 0.56 (4.93)
(%)
(d) number of staff/number of workers (lb) FS greater than LF 0.675 (1.957) 0.376(1.823)
(%)
(e) train/emp (train) (NT$i,ooo) FS greater than LF 2.57 (7.67) 2.92 (5.71)
(obs=352) (obs=2918)
(f) labour productivity (lp) (NT$1,000) FS greater than LF 1911 (3951) 909 (1042)
(output/emp)
Choice o f technique
(a) nasset/emp (kll) (NT$i,ooo) FS greater than LF 795(1983) 308 (457)
(b) (machinery+equipment)/emp (kl2) FS greater than LF 694 (2641) 188 (736)
(NTS 1,000)
R& D intensity (%)
(a) (R&D+royalties)/sale (mdl) ambiguous 0.052 (0.342) 0.020 (0.040)
(obs=119) (obs=294)
(b) R&D/sale (md2) ambiguous 0.022 (0.157) 0.013 (0.087)
(obs=436) (obs=2930)
(c) royalties/sale (md3) ambiguous 0.013 (0.049) 0.009 (0.031)
(obs=140) (obs=347)
Note: obs = number of observations.
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of 
China, The report on 1986 industrial and commercial census, Taiwan-Fukien Area, ROC, 
manufacturing sector, Taipei.
The standard deviations of all variables are rather large, leading to the 
conclusion that differences between two groups are insignificant. Therefore, further 
inspection of the statistical significance of these mean differences is needed. Two
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Statistical tests are conducted to examine the statistical significance of these mean 
differences: first, the univariate test of the significance of each variable is performed; 
and, second, because this test does not take into account interaction among the 
variables, a multivariate test is used to analyse the variables simultaneously.
Univariate analysis
The univariate test applied here is a non-parametric test. Non-parametric statistical 
methods are useful where directional differences are available and they have the 
advantage of not assuming any specific distribution of the population under analysis. 
Hence, the statistical hypothesis of the univariate tests does not involve population 
parameters but is concerned with the form of the population frequency distribution. 
One popularly used non-parametric test in empirical studies is the Wilcoxon Matched 
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test (for instance, see Mason (1973), Willmore (1986), Chung 
and Lee (1980) and Kumar (1989)). The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is used to analyse 
the paired differences by considering the paired difference of the two populations. 
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test can utilise information both on directions and on the 
magnitude of the difference within pairs because it gives more weight to a pair which 
shows a large difference between the two conditions than to a pair which shows a 
small difference. The null hypothesis for this test is that the two population relative 
frequency distributions are identical. One benefit of using this test is that the test 
statistic for more than 25 observations is approximately normally distributed, with a 
mean and a variance of
M e a n = * ^  Variance = » (» + 1)(2» + 1)
4 24
and the Z statistic is
T-[n(n + 1)/4] 
V »(« + l)(2« + l) /2 4 )
where T is the smaller of the rank sum for positive difference and the rank sum for 
negative difference, and n is the number of non-zero differences.
The Wilcoxon test is applied to test the 111 matched pairs of industries. The 
test can be either one- or two-tailed. Since the null hypothesis is that there is no 
difference between foreign and local firms, the two-tailed test is applied. The
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alternative hypothesis is, therefore, that the performance of foreign subsidiaries is 
different from that of local firms. The decision rule for the two-tailed test is: reject H 0 
at the level of significance a  if Z exceeds or Z is less than c o ^ , where 
and co^ /2  are the critical values for a  significant level. The results of Wilcoxon’s
Rank Sum Test are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Analysis of discriminating characteristics: Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank Test 
(matched by industry)
Terms* Z statistics Foreign subsidiaries (FS) 
versus
Local firms (LF)
sale 8.54 greater than
nässet 8.48 greater than
profit 3.14 less than
exp 7.32 greater than
emp 8.23 greater than
wage 8.48 greater than
wlb 4.48 greater than
lb 3.77 greater than
train 4.60 greater than
IP 9.14 greater than
kll 8.13 greater than
kl2 8.19 greater than
mdl 7.21 greater than
md2 6.91 greater than
md3 3.43 greater than
Note: (i)
(ii)
(hi)
(iv)
* the abbreviation of each term follows the definition in Table 4.1 
5 % significant level for two-tailed Z statistic is 1.96. 
greater than = foreign firms, on average, are greater than local firms, 
less than = foreign firms, on average, are less than local firms.
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of
China, The report on 1986 industrial and commercial census, Taiwan-Fukien Area, ROC, 
manufacturing sector, Taipei.
It is apparent that all the variables suggest statistically significant differences 
between foreign subsidiaries and local firms. The direction of differences indicates 
that foreign subsidiaries have a significantly larger scale of production, stronger 
export orientation, higher wage expenditure and labour quality, and more capital- 
intensive technology, but lower profit margins than their local counterparts. This 
result is in line with the simple analysis reported in Table 4.1, but is more definitive.
That foreign subsidiaries possess a larger scale of operation than local firms in 
Taiwan is often taken for granted because, under the policies of The Three Principles
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of the People,4 the Taiwanese government basically discourages the formation of 
large firms. This has led to over 95 per cent of Taiwan's firms being small and 
medium sized. Apart from the effect of such policies, local firms are also relatively 
uneasy about raising large amounts of capital locally because of the rigidity and 
restrictions of the domestic financial market. The restriction on local enterprises’ 
access to international financial markets has also constrained the expansion of firms.5
Foreign subsidiaries had a significantly different sales strategy from their local 
counterparts. They tended to be export oriented when compared with their local 
counterparts. This result was to be expected on a priori grounds, for the costs of 
exporting are much lower for foreign firms, which have access to international market 
information and sales organisations through their parent companies overseas. 
However, this result differs from Riedel’s (1975), which concluded that there is no 
significant difference between the two groups of firms in this respect. One explanation 
lies in the different year being processed in the analysis. Riedel’s data are for 1972, 
when Taiwan’s economy was yet to take off and still had a trade deficit. Both local 
firms and foreign firms were pursuing gains from import substitution. However, the 
limitations of import substitution forced the government to shift industrial and trade 
policies towards export promotion. Export-oriented foreign investments were also 
encouraged. The impact of these policies began to be felt from that time. The trade 
account has been in surplus since 1975.
On the other hand, according to the survey data of the Investment 
Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs (1992), foreign subsidiaries’ exports rose 
to, and stayed above, 60 per cent of their sales,6 yet their total exports accounted for 
nearly 20 per cent of Taiwan’s total exports. The remaining 80 per cent of Taiwan’s 
exports was produced by a relatively huge number of local firms. The average value 
of foreign subsidiaries’ export is higher than that of local firms, which suggests 
foreign subsidiaries are export oriented when compared to local firms and thereby 
gives support to the Wilcoxon’s test results.
Foreign firms are often criticised for transferring relatively capital-intensive 
technologies to less developed countries where labour-intensive techniques are 
preferred, because the manufacturing sector has to absorb abundant suppliers of
4 The Three Principles of the People (nationalism, democracy and livelihood) written by Dr Sun 
Yat-sen who established the Republic of China, stress the equitable allocation of wealth and the 
equality of human beings, and hence the restriction of private capital.
5 The restriction on raising capital from international financial markets was removed in the 1990s. 
However, the high operative and distributive cost of issuing bonds in the international financial 
market is a big burden for Taiwanese firms because of their relatively small size, which prevents 
most of them taking such actions.
6 This percentage has been decreasing since 1986 when the Taiwanese economy changed 
dramatically, because of the quick appreciation of the NT dollar and rising labour costs.
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labour in the domestic market. The relevant question, however, is how well do 
foreign subsidiaries do, compared to local firms, in absorbing labour? The variable for 
technology indicates that foreign subsidiaries performed quite poorly in Taiwan. Both 
measures of the capital-labour ratio suggested that foreign firms utilised techniques of 
production that were significantly more capital intensive than those of their local 
counterparts. This result confirms the study of Schive (1990), but contradicts the 
study of Riedel (1975) who concluded that export-oriented foreign investment tends 
to use more labour-intensive technology than domestically oriented foreign 
subsidiaries. However, in the case of Taiwan, the entry of foreign subsidiaries is 
encouraged because of their ability to provide new technologies rather than to absorb 
labour, which has become scarcer in Taiwan since the 1980s. Capital-intensive 
techniques are now preferred.
Do foreign firms in Taiwan pay higher wages for the same quality of labour? 
This question cannot be answered with the data available in this sample. What is 
evident is that foreign firms pay higher wages, which might imply that they prefer to 
hire skilled workers or quick learners who can cope with the production technology 
within a short period of time. The ratio of white-collar to blue-collar employees, a 
crude indicator of labour skills, is higher for foreign subsidiaries.
The technology and labour quality variables suggest that foreign subsidiaries 
indeed transfer new technology into Taiwan and thus produce spillover effects within 
the economy. The higher labour productivity of foreign subsidiaries also provides 
support for the possibility of spillovers from foreign firms to domestic firms.
However, one finding which differed from that of Table 4.1 relates to training 
expenditure per employee. The Wilcoxon’s test suggests that foreign subsidiaries 
underwrote significantly larger training expenses per employee (train) than local firms. 
This result is in line with the general prediction noted in the second column of Table 
4.1. Since foreign subsidiaries in Taiwan use more capital-intensive technology, some 
of which may be completely new to the local market, training is needed to improve 
the efficiency of production. The R&D intensity (R&D plus royalties (m dl)) test 
suggests that foreign subsidiaries invested more in R&D, in accordance with Schive’s 
conclusion. The other two measures (R&D (md2) and royalties (rnd3)) also indicate a 
higher expenditure on the part of foreign subsidiaries than that of local firms. The 
high expenditure on technical fees and royalties, accompanied by a low profit margin 
may imply, to some extent, that foreign subsidiaries manipulated the transfer of then- 
profits via technical payments. Again, there are sampling problems. No data are 
reported on foreign subsidiaries’ R&D plus royalties (rndl) for twelve industries, nor 
for 56 industries for the R&D expenditure (md2), while the reports from local firms 
are relatively complete in respect of these variables. The differences between the two
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variables and ranks were obviously affected by missing data. The estimation of 
training expenditure per employee (train) also presented the same problem, with 
sixteen industries for foreign subsidiaries and only two industries for local firms giving 
no report on this variable.
The profit variable suggests that foreign firms’ profits were lower than their 
local counterparts. However, as mentioned, reported profits do not necessarily reflect 
the true profits of the firm, since foreign firms are able to manipulate them, through 
transfer pricing. Unfortunately, there is no method nor any evidence for assessing the 
effect of foreign firms’ transfer pricing on profits in Taiwan. No data were obtainable 
on material purchasing, destination of products sales, unit price of products and so 
on. In general, relatively high tariffs, which prevailed in Taiwan till 1986, might have 
induced foreign subsidiaries to under-report the value of materials imported if their 
products are mainly supplying the domestic market. Most foreign investments in 
Taiwan are export oriented, and foreign firms tend to manipulate transfer pricing by 
showing higher import prices for materials and a lower export prices for products in 
order to maximise global profits and suppress subsidiaries’ profit margins in the host 
country.
With regard to the profit component, foreign subsidiaries in Taiwan were 
generally paying higher wages and employing more machinery and equipment in 
production. This might suggest that they were producing more differentiated products 
and with higher production costs, compared with their local counterparts. Taking into 
account transfer pricing strategies as well, it follows that the profit margins of foreign 
subsidiaries would be lower than their local counterparts, as predicted by the 
estimation.
Multivariate analysis
The univariate analysis gave rather explicit conclusions about differences in the 
performance of foreign subsidiaries and their local counterparts. However, the 
difference in respect of one variable might be attributed to the differences in respect 
of any of the other characteristics, or a combination of other additional 
characteristics. In order to take into account the interaction among variables, a 
multivariate analysis is used. One multivariate technique often used is the estimation 
of discriminant functions; for example Riedel (1975) and Kumar (1989). However, 
Press and Wilson (1978), comparing logistic regression and discriminant analysis, 
conclude that each method is unlikely to give substantially different estimations. 
Moreover, a logistic regression is preferable to the discriminant analysis because 
discriminant analysis is formulated on the assumption that the two groups are 
multivariate normal with a common covariance matrix and this assumption is unlikely
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to be satisfied in empirical applications. Wide applicability is one of the advantages of 
using a logistic function for discrimination. Therefore, a logit model is employed here. 
A logistic analysis is usually formulated mathematically by relating the probability of 
some events occurring, conditional on some explanatory variables. The logit model is 
based on the cumulative logistic probability function, which is similar to the 
cumulative normal function,7 and is specified as:
J _|_ g - (b 0+b1Xu+-+bnXni)
P is the probability that a choice is made, given X m. In order to estimate the 
probability function, the equation to be estimated is in the following form:
P
In-— — -  ß 0 + ßiXj, + ß 2X 2- + — t- ß„Xm. , / = foreign firms, local firms
Xni = the explanatory variable represents the behaviour of the ith firm in nth 
variable.
The dependent variable in this equation is the logarithm of the odds that a particular 
choice will be made, which is called the log-odds ratio and is a linear function of the 
explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients ( ß s) do not indicate the increase in 
the probability of the event occurring, given one unit increase in the corresponding 
independent variable. Rather, the coefficients reflect the effect of a change in an 
independent variable on the dependent variable.
The logit model posits that the establishment of a foreign subsidiary is 
associated with a set of strategic variables (such as export-orientation, scale, and 
other factors). These characteristics allow classification into one of several alternative 
groups. In a logit model in this context, P is the propensity to be a foreign firm, and 
1-P is the propensity to be a local firm. X ni are the characteristics of firms’ behaviour 
defined in the previous section in terms of the comparative performance hypotheses.
However, since P and 1-P here are not observable, an alternative approach is 
to define a ‘latent’ variable for the dependent variable, that is, defining a dummy 
variable for the left hand side of the above equation. Therefore, it is convenient to 
classify the two groups of firms into binary grouping variables, such that, if it is a
7 That is the reason why the logit model is often used as a substitute for the probit model.
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foreign subsidiary, then the defining variable can be 1, with 0 being a domestic firm. 
Setting this ‘latent’ variable as the dependent variable, with the characteristics of firm 
behaviour as the explanatory variables, a logit model can be constructed as in the 
above equation. The estimated results of the logit model are shown in Table 4.3. It 
should be noted that all variables are defined in the same way as those in Table 4.1.
Table 4.3 The logit analysis (matched by industry)
constant sale nässet exp lb kl kll md mdl profit train
(A) -5.44 -0.0001 0.0614 1.17 0.004 146.57 -5.99 0.73
-6.41 -0.69=* 6.22 1.51* 4.84 3.48 -2.99 2.27
(B) -5.36 -0.0001 0.0601 1.12 0.004 94.32 -3.81 0.84
-6.44 -0.51s1 6.25 1.49* 4.93 1.97 -1.75 2.28
(C) -4.27 -0.0001 0.0518 1.72 0.0026 143.20 -5.73 0.85
-5.82 -0.65s' 5.79 2.32 3.55 3.44 -2.90 2.72
(D) -5.50 -0.0004 0.0617 1.17 0.0041 143.70 -5.85 0.75
-6.46 -0.87* 6.25 1.51* 4.83 3.40 -2.91 2.27
(E) -4.34 -0.0002 0.0521 1.75 0.0027 138.97 -5.55 0.86
-5.89 -1.09* 5.82 2.35 3.64 3.33 -2.80 2.72
(F) -5.10 -0.0001 0.0580 1.21 0.0042 161.62 -6.58
-6.30 -0.45 6.18 1.59* 5.21 3.73 -3.05
(G) -5.14 -0.0003 0.0581 1.22 0.0043 160.44 -6.50
-6.33 -0.62* 6.19 1.59* 5.20 3.68 -2.98
Note: (i) upper row of each equation is the estimated coefficients; lower row is the t-ratio.
(ii) * indicates the insignificance of the coefficients.
(iii) the significance of variable lb is always at 10% level.
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of 
China, The report on 1986 industrial and commercial census, Taiwan-Fukien Area, ROC, 
manufacturing sector, Taipei.
All variables were significant in the univariate analysis, yet the logit estimation 
indicated that some variables were insignificant across all experiments. These 
variables were excluded in this multivariate context. Several points can be made from 
the estimates in Table 4.3. The wage and employment variables were sometimes taken 
as a measure of scale of production which in turn might be highly correlated with the 
variables for sales and net value of assets, and thus lead to the biased estimation. 
These two variables were also excluded. The empirical test showed that sales were 
highly correlated with employment and wages; the correlation coefficients being 0.83 
and 0.88. The correlation coefficient of net value of assets (nässet) and employment 
(emp) is also as high as 0.67, and nässet and wage is 0.81.
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Secondly, the variable for labour productivity is not only highly correlated 
with the variable for the capital-labour ratio (the correlation coefficient is 0.96), it is 
also strongly correlated with the variables of training per worker (the correlation is 
0.83) as well as the ratio of blue-collar and white-collar (a correlation of 0.53). The 
inclusion of this variable may produce a biased estimation and affect the sign and 
significance of other parameters, hence it is also deleted from the analysis. The 
estimation of labour productivity is discussed in other chapters.
Thirdly, the relatively few reports on royalties (rnd2) meant that this 
coefficient was always insignificant, so this variable was dropped too. As for the other 
two R&D intensity variables (rnd and rndl), firms could theoretically choose both 
R&D investment and buying technology simultaneously (that is, md variable); 
however, the most common case was for a firm to choose either one (that is, m dl or 
rnd2). Therefore, md and m dl variables were included and estimated separately. 
Both of these coefficients were significant in explaining the difference in R&D 
intensity between the two groups of firms in Taiwan.
One finding in the logit analysis of Table 4.3 which is rather different from the 
univariate and simple statistical analysis is the negative sign for the scale of 
production, whether measured by sales or by net value of assets. The estimation result 
suggested that an increase in the scale of operation meant a decrease in the probability 
of a firm being a foreign subsidiary. This result seems to be counter intuitive. The 
difference might be due to the negative correlation of scale with other variables, such 
as export ratio, variables of R&D intensity, and profit. Since the coefficients for scale 
of production in all equations were insignificant, it could be concluded that this 
coefficient was indistinguishable from zero and had no explanatory power in 
distinguishing the behaviour of the two groups of firms. Hence, foreign subsidiaries 
were not significantly larger than Taiwan's enterprises.
The coefficient for R&D plus royalties is positive and significant whenever it 
appears in the equations. This suggests that foreign firms had higher R&D intensity 
than their local counterparts. The explanatory power of the R&D variables might, 
again, be affected by the unequal observations between the two groups of firms. Of 
the foreign subsidiaries, 15.1 per cent reported their royalties payments but only 1.1 
per cent of local firms did so. The explanatory power of the coefficient for R&D plus 
royalties/sale (md) was strengthened by relatively more information obtained from 
both groups of firms.
Export (exp), employment (emp), labour quality (lb), and capital-labour ratio 
(both kl and kl2) had positive and significant estimated coefficients, suggesting that 
foreign subsidiaries preferred to sell to the international market, hired more 
employees, paid higher wages, and used more mechanised technology. The coefficient
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of the ratio of wages of staff and wages of workers (wlb) was insignificant but with 
the expected sign. As a whole, these estimation results were consistent with the 
univariate analysis.
The coefficient of profit was always negative and significant. This suggests 
that a unit increase in profit margins meant a higher propensity to be a local firm. 
Local firms tended to have higher profit margins than foreign subsidiaries. This result 
also accords with the univariate analysis. The variable representing training in firms 
had a positive and significant coefficient, similar to the univariate estimation. This 
suggests that foreign subsidiaries provide more training to their workers, on average, 
than do local firms.
Empirical analysis matched by firm size
The results of the previous section suggest that foreign-owned firms and local firms in 
Taiwan perform differently in terms of capital-labour ratio, export propensity, 
profitability, and employment strategies, even at the four digit industrial level. 
However, it is open to question as to whether this is due to ownership or other 
factors, such as scale differential, market conditions, and X-efficiency. As a large 
proportion of the local firms in Taiwan are small in size, either in terms of number of 
employees or scale of production, the deviation between the two groups of firms in 
terms of these variables may be exaggerated.
To add to this analysis, the size of firms can be matched at the four digit level 
of industrial classification. The analysis is based on data for 230 pairs of foreign- 
owned and local Taiwanese firms drawn from 67 manufacturing industries in the 
above sample sets. In general, two proxy variables can be used to represent the size of 
firm, number of employees or scale of production of a firm. Here, number of 
employees is chosen to determine the size of firm. The choice of employees as the 
proxy variable to match the two sets of firms is unavoidably arbitrary. The firms are 
matched by number of employees and in no case does the difference in number of 
employees exceed 10 persons. If there are two or more firms with the same number of 
employees, the mean of those firms in terms of all other variables has been taken as a 
representative firm.
The hypothesis in the following tests is that, if the different performance of 
foreign subsidiaries and local firms is due to the difference in size of firm rather than 
ownership, then the difference will be negligible with firms of the same size. If the 
results reveal that a significant difference between foreign firms and local firms still 
exists, it suggests that the difference may be attributed to difference in ownership.
As before, Table 4.4 reports the mean values for each type of firm. Comparing 
firms of the same size, foreign subsidiaries had the larger mean values for all variables.
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The results were similar to those reported in Table 4.1 except for the profit 
parameter. Foreign firms enjoy a higher profit margin than local firms of the number 
of employee, a result contrary to that suggested in previous estimations.
Table 4.4 Parameters for discriminating between foreign and local firms in Taiwan 
manufacturing (matched by firm size)
Mean (standard deviation)
FS LF
Scale o f production (NT$1,000)
sale 363624 (467916) 327265 (498075)
net value of assets (nässet) 138255 (270242) 96391 (162267)
Profitability (profit) (% ) 2.205 (5.436) 1.648 (5.872)
Export ratio (exp) ( % ) 66.43 (41.346) 58.39 (39.50)
Em ploym ent and labour quality
wage+benefit fringe (wage) (NT$1,000) 52295 (47661) 44339 (51031)
wage of staff/ wage of workers (wlb) (%) 0.974 (2.654) 0.664 (1.194)
number of staff/number of workers (lb) 0.635 (2.223) 0.400 (0.924)
train/emp (train) (NT$ 1,000) 2.029 (3.182) 1.642 (3.114)
(obs=82) (obs=87)
Choice o f technique (NT$1,000)
nasset/emp (kll) 530.23 (784.105) 355.96(411.56)
(machinery+equipment)/emp (kl2) 478.80 (762.237) 287.48 (388.57)
R& D intensity ( % )
(R&D+royalties)/sale (mdl) 0.0134 (0.022) 0.0065 (0.0093)
(obs=82) (obs=87)
R&D/sale (md2) 0.0116(0.0210) 0.006 (0.009)
(obs=82) (obs=87)
royalties/sale (md3) 0.0018(0.0051) 0.0004 (0.002)
(obs=82) (obs=87)
Note: obs = observations.
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of
China, The report on 1986 industrial and commercial census, Taiwan-Fukien Area, ROC, 
manufacturing sector, Taipei.
As in Table 4.1, the matched pairs of the same size are also drawn from a 
disaggregated level of industry (five digit level or above). The fluctuation among 
matched pairs for each variable has been minimised by controlling size, yet variance 
for each variable remained at a high level, as shown in Table 4.4. Comparison of the 
mean values for each industry or averaging of simple differences may still be
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misleading. Once again, to avoid this deficiency the univariate and multivariate 
analyses used in the previous section have been estimated.
The Wilcoxon’s test of the matched pairs in Table 4.5 is consistent with the 
results in Table 4.2. All parameters suggest that foreign firms performed significantly 
differently from domestic firms in terms of scale of production, export ratio, wages, 
capital-labour ratio, and R&D expenditure, except for the profit variable. Foreign 
subsidiaries also had higher output, export, wages payment, R&D expenditure and 
used better technology than local firms after taking into account the number of 
employees. The Z statistic for the coefficient of profitability (profit) was 0.63, in the 
range of accepting the null hypotheses of no difference between the two groups of 
firms, which suggests that foreign subsidiaries’ profitability is not significantly 
different from that of local counterparts if the size of firms was the same.
Table 4.5 Analysis of discriminating characteristics: Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank Test 
(matched by firm size)
Z statistics Foreign firms 
versus 
Local firms
sale 1.98 greater than
nässet 3.75 greater than
profit 0.63* greater than
exp 4.06 greater than
wage 4.94 greater than
wlb 2.89 greater than
lb 3.21 greater than
train 2.79 less than
kll 4.34 greater than
kl2 4.99 greater than
value added 5.29 greater than
mdl 3.24 greater than
md2 2.87 greater than
md3 10.32 greater than
Note: * coefficient insignificant.
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of 
China, The report on 1986 industrial and commercial census, Taiwan-Fukien Area, ROC, 
manufacturing sector, Taipei.
Moreover, the statistic of training per worker suggests that foreign firms put 
less effort into training than local firms. This might also imply that if domestic firms 
have the same scale and ability to compete with foreign counterparts, they make more 
effort to catch up with foreign firms in absorbing new techniques or knowledge by 
underwriting more training programs. Foreign subsidiaries stimulate a demonstration 
effect in their local counterparts. This result highlights the spillover effects of foreign 
subsidiaries.
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The logit analysis for matched pairs by size in Table 4.6 reveals some different 
results from the full sample analysis above. The variables for export ratio, capital- 
labour ratio and R&D intensity remain significantly different between the two groups 
of firms, but the variables for labour quality, profit and training become insignificant. 
It appears that foreign subsidiaries and local firms employ similar strategies in respect 
to employment, profit and training.
Table 4.6 The logit analysis (matched by firm size)
constant exp lb kl kl2 mdl md2 profit train
(A) -1.2907
-4.7103*
0.0113
4.0308*
0.0753
1.0133
0.0010
3.6186*
24.3424
2.2620*
0.0204
1.1704
-0.0226
-0.4718
(B) -1.2582
-4.6228*
0.0110
3.9759*
0.0792
1.0419
0.0010
3.6626*
19.6741
1.8184**
0.0211
1.2135
-0.0178
-0.3743
(C) -1.3685
-5.0479*
0.0122
4.3243*
0.1040
1.2513
0.0012
4.1832*
21.4273
1.9602*
0.0178
1.0152
-0.0312
-0.6438
(D) -1.3577
-5.0131*
0.0122
4.3137*
0.1071
1.2716
0.0012
4.3017*
18.0949
1.6404**
0.0183
1.0428
-0.0285
-0.5891
Note: (i) upper row of each equation is the estimated coefficients; lower row is the t-ratio.
(ii) * indicates 5% significance level of the coefficients; ** indicates 10% significance of the 
coefficients.
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of
China, The report on 1986 industrial and commercial census, Taiwan-Fukien Area, ROC, 
manufacturing sector, Taipei.
The expenditure and revenue structure of firms in this matched pair sample are 
statistically the same, with 56.5-57.5 per cent going to material costs, 18 per cent to 
wage payments, 0.7 per cent to tax charges, and 23 per cent to miscellaneous costs. 
This similarity in cost structure reflects the similarity in profit performance. Therefore, 
the level of profitability between the two groups of firms is not significantly different.
Conclusion
The empirical analyses in this chapter lead to a number of conclusions as well as to 
some unresolved questions about the characteristics of foreign firms in Taiwan when 
compared with their local counterparts of the same size operating in the same 
industry.
One finding is that foreign firms utilise more capital-intensive techniques of 
production than their local counterparts. The fact that they do so implies that they 
make less use of unskilled labour. This may be because they have to pay higher wages
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for labour of the same quality, or because they want to put more effort into quality 
control of products produced with more machinery and equipment.
There is strong evidence that foreign firms export a much larger proportion of 
their output than do domestic firms. R&D investment is also higher for foreign firms. 
These results are to be expected, since the advantages of the multinationals often stem 
from their possession of brand names, proprietary technology, and links to overseas 
markets.
The analysis also shows that ownership ties do affect performance. In a broad 
sense, foreign-owned firms are much larger in scale than local firms. In addition, ties 
to a parent company give the foreign subsidiary an advantage over local firms in 
export markets, enabling them to attract and retain highly-skilled employees, using 
capital-intensive and skill-intensive techniques of production.
There is also no doubt that foreign firms in Taiwan typically have high levels 
of labour productivity compared with local firms either in the same industry or of the 
same size. This could result from any one of the following factors:
(i) more machinery and equipment per worker;
(ii) employees with greater skills and training;
(iii) greater technical efficiency, in the sense that the same output is produced with 
fewer inputs; or
(iv) some combination of these possibilities.
The results in this chapter show very clearly that the first two factors play an 
important role in accounting for productivity. In the absence of a clearly specified 
production function, measuring technical efficiency is impossible, and nothing can be 
inferred about the importance of this factor at this stage.
In summary, this analysis shows that foreign subsidiaries indeed perform 
differently from domestic firms in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, the result strongly 
suggests that foreign subsidiaries may generate spillover effects in the domestic 
market. For instance, higher export ratios indicate that they may lead to linkage 
benefits to domestic firms by providing information on export channels and markets. 
Their higher labour productivity suggests that they raise productivity levels in the host 
market via training and labour turnover. The demonstration of the more capital 
intensive technology by foreign firms encourages domestic firms to gain knowledge of 
it and accelerate technology transfer. As a whole, the results imply the existence of 
the spillover effects in the Taiwan economy.
As the realisation of spillover effects can raise the productivity efficiency in 
the host market, the following chapters employ the concept of the growth of total
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factor productivity— the best indicator to measure productive efficiency— to test the 
existence of spillover effects in the presence of foreign direct investment.
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5 Productive Efficiency Test of the Spillover 
Effect
There is much evidence that points to the important contribution made by foreign 
firms to the technological development of the Taiwanese economy. Chapter 2 set out 
the contributions that are potentially made by spillovers from foreign firms. Chapter 4 
demonstrated some key differences between the behaviour of foreign subsidiaries and 
local firms, particularly in regard to the capital-labour ratio and R&D investment. In 
this chapter, an empirical test of foreign firms' contribution to technological change in 
Taiwan’s manufacturing industries is carried out.
A proxy for technological change is total factor productivity improvement— 
an index representing improvement in productivity efficiency— and the stock of 
foreign capital in the market may be taken to represent the contribution of foreign 
direct investment via the spillover effect. If a positive correlation is detected in a 
correlation test between these two variables, it may suggest that an industry with a 
higher level of foreign investment can expect a higher level of productivity growth. 
Aside from the spillover effect, scale of operations has also been identified in the 
literature as one of the major contributors to the growth of total factor productivity. 
Decomposition of total factor productivity into a scale effect and a spillover effect 
from foreign investment allows examination of the impact of foreign entry after taking 
into account scale effect.
A brief description of the definition of total factor productivity and its 
measurement follows. An hypothesis to account for spillovers is outlined, and the 
methodology to test the spillovers generated by the inflow of foreign capital is 
described. The empirical study of the effect of foreign investment on Taiwan’s 
manufacturing sector is undertaken, and then conclusions are drawn.
Introduction
The dynamic factor that drives technological change is knowledge, and there are 
many stages in the accumulation of knowledge that precede technological 
innovations. The elements of knowledge range from pure principles of science to 
applied science to technical knowledge and the specific embodiment of technical 
know-how in the form of better organisational structures, new equipment, and better 
skills. The main features that distinguish the accumulation of technical knowledge 
from other forms of capital accumulation are that it is highly durable, its potential
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impact is extremely uncertain, and it is subject to large external economies. Once it is 
produced, the cost of its transmission is almost zero; that is, it soon becomes a public 
good.
In most of the literature on factor productivity and the production function, it 
is assumed that technical change is autonomous, neutral and growing at a constant 
rate. However, it is doubtful whether it can be assumed that the level of technical 
knowledge is exogenously determined, because the level of technical knowledge may 
also be determined by the amount of resources allocated to the production of new, or 
modified existing, techniques (R&D investment). In this sense, foreign investment is a 
major source of technological change via technology transfer, particularly for 
developing countries.
Foreign direct investment theory suggests that intra-marginal gains from 
foreign investment to the host market lie in the effects of foreign investment on the 
productivity of resources owned by the host economy. The host country’s private 
sector generally may not benefit directly from the entry of foreign firm because 
foreign firms are relatively efficient. However, as explained in Chapter 2, local firms 
can raise productivity from the spillovers that occur when foreign firms cannot 
capture all quasi-rents from their productive activities, such as training and the 
diffusion of information.
Many researchers claim that one of the most significant contributions of 
foreign investment is likely to come from these externalities, but they are normally 
difficult to measure. Only a few quantitative analyses of spillover effects appear in the 
literature: Caves (1974), focusing on Australia and Canada; Globerman (1979) on 
Canada; and Blomstrom (1989) on Mexico. All of these studies employ the 
improvement in productive efficiency as an indicator of the presence of externalities 
as defined by Caves (1974). Caves classifies the influence of spillovers on productive 
efficiency in the presence of foreign subsidiaries into three categories:
(i) Allocative efficiency: since foreign firms may provide a significant increase in 
competition in the host market, they may pare down monopolistic distortions 
and raise the productivity of the host country’s resources by improving their 
allocation.
(ii) Technical efficiency: foreign subsidiaries might increase pressure on local firms 
to improve their technical efficiency, for several reasons. Foreign firms tend to 
operate in industries marked by product differentiation and high barriers to 
entry, where the threat of potential competition does not continuously enforce 
cost minimisation or production on an efficient scale. The foreign firms 
themselves tend to be efficient firms, because success in a domestic market is a 
precondition for attaining multinational status. Foreign subsidiaries may also
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avoid the inefficiencies of small scale more often than their local rivals. In 
general, foreign firms may squeeze their rivals both through upward pressure on 
factor prices and downward pressure on product prices.
(iii) Technology transfer: foreign firms may speed up the transfer of technology and 
innovations, leading to faster dissemination of knowledge than would otherwise 
be the case among local firms that compete with them, supply them or 
otherwise enjoy some point of economic contact.
Following this classification, Caves (1974) and Globerman (1979) find weak 
support for the spillover benefit hypothesis, but Blomstrom confirms the significance 
of spillovers. Most of these studies attempt to test the effects of the spillovers from 
foreign firms on technical efficiency and technology transfer. The effect on allocative 
efficiency may be a part of the spillovers effect, but the difficulty in defining a proper 
indicator of allocative efficiency restricts its empirical testing. In general, allocative 
efficiency is assumed to be inversely related to the profit of local firms. If foreign 
investment has any special virtue in improving allocative efficiency, the profit rates of 
local firms generally should be inversely related to the competitive pressure caused by 
the entry of foreign firms. However, accounting profit rates are a notoriously unstable 
measure of industry performance, and inter-industry differences in profit rates may 
also vary substantially over the business cycle. There are limitations, therefore, in the 
use of profit rates as a measure of allocative efficiency. Profit rate at an industry level 
is a highly aggregated figure, and the appropriateness of its use as an indicator of 
allocative efficiency is extremely doubtful. These difficulties have restricted the study 
of the effect of foreign investment on allocative efficiency in the past.
Spillovers can be tested for their effect on technical efficiency and technology 
transfer. It can be assumed that there is a positive relationship between the labour 
productivity of local firms in an industry and the presence of foreign capital in the 
same industry. This methodology is often applied to the inter-industry analysis and 
focuses on testing the existence of spillovers, instead of testing the magnitude or 
sources of spillovers. The basic hypothesis behind this productivity efficiency analysis 
is that, from the observation of a positive relationship between the productivity level 
of local firms in an industry and foreign participation in the same industry, it can be 
inferred that foreign investment raises the productivity of local firms through spillover 
efficiency. The dependent variable in these models is commonly a productivity 
measure for local firms in an industry.
Theoretically, it is preferable to construct the productivity measure as a ratio 
of net output to an index of total factor inputs, but due to data constraints, all studies 
mentioned above use only a partial measure of productivity, namely labour 
productivity, which is usually constructed as the ratio of total value-added in local
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firms to total number of employees in the same firms. The labour productivity index 
represents the level of technical efficiency in these models. As is widely recognised, 
labour productivity is not an appropriate index for expressing differences in the 
amounts of inputs used. Furthermore, as foreign subsidiaries cluster around advanced 
technology and marketing activities, it is possible to argue that a labour productivity 
measure merely reflects some difference in industrial characteristics.
The specification and measurement of total factor productivity provides a 
more direct and general measure to evaluate the significance of economic 
externalities. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth, a residual concept in analysis of 
product growth, can be used as a proxy measure for efficiency. This chapter intends 
to deal with the spillover benefits of foreign entry on Taiwan’s manufacturing 
industries by testing the relationship between total factor productivity and stock of 
foreign capital. The basic hypothesis is that an industry with higher foreign 
involvement is assumed to be able to raise productivity faster than others.
Methodology and hypothesis
Productivity is the relationship between outputs of goods and services and inputs of 
basic resources— labour, capital goods and natural resources. An increase in 
productivity can result from conservation of, or savings in, the use of scarce resources 
per unit of output; it helps to mitigate price increases by off-setting rising wage rates 
and other input prices; and it increases the international competitiveness of 
production. Productivity changes also contribute to the changing industrial structure 
of the economy and the reallocation of resources. Since firms from the same and 
different industries all compete in the factor market, average hourly earnings and the 
price of capital tend to rise at similar rates over the long run in various industries, 
hence relative changes in unit costs and prices are negatively correlated with relative 
changes in productivity, by industry.
Productivity differences across firms (or plants) in the same industry can have 
a number of sources. As noted by Salter (1960), firms may not use the same 
techniques to produce the same industrial commodities. Since new vintages of capital 
make use of the latest and best industrial techniques, it follows that a firm’s 
productivity depends in part on the newness of its capital equipment. As noted by 
Jorgenson (1972; 1974) and Nadiri (1970), a second source of productivity difference 
related to production theory is the likelihood that firms are not employing the same 
relative quantity of other factor inputs in combination with their workforce. For 
example, there may be differences in their capital-labour ratios. A third source of 
productivity difference among firms can derive from any tendency they might have to 
hire production workers of various skills. Another source of difference may be size.
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The fact that foreign subsidiaries are, on average, of larger scale, more capital 
intensive, and employ more skilled labour than their local competitors in Taiwan (as 
tested in Chapter 4) contributes to the productivity differentials between the two 
types of firms. Such ownership characteristics may not benefit local firms directly, but 
foreign firms’ demonstration of new technology (capital intensive) and training 
(skilled labour) can encourage domestic firms to learn or recruit skills to raise their 
productive efficiency.
As productivity may be thought of as the degree of efficiency exhibited in the 
process of turning inputs into outputs, there are two methods which are commonly 
used in the literature to estimate productivity— measurement of total factor 
productivity and partial productivity measures.
Partial factor productivity measures a ratio of output to the amount of a single 
input used (usually labour). Caves (1974), Globerman (1979), and Blomstrom (1989) 
employ a partial labour productivity index as the measure of productivity. Labour 
productivity is generally defined as the ratio of total value-added in local firms to total 
number of employees in the same firms. The usage of this specification is mainly due 
to data limitations and to its simplicity. Use of labour productivity as a measure of 
firm’s productivity has its problems, because labour is not the sole source of 
productivity improvement. Output per worker may rise as a result of the substitution 
of capital or other non-labour inputs for labour, not only as a result of increased 
productive efficiency; and labour efficiency as such is only one of the factors affecting 
output per worker. Only if output is related to all associated inputs can one determine 
the net saving of resource inputs and thus the increase in overall productive efficiency. 
A useful and meaningful productivity framework should be able to identify the 
process of productivity improvement and the interaction with other factors in the 
overall production process. As suggested by Globerman (1979), the ideal is to 
construct a productivity measure as the ratio of net output to an index of total factor 
input, such as total factor productivity.
Spillovers from foreign firms to local firms deliver their benefit only after a 
lag, as the entry of foreign capital entails the time-consuming relocation of indigenous 
firms, and the productivity-enhancing effects in the host market take time. Using data 
for productivity in one year and testing its relation to a number of factors, such as 
differences in factor proportions, quality of inputs, and scale economies, to explain 
the spillovers from foreign subsidiaries to domestic industries, as in previous studies, 
is unreliable. Moreover, spillovers are embodied in changes in input quality, 
management skills and know-how, scale economies and other factors, which are the 
source of total factor productivity rather than labour productivity. Total factor 
productivity measures the residual element in product growth (Domar 1961), or
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technological progress (Solow; 1957), because a change in total factor productivity is 
approximately equal to that part of the change in output that is not explained by 
changes in the inputs. This is why TFP growth is often identified with technological 
progress. Hence, TFP growth provides a better measure to evaluate spillover effects.
There are two approaches to measuring TFP growth, according to Kalirajan, 
Obwona and Zhao (1994), namely: (a) the deterministic approach, and (b) the 
stochastic approach. Furthermore, the deterministic approach may be subdivided into 
two categories: (i) the index number approach, in which no specification of 
production functions is required, and (ii) the growth accounting approach, which 
requires the specification of a production function before TFP growth can be 
measured. The latter approach can be further divided into two groups, based on the 
method of quantifying output growth. One method estimates the parameters of a 
production function as the shares of factor inputs by using given data. The other 
method, using programming techniques, estimates the specified production 
parameters. On the other hand, the stochastic approach may be subdivided into the 
neutral technological progress approach and the non-neutral technological progress 
approach (the random coefficient stochastic approach), based on different 
assumptions of technological progress across time and among observations. Two 
alternative approaches are used here. Due to data limitations, the index number 
approach is employed in this chapter to evaluate TFP growth during 1961-92 in 
seventeen industries in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, and the stochastic approach is 
used in Chapter 6 to evaluate TFP growth in Taiwan’s electronic industry, based on 
firm-level data.
The deterministic approach was developed by Solow (1955), Kendrick 
(1961), Griliches and Jorgenson (1966), Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), Nadiri 
(1970), and Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982). Solow was the first to posit an 
aggregate production function explicitly to measure TFP growth. His ‘Divisia’ or 
geometric index was based on the Cobb-Douglas production function written in terms 
of capital and labour, and was characterised by linear homogeneity and disembodied 
Hicks-neutral technological change. Since then, this residual measure of TFP growth 
has been extended to other specifications of production function and widely applied in 
empirical research, especially in those studies attempting to correlate TFP growth 
with investment in technology. Many of these studies have also attempted to account 
for the accuracy of input measures in measuring total factor productivity, such as 
Griliches and Jorgenson (1966), Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), Gollop and 
Jorgenson (1980), and others.
The analytical framework for most empirical research on TFP growth is 
premised on the neoclassical economic theory of production. In the terminology of
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theory of production, the rate of growth of TFP is the difference between the rate of 
growth of real output and the rate of growth of real factor input. The rate of growth 
of real output and real factor input are defined, in turn, as weighted averages of the 
rate of growth of individual outputs and factors; and the weights are relative shares of 
each product in the value of total output and of each factor in the value of total input. 
If a production function is characterised by constant returns to scale and if all 
marginal rates of substitution are equal to the corresponding price ratios, a change in 
total factor productivity may then be identified with a shift in the production function, 
but if changes in real product and real factor input are accompanied by no change in 
total factor productivity, this can only be identified as movements along a production 
function. Of course, changes in total factor productivity or shifts in a given 
production function may be accompanied by movements along a production function.
The conventional analytical framework for constructing an index of TFP 
growth is premised on the existence of a well-behaved production function. Suppose 
that the production function is accurately specified, and that inputs are properly 
measured, then the growth of total factor productivity may be attributed to external 
economies, scale economies, structural changes, technological progress and other 
factors. Since numerous forces are involved in the determination of total factor 
productivity growth, it is difficult to sort them into one or more categories. However, 
in the literature, two major elements are identified: the technological progress in 
production process, and the movement in relative factor prices; that is, technical 
efficiency changes. Therefore, technological progress broadly involves:
(i) improvement in the efficiency of production; that is, equal reductions in the unit 
cost of all factors of production by applying better techniques;
(ii) bias in technical change; where the nature of the new technique is such that it 
leads to a greater saving in one input than in the other;
(iii) the elasticity of substitution, which measures the ease of exchanging factors of 
production in the course of the production process;
(iv) the scale of operation of the production process; including economies 
(diseconomies) that arise due to changes in the scale of operation of the 
economic unit; and
(v) the homotheticity of the production function; or whether the returns to scale are 
evenly distributed among all factors of production.
Besides technological changes, movements in relative prices also influence 
factor productivity via the effect on the capital-labour ratio by increasing the 
employment of one factor of production (capital) at the expense of the other (labour). 
The response to changes in factor prices depends on the elasticity of factor
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substitution. Since these characteristics of technical progress are highly 
interdependent, the distinction between the influence of technological progress and 
technical change in TFP growth cannot be neatly separated either in theory or in 
practice, especially through applying the conventional measures of productivity, such 
as the growth accounting approach. Hence, all these influences are embraced in the 
rate of TFP growth in the analytical framework employed here. In this sense, the 
growth of TFP offers insight into factors that are the root of productivity growth.
Index of total factor productivity
The rate of TFP growth is measured, according to the definition of the deterministic 
approach, by taking the time derivative of a well-behaved production function. The 
observed factor shares are then used as proxies for the parameters of the production 
function. Constant returns to scale and Hicks-neutral technological progress are in 
general assumed. Imposing the constant returns to scale assumption matches cost and 
revenue accounting in national income in empirical studies, yet the impact of 
economies of scale on the growth of output should also be considered when the index 
of TFP growth is derived.
A production function denotes the relation between quantities of different 
inputs used and the quantities of different outputs produced at a given period of time. 
If there are two factor inputs in production, then a production function can be 
expressed as:
Q(t) = f (K,L; t )  ( 1)
which denotes that a relation exists between inputs L (labour), K  (capital), and 
outputs Q (value-added) 1 in an industry. It is possible to reflect the changing nature of 
the relationship between inputs and outputs by incorporating time (t) into the 
production function, then t becomes one of the additional variables in the production 
function. Assuming this production function is homogenous2 and conforms to certain 
differentiability and curvature characteristics, then the index of TFP growth can be 
expressed as rate of growth of output with respect to time, a function of time t, 
holding capital and labour input constant. The ranges of the upward shift of the
* Since no intermediate inputs— materials or energy—  are considered in this production function, 
instead of total output, value-added is used to represent the level of output for an industry.
2 That means the production function can be expressed as:
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isoquant line, due to input quality changes or technological progress, can then be 
defined as
A(t) = (2)/
where A represents the rate of technical change or the rate of TFP growth. 
Differentiating production function (equation (1)) with respect to time t yields
Under the Hicks-neutral technological progress assumption,3 the above equation 
states that the rate of technical change can be expressed as the rate of growth of the 
corresponding output less a weighted average of the rates of growth of capital and 
labour input, where the weights are given by the corresponding factor shares. 
Dividing this equation by output Q yields
Assuming factor markets are perfectly competitive, then the conditions for 
yielding producers equilibrium and minimising production cost are that marginal 
productivity of labour is equivalent to real wage, and marginal productivity of capital 
is equivalent to real rent; these are,
d Q _ d ^ d L + d ^ d ^ + df_ 
dt dL dt dK dt dt
Q dL Q dt dK Q dt Q(= f )
(3)
W W R  _ R  
~ P
(4)
3 This means that the production function can be written as
Q(t) = A ( t ) f ( K , L )
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where W represents the price of labour and R is the capital price; *s the
marginal cost of production which is equal to P, product price. Substituting these two 
cost-minimising conditions into equation (3) and rearranging the equation, we obtain
Q WL L RK K  •
Q = (d% Q)Q L + (d% Q)Q K +A
On the other hand, according to the definition of elasticity, the elasticity of 
cost-output can be defined as the form
3Q C
Substitution into equation (5) yields
Q WL L RK K •
-  = a / e ) — - + ( l / e ) - - + A
• Q L K
A = ^ - ( l / e ) { S l( - )  + Sk( - ) }
(6)
(7)
where S, and Sk are the cost share of labour and capital inputs in production. In 
accordance with the conventional definition of the total factor productivity index4 5
4 e  >  1 implies decreasing return to scale in production, because the rise in production cost is
greater than the increase in output.
e = 1 implies constant return to scale in production.
£ <  1 implies increasing return to scale in production.
5 The traditional TFP index is defined as
d\nQ
dT
= h
d\r\K d \nL
-----------h S , ---------- h Sr,
where ST is the rate of TFP growth, SK and SL are value shares of capital and labour 
respectively, Q, K and L represent output, capital and labour. This equation can be rewritten as
TFP
TFP
The derivation of the above equation is presented in Appendix 5. A.
115
which measures the residual of the changes in output levels controlling for input 
levels, the following equation can be derived:
• TFP L k
^  = ^ + [1- (1/e )]{S,(I )+St (- ))
or
TFP • L K
—  = A + [( l /e ) -  !]{ $ ,(-)  + 5, ( - ) }  (8)
TFP
The term — — 
TFP
Q K L
§ - s«(7>-«T) is derived by imposing the assumption of
constant returns to scale in production, while the term [ ( l /e ) - l ] { 5 ,;(—) + Sk(—)} in
L &
equation (8) expresses the scale effect on productivity growth. If the rate of technical 
progress expressed by changes in total factor productivity and shifts of production 
function is consistent, then 1 / e should be equal to 1 (ie. constant returns to scale). If 
production exhibits increasing returns to scale ( l / s ) > l ,  change in total factor 
productivity is influenced by technical progress and the scale effect simultaneously, 
hence the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFp / tFP) is larger than the rate 
of technical progress estimated by the production function (A). Ceteris paribus, 
when the production function is decreasing returns to scale, then (TFp / tFP) will be 
smaller than (A).
Theoretically, both economies of scale and technological progress contribute 
to the growth of output; a biased growth rate of total factor productivity is induced if 
no account is taken of the effect of economies of scale. In order to compromise with 
the cost and revenue accounting requirements in national income, it is common to 
impose the constant returns to scale assumption in empirical studies, especially an 
aggregated analysis such as on a nation-wide or industry basis. Therefore, the rate of 
TFP growth is typically derived under the constant returns to scale assumption, that 
is,
• TFP
A = ------
TFP (9)
Rearranging above equation produces
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( 10)
Q L 
Q L
K L
The left-hand side of this equation is the rate of growth in labour productivity. 
The second term on the right-hand side is the rate of growth in the capital-labour 
ratio, weighted by the distributive share of capital, and the first term is TFP. 
Rearranging the above equation gives
Q K Q L
A = S t iQ ~ l ) + SliQ ~ T ) ( 11)
Equation (11) indicates that the rate of total factor productivity growth is defined as 
the summation of the productivity growth of all factor inputs.
The above index of technical change, being based on the primal model 
(equation (1)), is called the primal rate of total factor productivity growth. Instead of 
dealing with the production function, one might choose to deal with the cost function 
which is denoted by the dual model. The cost function can be defined as having the 
following form:
CiQyP^t): minimum total cost of producing output Q under prices Pi for the 
ith inputs.
Using duality, another index related to total factor productivity can be 
constructed. If the dual rate of total factor productivity is denoted by X , then
d%  _ d\nC dlnQ  
C dT
d ln P-2 A - T - ] ( 12)
X is called the rate of cost diminution. This equation expresses TFP growth as the 
change in average cost after taking into account changes in input prices. It reflects the 
shift in the average cost curve over time. On the other hand, Ohta (1974) 
demonstrated that A is related to X as follows:
e (13)
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which means that, whenever constant returns to scale is imposed (e = 1), then A = X.
The above derivation of the rate of TFP growth assumes that the production 
function is continuous and differentiable, which is also called the Divisi index of TFP 
growth. However, the true variables are always observed in discrete form.
If two discrete points of time are considered, Gollop and Jorgenson (1980) 
define the average rate of technical change as the Tornqvist TFP index, which can be 
approximated as the difference between the successive logarithms of output induces a 
weighted average of the differences between the successive logarithms of inputs 
(capital and labour) with weights given by average value shares. That is,
In <2(0 -  ln Q(t -1 )  = 5 jc[ln K(t)  -  ln K ( t - 1)]
+ [In Lit)  -  ln L(t  -1 )]  (14)
+ [ln TFP (T) -  ln TFP (t -1 )]
where S k and S l are the value shares of capital and labour inputs averaged over 
periods t and t-1.
SK= \ [ S K«)  + SK(t - l )]  
SL = ^ [ S L(t) + SL(t- \ )]
(15)
TFP(t)
In ^  is referred to as the Divisia-translog index of TFP growth, or
the Tornqvist index of TFP growth. Rearranging and rewriting equation (14) gives
ln TFP(t) -  ln TFP(t - 1) = In 0(0
- I n
K(t)s‘ -L(.t)h  
Q ( t - 1)
K ( t - \ y K - L{ t - \ )
(16)
Let 7 (0  = K{t)SK -L(t )SL. 7 (0  is called the Tornqvist index of total factor input for 
time t. Substituting into equation (16) yields
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ln TFP(t) -  In TFP(t -1 )  = ln -  ln —
1 ( 1- 1)
( 17)
where <2(0
l ( t )
represents the total factor productivity for time period t; and Q i t - 1) 
I ( t - l )
for
period t-1. If the indexes of total factor input and output are known, the index of total 
factor productivity is derived accordingly.
Test hypothesis
Thus far, measurement of the rate of change in TFP has been performed using two 
methods. One method calculates the rate of technical change on the basis of the data 
on output, input and cost shares of inputs directly without estimating the production 
function, such as Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978), Wong and Wang (1994), as well 
as Denny and Fuss (1983); the other method performs the estimation of the 
production function and derives the rate of change in TFP from the estimated result, 
such as Kwon (1986) and Chen and Tang (1990). Since the data on cost shares for 
each factor input are calculated and published by the Taiwanese government, a direct 
measure of total factor productivity is possible. There is no need to specify and 
estimate the form of production function. Thus, the first approach is followed in this 
study.
The derived TFP index allows a test for the existence of spillover effects from 
the entry of foreign capital via technological progress or economies of scale. The 
basic hypothesis follows that of Caves (1974) and others; that is, productivity growth 
is a function of the presence of foreign capital. The higher the degree of foreign 
involvement, the higher the productivity growth of an industry. Direct testing of the 
relationship between productivity growth and foreign involvement by the level of 
variables probably introduces biased test results, for example, a simple correlation test 
is affected by the dispersion of the variables, a higher weight being given to a higher 
level of values. The Spearman rank correlation statistic, however, is a valid measure 
for testing independence between two variables by comparing the ranks between two 
variables. It is employed here to test the relationship between productivity growth and 
the impact of foreign firms. The test is not perfect but the presence of host country 
benefits from spillovers from the entry of foreign firms is suggested, if two series are 
positively correlated.
Next TFP growth was decomposed to identify the sources of productivity 
growth, particularly the contribution of foreign investment to productivity growth. 
The literature confirms that there are factors affecting TFP growth, such as business
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cycle, scale of operations, changes in government regulation and X-efficiency of 
firms. Increasing competition and technological progress can also affect the growth of 
TFP. Among these, spillover effects from foreign direct investment can encourage 
competition, improve the X-efficiency of firms and accelerate technological progress, 
and foreign direct investment can improve productivity growth via these factors. 
Foreign capital inflow may also enlarge the scale of operations due to the 
dissemination of marketing skill and information to domestic firms which enable them 
to increase their output and obtain scale economies. As indicated by equation (8), 
economies of scale can affect the rate of TFP growth. Christensen and Greene (1976), 
Kwon (1986), and Chen and Tang (1990) found that scale economies are one of the 
main factors influencing the growth of TFP.
The test here attempts to separate the scale effect from the other factors in the 
investigation of the relationship between foreign spillovers and productivity growth. 
In order to do so, a decomposition of the rate of TFP growth is necessary. A 
derivation of the decomposition is demonstrated below. Theoretically, it is possible to 
decompose the rate of TFP growth into three sources: the scale effect, the spillover 
effect from foreign firms, and the unexplained shift over time.
The index of TFP growth can either derive from production function or cost 
function. However, the dual approach is a more straightforward way to incorporate 
the scale factor, because cost function is a function of output level and factor prices. 
Therefore, it is necessary to define the rate of TFP growth by applying the duality 
theory if decomposition of TFP growth is needed. The dual rate of TFP growth was 
defined previously in equation (12).
A general form of the cost function by which the scale and spillover factor can 
be separated from other factors which contribute to productivity growth can be 
specified as:
C = C(Pi,Q,F;T)
where Pt is the factor price vector, which includes the prices of capital and labour; Q 
is the level of output; F is the level of foreign capital involvement, which represents 
the level of spillovers; and T is time.
Logarithmically differentiating the cost function with respect to time obtains,
d\nC
dT
S 5i(dln/5/dT)+V;(dlnß/dr)-VF(rflnF/cfr)-Vr (18)
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where S: = d\nC d\nP;
_  1 i ^ i
c , represents the cost share of input i (with Xi standing
for input i);6 Vq = 3 In C/3 ln Q, measures the scale effect on costs;
VF = - 0  ln C/d ln F) measures the effect of foreign capital penetration on costs and 
VT = - (d  ln C/d ln T) measures the shift in the cost function over time. If foreign 
penetration reduces (increases) production costs, VF will be positive (negative); that 
is, foreign capital generates positive (negative) spillover effects on productivity.
Substituting the above equation into the definition of the dual rate of TFP 
growth in equation (12) yields:
. ,, _-w dlnQ.  Tr ,d ln F .  _
(19)
The above equation decomposes TFP growth into three sources: the scale effect 
(1 -  Vq), the foreign capital effect (VF), and the unexplained shift over time (VT). This
equation can then be transformed into a regression equation:
X = y 0 + Yl (d In Q/dT) + y 2 (d In F/dT) + y 3T (20)
where the unexplained part of the productivity growth is captured by y 0 + y 3T . The 
scale effect is represented by y p where a positive y { implies increasing returns to 
scale and the effect of foreign investment (VF) is replaced by y 2.
Before undertaking the empirical study, the link between X (cost side) and 
A (production side) should be considered, because it is almost impossible to estimate 
the cost function at a highly aggregated level of industrial analysis, due to the vintage 
of capital and the difficulty in obtaining proper capital service prices, especially where 
there are no secondary capital markets. The rate of TFP growth is usually measured 
from the production side if a highly aggregated level of industrial analysis is 
considered, such as at the two-digit level used in this study. However, as noted in 
equation (13) by Ohta (1974), the two definitions of the rate of TFP growth are 
equivalent when the constant returns to scale assumption is imposed. His conclusion 
allows X to be substituted for A, and thus allows the regression analysis of the kind 
used in this study, since constant returns to scale are assumed in measuring TFP 
growth.
6 This definition is obtained by Shepherd’s lemma under the assumption of competitive markets.
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Empirical results
The empirical study uses the two-digit industrial classification for Taiwan’s 
manufacturing sector. The period of measurement is from 1961 to 1992, the choice of 
period being mainly dictated by the availability of data and no separation of foreign 
and local firms in an industry is available. Since there are slight changes in industrial 
classification over time, some industries have been consolidated to enable consistent 
sampling. As a result, there are data for sixteen industries available for measuring the 
index of total factor productivity. However, when testing the relationship between 
productivity growth and the presence of foreign direct investment later on, a further 
consolidation of the industrial classification is necessary to relate the industry data to 
the survey data of the Investment Commission, which uses a cruder classification with 
availability only from 1975 to 1992.
The data for the empirical study include the series of real value-added, real 
fixed capital stock (excluding land), working hours, and value shares of capital and 
labour for each industry in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector.7 Since data of material 
inputs and their share in production are not available at an aggregated level for parts 
of the sample period, this factor is eliminated and thus the level of output for each 
industry is replaced by value-added. The series of real value-added is derived from 
nominal value-added deflated by wholesale price index. In addition, for consistency in 
the unit of the measurement for each variable, a base year is chosen and the whole 
series normalised to this base year; the estimation is then based on these normalised 
data. In this study, the mid year of the data series (1976) is chosen as the base year.
First, the Tornqvist total factor productivity index is measured. Following 
equation (17), the Tornqvist TFP index is the index of total output divided by the 
index of total inputs; hence, it is necessary to derive the index of total factor input. 
The Tornqvist index of total input, I(t), can be derived from the following definition:
n t - 1) K i t - 1) + SL In
Lit) 
L i t - 1)
Since the right-hand side variables are all exogenously given, a series of total factor 
input indices is then obtainable. The series is then deflated to the base year chosen, 
which is assumed to be equal to 100. After deriving the index of total factor inputs, 
the index of total factor productivity is derived by dividing value-added by the index 
for total factor inputs.
7 The data sources and construction are listed in Appendix 5.B.
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The measured indices of TFP for each industry are listed in Table 5.1, and 
averaged for four periods: 1961-70, 1971-80, 1981-92 and 1961-1992. The last row 
in the table shows the average growth for the whole manufacturing sector across the 
whole period.
Table 5.1 The average growth of total factor productivity (%)
1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1992 1961-1992
Food and beverage 17.49 16.56 15.03 17.74
Textiles 24.51 17.10 20.02 40.98
Apparel 22.94 17.18 15.66 32.22
Leather & fur 19.09 13.25 18.26 27.94
Lumber & furniture 19.95 8.36 9.83 7.27
Pulp & paper 15.20 14.05 14.46 14.44
Chemical & plastic 18.20 16.09 23.14 28.80
Petroleum 26.44 4.79 18.12 8.38
Rubber 26.77 9.95 14.33 24.55
Non-metal 17.59 12.90 16.72 17.46
Metal 13.86 6.88 24.47 11.63
Fabricated metal product 30.58 15.51 13.76 33.28
Machinery 25.67 13.73 20.06 40.76
Electronics 34.07 16.77 21.53 58.34
Transportation 42.04 12.46 17.50 54.97
Miscellaneous 46.68 20.39 15.18 77.94
Whole manufacturing sector 25.07 13.50 17.38 31.04
Source: Derived as described in the text.
The average growth of productivity efficiency for the whole manufacturing 
sector appears to be faster during the 1960s than in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
particularly low growth of productivity during the 1970s for all industries could be 
attributable to the two oil crises in 1973 and 1978. The world commodity market 
fluctuated dramatically during the two oil crisis periods. This affected the Taiwanese 
economy directly, as Taiwan does not have abundant natural resources and has to rely 
heavily on importing raw materials to maintain economic growth. Furthermore, since 
the Taiwanese manufacturing sector was heavily export-oriented, the world market 
recession after the oil crises also affected Taiwan’s manufacturing growth. The 
vulnerability of the Taiwanese economy in the oil crises, particularly affected the 
resource-consuming industries, such as the petroleum, rubber and metal industries.
The recession of the 1970s encouraged the restructuring of the Taiwanese 
manufacturing sector towards knowledge-intensive and high value-added industries, 
and the growth of the electronics, machinery and chemical industries began to outstrip
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the traditional industries, such as the apparel, rubber and miscellaneous industries. 
Restructuring led to higher productivity growth in these industries during the 1980s.
An examination of each industry reveals that miscellaneous industry 
(combined with the precision equipment industry) had the highest average growth in 
productivity for the whole period, as high as 77.9 per cent. This industry held its 
leadership in productivity growth during the 1960s (46.7 per cent) and the 1970s 
(20.39 per cent), but was then overtaken by the growth of the metal and chemical 
industries in the 1980s. Light industry was the strategic development industry in the 
early stages of Taiwan’s development, one which not only could absorb abundant 
labour but which also encouraged workers to obtain skills. As a result, Taiwan 
became the kingdom of toys, umbrellas, shoes, bicycles and clocks, and exports of 
these light industrial products dominated the world market before the 1980s. The high 
productivity growth in this industry is readily understandable. The lumber and 
furniture industry grew the slowest, 7.3 per cent, due to its relatively low productivity 
growth during the 1980s. Taiwan’s lumber and other products were famous for their 
high quality and craftsmanship in the world market during the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, after the economic take-off of the 1960s, this industry lost its comparative 
advantage, mainly due to the shortage of raw materials, which induced a long-term 
recession in the industry and the movement of skilled workers to other high-potential 
industries.
The textile industry maintained steady growth in productivity over time, 
compared with the related apparel industry. This reflects a typical industrial 
restructuring pattern which can be attributed to labour shortage; the labour-intensive 
downstream industries were driven out by the development of upstream industries, 
which are relatively capital- and skill-intensive. At the same time, the chemical, 
machinery, and particularly the electronics industries maintained a high level of 
productivity growth for over three decades. Some studies explain the high growth in 
the electronics industry in terms of the shorter life cycle of electronic products, but 
this does not explain how new products and technology were developed continuously 
in this industry with little expenditure on R&D in the early years, or how workers 
managed to absorb the new technology and know-how. One possible explanation is 
the demonstration and training effect of the continuous entry of foreign firms. 
Spillover effects from the entry of foreign firms may have contributed to productivity 
growth. It is possible to examine the relationship between foreign investment and 
productivity growth across industries over time.
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Assuming that the entry of foreign capital contributes to productivity growth, 
the stock of foreign capital in an industry represents the potential benefit that an 
industry can obtain from foreign direct investment. Data on the actual stock of foreign 
capital in an industry are not available in Taiwan. It is necessary to define an 
appropriate index to express the impact of foreign capital inflow. A feasible proxy is 
the flow of foreign capital into an industry, expressed as the total the amount of 
foreign capital in firms in the survey data held by the Investment Commission of 
Taiwan. The survey began in 1975, but reliable data only exist from 1976. The sample 
period chosen in the following study is 1976-1992. To make data consistent, a 
reconsolidating of the classification of industries is required because there are only 
eleven industries in the manufacturing sector surveyed by the Investment 
Commission. The rubber industry is added to the chemical and plastic industry, 
primary metal combined with fabricated metal, and machinery with transportation, 
while the petroleum and miscellaneous industries are dropped because there is no 
suitable classification available in the survey.
There is another problem with this survey. Since the survey was designed for 
cross-sectional analysis, there is inconsistency in basic information for some firms 
when a time series is applied, such as different or missing industrial classifications. 
There is also problem with the code. Every foreign firm is registered under a code by 
the Investment Commission at the time of approval. Since the growth in the inflow of 
foreign direct investment exceeded the initial expectations of Taiwanese government, 
some new investments in later years were assigned the same codes, causing problems 
in the study of the series data over time. These have been adjusted and the direct line 
method has been used to extrapolate missing data for some years of a firm.
The stock of foreign capital in each industry is listed in Appendix 5.C. The 
electronics industry has received the highest volume of foreign investment. Other 
industries are ranked as follows: chemical, machinery, metal, and then textiles 
industry. Table 5.2 shows the average stock of foreign capital for each industry for 
1975-1984, 1985-1992 and 1975-1992.
The year 1985 was as a turning point in Taiwan’s economic growth in many 
respects, including the opening up of domestic commodity and financial markets, the 
relaxation of restrictions on holding and remitting foreign exchange, and the reform of 
the labour market by the enforcement of the Labour Standard Law. In addition to 
these policy changes, there was a rapid currency appreciation as well as a severe 
shortage of labour and industrial land. It was a period of dramatic change in the 
economic environment.
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Table 5.2 Average stock of foreign capital by industry (1975-84,1985-92,1975-92) 
(NTS1,000)
1975-1984 1985-1992 1975-1992
Food & beverage processing 938,746 3,360,313 1,998,182
Textiles 2,986,857 3,973,052 3,418,317
Apparel 718,588 792,842 751,074
Leather & fur products 80,620 173,194 121,121
Lumber & bamboo products 401,708 442,093 419,377
Pulp, paper & products 264,350 657,703 436,442
Plastic, rubber & chemicals 7,494,547 22,756,394 14,171,605
Non-metallic minerals 646,041 1,952,676 1,217,694
Metal products 1,777,014 7,421,279 4,246,380
Machinery 2,576,651 10,681,169 6,122,378
Electronic products 11,829,174 33,569,721 21,340,663
Source: Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission.
The currency appreciation reduced the cost margin of firms. As most of 
Taiwan’s firms are export oriented with low value-added in production, a shrinking of 
profits caused a crisis in their operations, particularly for marginal firms. The harsh 
Labour Standard Law ,8 labour shortages, and frequent strikes by workers reduced 
domestic investment. The harsh economic climate led many employers to begin to 
evaluate the potential of outward investment. At the same time, the liberalisation of 
foreign exchange controls became a catalyst for the realisation of investments abroad. 
Many heavily labour-intensive inward investors began to re-evaluate their 
investments. Some— particularly those in the EPZs— began to relocate to other 
cheaper labour cost regions, because the cost of relocation involved a relatively low 
sunk cost in establishing production sites in EPZs.
At the same time, there was also a continuous inflow of foreign capital. 
Because marginal firms or extremely low-end products had been relocated through 
outward investment, new capital inflow had to face rigorous competition from 
stronger local firms. In order to compete with local firms, new foreign direct 
investment had to embody advanced technology or other superior ownership-specific 
assets. These new investments would have raised productivity if there were 
externalities. On the other hand, if their technology or assets were far superior to 
those of local firms, there might have been less opportunity for spillovers. In this case, 
foreign direct investment might form an ‘enclave’ and thus create few, or a low level 
of, spillovers to the domestic market. The net benefits of externalities from foreign
 ^ This law has been criticised by many labour economists in Taiwan as leaning too much towards 
the labour side and damaging firms’ operations.
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direct investment is ambiguous after 1985. Hence, the sample period is divided at this 
year.
A correlation test is applied to examine the relationship between total factor 
productivity and the stock of foreign capital. First, the variables are analysed across 
industries. The correlation coefficients between these two variables were 0.314, 0.571 
and 0.490 respectively for the above periods. The standard correlation revealed no 
strong direct relationship between total factor productivity and foreign investment. 
However, the Spearman rank-correlation coefficients were 0.682, 0.700 and 0.709 
respectively for each period. Since the critical value of Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient for 95 per cent significance level with 11 observations is 0.623, the results 
reveal that the null hypothesis of no correlation between TFP and the stock of foreign 
capital cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent level of confidence.
These results imply that there was a higher productivity growth in industries 
which also had larger foreign involvement. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that there was a significant spillover effect in the presence of foreign direct 
investment. Foreign direct investments introduced advanced technology and 
techniques and aided the development of Taiwan’s manufacturing industries. They did 
not form an enclave in Taiwan. It is conceivable that foreign direct investment played 
the role of ‘tutor’ in disseminating knowledge and technology in the Taiwanese 
manufacturing sector.
Next, a correlation test is applied across time for each industry. The results 
are set out in Table 5.3. The test results show that the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between these two variables is rejected for all industries except the lumber 
and bamboo products industry. As noted previously, this industry had traditionally 
developed its own techniques and skills. Inflow of foreign capital tended to be 
indifferent to the development of this industry.
However, most of them were rejected at 1 per cent significant level, except 
the clothing industry at 5 per cent, and the paper & products industry at 10 per cent 
level. The clothing industry was a labour-intensive industry in Taiwan’s economic 
development; labour shortages and rising wages from the 1980s forced this industry 
to restructure towards upstream textile industries. The changed economic 
environment not only affected productivity growth, but also influenced the inflow of 
foreign capital into this industry. The pulp and paper products industry is a typical 
domestic market oriented industry and almost all materials, as well as equipment were 
imported. Indigenous firms grew independently and this resulted in a low correlation 
between productivity growth and the inflow of foreign capital in this industry.
From Table 5.3, the Spearman’s rank test revealed that the no correlation null 
hypothesis can be rejected on a different level of confidence interval for most
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industries. The standard correlation test also confirmed a high correlation between 
productivity growth and the stock of foreign capital, except in the lumber and 
bamboo products industry. Both test results stated that an industry grew faster 
whenever there was a higher inflow of foreign capital. The results are consistent with 
the hypothesis.
Table 5.3 The correlation test for TFP and the stock of foreign capital, 1975-1992
standard correlation 
coefficient
Spearman rank 
coefficient
Food & beverage processing 0.957 0.971***
Textiles 0.870 0.894***
Apparel 0.614 0.532**
Leather & fur products 0.908 0.918***
Lumber & bamboo products 0.320 0.288
Pulp, paper & products 0.895 0.900***
Plastic, rubber & chemicals 0.920 0.947***
Non-metallic minerals 0.966 0.944***
Metal products 0.969 0.968***
Machinery 0.977 0.997***
Electronic products 0.990 0.994***
Note: ** indicates 95% significant level of Spearman rank coefficient (critical value = 0.507); 
*** indicates 99% significant level of Spearman rank coefficient (critical value = 0.666).
Both correlation analysis across industries and over time strongly suggest the 
existence of spillover effects by rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between productivity growth and foreign capital involvement. The 
relatively low level of significance in testing the relationship across industries can be 
attributed partly to the low productivity growth of raw material-consuming industries 
and the effects of the world recession. During those periods, the volume of foreign 
capital in the market might be an inaccurate measure of the contribution of foreign 
involvement, because export-oriented products, even those of foreign subsidiaries, 
were strongly and adversely affected by the recession. Their influence on the domestic 
market might also have been counteracted by the low incentives for domestic firms to 
adopt new knowledge or technology, because of low expected future profitability. 
The time series analysis for each industry is less subject to this disadvantage.
This analysis suggests that the hypothesis of ‘no correlation’ between TFP and 
the stock of foreign capital can be rejected. It reveals a possibility of the existence of 
spillover effects in the presence of foreign direct investment. The next step is to 
identify this externality through more systematic analysis. As shown in equation (20), 
the measured growth in total factor productivity can be decomposed into three parts 
related to changes in economies of scale by the expansion of operations, spillover
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effects from the entry of foreign capital, and the unexplained part which represents a 
shift of production function (or cost function).
It should be noted here that the level of total output for each industry replaces 
the variable of value-added in the previous measure of TFP, because the level of total 
output measures more directly the scale factor. However, modification is needed to 
equalise the primal and dual measurement of TFP growth, by adjusting the deviation 
between the level of output and value-added. Mathematically, these two measures 
maintain a proportional relationship. The proportion is equal to the share of value- 
added to total output.9 Average TFP growth adjusted by the share of value-added is 
listed in Table 5.4. The rates of growth in total output and stock of foreign capital are 
also presented for comparison.
Table 5.4 The average growth of TFP, output and foreign capital stock (%)
TFP Output Foreign capital stock
1977-84 1985-91 1977-91 1977-84 1985-91 1977-91 1977-84 1985-91 1977-91
Food 1.32 1.55 1.41 11.28 2.62 7.81 22.18 16.52 19.91
Textiles 2.83 2.65 2.76 10.48 3.02 7.49 5.18 4.68 4.98
Apparel 2.25 2.10 2.19 17.36 -1.62 9.77 6.12 5.42 5.84
Leather 2.01 2.71 2.29 25.39 3.42 16.60 15.47 6.60 11.92
Lumber 1.00 0.98 0.99 10.18 1.65 6.77 6.64 5.33 6.12
Pulp & paper 1.76 3.11 2.30 16.78 11.23 14.56 19.61 13.82 17.29
Chemicals 1.82 2.49 2.09 18.79 7.20 14.15 16.46 14.83 15.81
Non-metallic 1.27 3.25 2.06 16.21 5.58 11.96 20.60 22.10 21.20
Metal 1.61 2.11 1.81 19.68 8.10 15.05 13.20 16.68 14.59
Machinery 1.62 2.79 2.09 17.39 12.78 15.55 21.60 17.38 19.91
Electronics 2.38 2.93 2.60 19.71 11.65 16.49 17.58 24.22 20.23
Source: (i) Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission
(ii) Derived as described in the text.
(iii) Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Gross 
Domestic Product and Factor Incomes by Kind of Activity, each year, Taipei.
The table shows that total output and foreign capital inflow grew quite rapidly 
in the early period, but slowed down in later years, except for the metal industry into 
which foreign capital inflow continued to grow strongly. The apparel industry shifted 
to negative output growth after 1985. These two series reveal a rather similar growth 
pattern, suggesting that the entry of foreign firms resulted in the enlargement of scale 
of production. Secondly, the rate of growth in TFP is higher in the second period. 
There is inconsistency in the growth trend of TFP with the other two series, and this 
may imply that there is a lag before the effect of spillovers has its impact.10
9 The derivation of this proportion is shown in Appendix 5.D.
In fact, the estimation results improve for some industries when one time lag of the stock of 
foreign capital is employed; but for some industries it worsens. Use of a time lag should take
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Following equation (21), the regression analysis for decomposed TFP growth 
is estimated. The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 Decomposition of TFP growth, the regression analysis 
X = Yo + y x(d In Q/dT) + y2(d\nF/dT) + y 3T
Industry Y o Y i Y  2 Y 3
Food & beverage processing 0.0124
(0.724)
0.0080
(0.080)
-0.0254
(-1.479)
0.0008
(0.588)
Textiles 0.0088
(0.629)
0.1719**
(3.072)
-0.0290
(-0.648)
0.0009
(0.736)
Apparel -0.0031
(-0.151)
0.1103*
(1.941)
0.0312
(0.904)
0.0016
(0.807)
Leather & fur products -0.0326
(-1.689)
0.1146**
(3.195)
-0.0059
(-0.279)
0.0046**
(2.725)
Lumber & bamboo products -0.0313
(-2.982)
0.2435**
(7.855)
-0.0241
(-1.329)
0.0033**
(3.043)
Pulp, paper & products -0.0164
(-0.837)
0.1290**
(2.434)
0.0170
(0.588)
0.0022
(1.424)
Plastic, rubber & chemicals 0.0075
(0.430)
0.0202
(0.397)
0.0143
(0.788)
0.0010
(0.809)
Non-metallic minerals -0.0005
(-0.019)
0.0167
(0.215)
0.0136
(0.300)
0.0020
(0.904)
Metal products -0.0031
(-0.193)
0.0496
(1.231)
-0.0089
(-0.357)
0.0019
(1.470)
Machinery -0.0059
(-0.317)
0.1070**
(1.926)
-0.0290
(-0.955)
0.0020
(1.628)
Electronic products 0.0047
(0.428)
0.0063**
(2.226)
0.0197
(0.868)
0.0009
(0.969)
Note: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
* significant at 90% level.
** significant at 95% level.
It should be noted that the regression analysis is based on the assumption that 
the levels of output and the stock of foreign capital are exogenous to 
contemporaneous productivity growth, because it is possible that productivity growth
account of the characteristics of each industry. It is conceivable that a larger establishment 
generally needs a longer time to operate and disseminate externally. Since this study is a 
preliminary to the overall analysis, an industry-by-industry analysis is left for further study.
130
will enhance the competitiveness of an industry and thus increase its output level, 
which in turn will attract the inflow of foreign direct investment. The exogeneity of 
output and the stock of foreign capital is thus assumed in the estimation of this 
regression. Moreover, it is assumed that the growth of foreign capital stock is 
uncorrelated with the time term, because foreign capital continues to enter and exit 
the host market.
The table reveals that the estimate of the scale effect ) is positive in every 
industry, and significant in 7 out of the 11 industries studied. Food and beverage, 
plastic, rubber and chemical, non-metallic and metal industries have positive but 
insignificant coefficients. It appears that the underlying technology exhibited 
substantial increasing returns to scale for all other industries. The results suggest that 
Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, in most industries, has been exploiting scale 
economies through expansion in the size of operation over time.
The food processing industry is labour- and land-intensive. Since both of these 
factors became more and more scarce with economic development, an enlargement of 
operations could have raised marginal costs more than marginal productivity for these 
scarce inputs. Scale economies are therefore not a major source of productivity 
growth in this industry. In the plastic, rubber and chemicals industries, which 
encompass a very wide range of products, there appear to have been offsetting cost 
and productivity effects and no observable scale effect. The non-metallic minerals and 
the metal industries faced similar conditions to the food industry, but their higher 
costs resulted from the reduction in mine deposits, the imposition of a new 
environment law and protests from local residents against excavating. In addition, all 
of these industries, except the plastic products industry, are basically domestic market 
oriented. The relatively small size of the domestic market limited the expansion of 
production in these industries.
The estimates of the spillover effect (y2) vary in sign and are insignificant for 
all industries. The results clearly indicate that when both scale and spillover effects are 
taken into account, the scale effect is the dominant explanatory variable for 
productivity growth. The enlargement of scale appears to be the channel through 
which spillovers of direct foreign investment affect productivity growth. Aside from 
this indirect contribution to the scale of output, foreign capital appears to have a 
rather ambiguous and weak linkage to productivity growth in Taiwan. Productivity 
efficiency does not appear to have been achieved through an increase in the stock of 
foreign capital.
There are some qualifications to this conclusion. First, note that the regression 
results imply no causal relationship between stock of foreign capital and productivity 
growth. This type of study requires extensive time-series data, which are not available
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here. In particular, the most significant period in which foreign direct investment 
might have had a affect on the Taiwanese economy was conceivably from the 1960s 
to the mid-1970s. This study simply demonstrates that the scale factor has 
explanatory power in interpreting productivity growth compared with the spillover 
effect. Secondly, other forces that affect productivity growth have been important, yet 
excluded from this investigation. For instance, the contribution of export expansion 
and the capital utilisation rate to productivity growth may have been important. Some 
studies11 suggest that these two factors are highly correlated with productivity 
growth.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that the entry of foreign capital is correlated with 
productivity growth in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. Yet growth in the stock of 
foreign capital is not as important a factor in explaining productivity growth as output 
growth. If the competition effect of the entry of foreign firms could force indigenous 
firms to reduce managerial slack or to adopt more efficient production processes, they 
would operate in a more efficient manner. More efficient operation implies higher 
productivity growth. However, adjustment to foreign entry would also require some 
adjustment in indigenous firms’ production processes or the exit of inefficient firms. 
This could impose some production costs and would be detrimental to productivity 
growth. These two effects might counteract each other and result in insignificant 
spillover effects.
There are a number of factors which might weaken the test results.
First, the spillover effect might not be contemporaneous with the inflow of 
foreign direct investment and might not be caught in the measure of TFP; for 
instance, foreign direct investment could raise labour productivity or change factor 
intensity in production, without growth in productivity. This can be seen in equation 
(10). Since the summation of input cost shares equals 1, this equation can be 
rewritten as,
Q K  •A \ n y = S K(A\n—) + A
Li Li
It is obvious that differences in the level of labour productivity can be 
attributed to two broad components. The first one is the difference in the level of
11 Chen and Tang (1990), and Nishimizu and Robinson (1984), proved the significant relationship 
between export and productivity, whilst Kwon (1986) discussed the influence of capital 
utilisation.
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TFP, and the second is the difference in the level of factor intensity A\n(K/L).  The 
growth in TFP can be attributed to the improvement in the use of resources by 
measuring the increase in the quantity of output given a fixed bundle of capital and 
labour, whereas a change in factor intensity assumes that if the ratio of capital to 
labour changes, then labour productivity will change. Increases in this ratio will raise 
labour productivity. There are reasons why factor intensity changes. Shifts in relative 
prices, new technologies and changes in the degree of processing are the major 
possibilities.
Although productivity growth and factor intensity change are two major 
components in labour productivity growth, they are correlated with each other. 
Changes in factor intensity may occur without any improvement in the ability to 
produce goods in a particular industry. They may occur without any increase in 
TFP.12 The specific ownership advantages of foreign firms can enable the entry of 
foreign investment and a shift in the capital-labour ratio, thereby improving labour 
productivity without changing TFP. This benefit from foreign direct investment 
derives only from changing factor intensity or labour productivity.
Secondly, volume of foreign capital may not be the best index to reflect the 
magnitude of the impact of foreign direct investment or the stock of foreign capital in 
an industry. There are two reasons. The nominal book value of capital is a flow 
concept, representing the total amount of foreign capital in an industry, which may 
not be a proper indicator of the stock of foreign capital in an industry, because it does 
not account for the difference in capital utilisation rate across firms. In addition, the 
cumulative book value of foreign capital does not take into account depreciation for 
machinery and equipment and the age of machinery and equipment; the real value of 
foreign capital probably significantly deviates from the book value. This may induce 
bias.
The share of employment by foreign firms in each industry, listed in Appendix 
5.E, was also tried as a proxy estimate for foreign capital penetration. The estimation 
results are similar to those reported here and therefore, no further report is provided 
on this variable. The spillover effect could still not be identified clearly. However, one 
interesting finding is that the share of foreign employment decreased continuously for 
many industries. The most dramatic instance is the electronics industry. The 
downward trend indicates the falling share of foreign investment and the growth of 
domestic firms in the market. These trends may indicate the contribution of foreign 
entrants via dissemination of technology and information, although there is no direct
12 For instance, labour productivity is increased if a worker is provided with more capital. Unless 
there is improvement in capital, this will induce a change in factor intensity but not TFP.
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evidence of this. A better index to represent the stock of foreign capital is desirable to 
provide a better estimate of spillover effects .
Thirdly, the time period chosen may not be ideal for measuring the effects of 
foreign direct investment. The Taiwanese economy had passed through a period of 
high growth and maintained relatively stable growth during the sample period. 
Domestic capital formation was expanding steadily and the importance of foreign 
capital in total capital formation was declining.
Finally, using highly aggregated industrial data may have hidden the 
significance of activities on productivity growth.
In summary, foreign direct investment is found here to have an ambiguous 
effect on productivity even though foreign direct investment and productivity are 
correlated. Scale economies appear to be a more important factor in explaining 
productivity growth in most industries. The underdevelopment of Taiwanese firms in 
technology and information, as well as the relatively small size of Taiwan’s domestic 
market, means that links to the world market are critical if scale economies are to be 
exploited. On the other hand, foreign direct investment is one of the most efficient 
channels for obtaining production knowledge and access to world markets, and the 
inflow of foreign capital has conceivably contributed to achieving of economies of 
scale in Taiwan. Its contribution to productivity growth is mainly seen through a scale 
effect.
134
6 A Productive Efficiency Test of the Spillover 
Effect in Taiwan’s Electronics Industry
Taiwan’s electronics industry has been one of the engines driving the growth of the 
manufacturing sector since the 1960s, especially during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
share of electronic products in manufacturing output increased from 1.7 per cent in 
1961 to 9.4 per cent in 1971, and from 10.8 per cent in 1981, to 19.5 per cent in 
1993. Exports of electronics amounted to less than US$100 million in the 1960s, but 
grew rapidly in the 1970s, and even faster after the 1980s. The share of electronics in 
total exports also rose dramatically, from 0.5 per cent in 1961, to 12.9 per cent in 
1971, to 18.4 per cent in 1981, and to 27.3 per cent in 1982. Taiwan’s electronics 
industry surpassed textiles to become Taiwan’s top industry in the 1980s.
Electronics also absorbed a huge amount of foreign investment. There were 
896 foreign investments valued at US$4.03 billion in the electronics industry over the 
period 1952 to 1992. This accounted for 24.4 per cent of all foreign investment, far 
exceeding the second-highest invested industry, the chemical industry (which 
accounted for 15.3 per cent, valued at US$2.5 billion). In the beginning, foreign 
enterprises were mainly attracted by the low wage costs and high labour quality of 
domestic resources. Foreign investment provided not only capital and markets, but 
also played a major role in the development of Taiwan’s electronics industry by 
transferring and demonstrating advanced technology, including management know­
how and production techniques. Many studies suggest that Taiwan’s electronics 
industry— through technological cooperation with foreign firms, labour turnover, and 
imitation— benefited from the spillover effects generated by foreign investment. 
However, no study has carefully quantified these externalities. This study attempts to 
ascertain whether there were spillovers in the electronics industry via channels other 
than size of operation; for instance, improvement in technical efficiency.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: a brief description of the role of 
foreign investment in the development of Taiwan’s electronics industry is first given 
to provide the background to, and the reason for, this empirical study; the 
methodology and testing follow; and then the conclusions are presented.
Development of the electronics industry
The electronics and textile industries stand out among Taiwan’s newly developed 
manufacturing industries. Both played their part as leading industries during the high
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growth period of Taiwan’s economic development. Since the 1980s, the 
diversification of electronic products— from TVs, radios, and calculators, to 
integrated circuits (IC), computers and other information products— has led the 
electronics industry to become the largest industry in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, 
overtaking the textile industry. The fast growth of this industry provided an incentive 
for foreign enterprises to enter the domestic market, bringing new technology and 
further extending the production frontier, thus enhancing growth. The heavy foreign 
capital involvement accompanied by high growth suggests the presence of spillovers 
from foreign enterprises to the local market. The evolution of Taiwan’s electronics 
industry and its interaction with foreign direct investment therefore presents an 
important case to examine.
After the import of the vacuum tube from Japan, Taiwan’s electronics industry 
was able to produce vacuum tube radios from the 1950s, but the start of transistor 
radio production in 1961 was a milestone in the development of the electronics 
industry. Since then, the electronics industry has grown extremely quickly: transistor 
radios and monochrome televisions were the major products in the 1960s; colour 
televisions, calculators and tape recorders dominated during the 1970s; and integrated 
circuits (IC) and information equipment followed in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
chronology of the development of Taiwan’s electronics industry is listed in Figure 
6. 1.
According to this chronology, the development of Taiwan’s electronics 
industry can be roughly divided into three stages, according to the definition of Liu 
(1987): the beginning, growth, and expansion stages.
The beginning stage: the age of television and transistor radios
The first transistor radio factory in Taiwan was opened in 1961 by a Japanese 
multinational. Although most of the components had to be imported from Japan, this 
production line introduced a new field to Taiwan’s electronics industry. However, the 
lack of technological information made the production of transistors impossible until 
1964 when the first fully foreign-owned electronics subsidiary was set up by the 
American General Instrument Company to produce transistors and electronic 
components. Since then, Taiwan’s electronics industry has played an active role in the 
world electronics market. This American subsidiary, and other companies that 
followed, created a market for local enterprises that produced low-end components 
while, at the same time, accumulating technical knowledge through learning-by-doing. 
The transistor radio became one of the major products in Taiwan’s economy during 
the 1960s.
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Figure 6.1 The chronology of Taiwan’s electronics industry
1961 Establishment of the first transistor radio assembly plant
1962 Start of mono-television broadcasting 
Introduction of IBM-650 computer
Commencement of joint ventures with Japanese electronic multinationals
1963 Beginning of production of mono-television
1964 Establishment of first fully foreign-owned investment, US General Instruments Co. 
(producing transistor and electronic components)
1966 Establishment of Kaoshiung Export Processing Zone and entry of foreign subsidiaries 
1969 Start of broadcasting and production of colour television
Export of electronic products exceeded US$100 million, recording trade surplus 
Establishment of Telecommunications Research Institute 
1971 Beginning of calculator production
1974 Establishment of Electronic Research and Service Organisation (ERSO)
1975 Beginning of digital watch production 
Introduction of micro-computers
1976 Exports exceeded US$1 billion
1977 ERSO set up Integrated Circuit (IC) model factory
1978 Imports reached US$1 billion
1979 US imposed import quotas on colour televisions
1980 Establishment of Hsin-Chu Scientific-based Industrial Park (high-tech district)
Ten Year Plan for the Development of Electronics Industry (1980-89)
1981 Identification of the electronics and information industry as the major strategic industry 
Acceleration of investments in the semiconductor industry
1982 Announcement of eight-year plan for industrial automation
ERSO development of production technology for multipurpose macrocomputer 
Commencement of personal computer industry
1983 Export of electronics products reached US$ 4.2 billion—the top export 
industry
Under technological support of ERSO, development of 16 bit personal computer begun
1984 Joint venture (Vitelic, Mosel, and Quasel) development of VLSI 
ERSO signed licensing agreement with Microsoft
1985 Success in developing digital TV chip set
1988 Testing ISDN (integrated service digital network)
1989 Open satellite and mobile phone communication
1990 Information and communication industry chosen as newly developing strategic industries
1991 Development of HDTV (high definition television)
1992 Establishment of scientific park for the development of computer software
Source: (i) Taiwan Electric Appliance Manufacturers’ Association (TEAMA) The Electronics 
Industry in Taiwan, Republic of China, 1984, Taipei.
(ii) Taiwan Ching Chi Yen Chiu So, Chung-Hua Min Kuo Tzu Hsun Tien Tsu Kung Yeh 
Nien Chien [Electronics Industry Yearbook of the Republic of China], 1994, Taipei.
Another major electronic product at this period was monochrome television. 
The know-how for television (TV) production was introduced mainly by Japanese 
multinationals. Major Japanese electronic manufacturing companies, like Toshiba, 
Mitsubishi, Matsushita and Nihon Denki, rushed into the Taiwanese market in 1962. 
They brought in capital and TV technology. Unlike the export-oriented American 
multinationals, the domestic market oriented Japanese investments preferred to 
cooperate with local enterprises. This technical cooperation allowed the first Taiwan-
137
made monochrome TV to appear in 1963. In the case of both TV and the transistor, 
foreign direct investment played the role of catalyst in the development of Taiwan’s 
electronics industry. The establishment of the Kaoshiung Export Processing Zone in
1965 accelerated the inflow of foreign capital and, hence, the growth of the 
electronics industry.1
The statistics show that production in the electronics industry was a negligible 
proportion of the manufacturing sector in this period, yet the share of TV and radio 
output in total electronics production was 47 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively, 
by 1966, totalling 81 per cent. TV production exceeded one million sets in 1970 and 
reached a peak of 7 million sets in 1978. The production of transistor radios grew 
even faster, from one million sets in 1965 to a peak of 14.5 million sets in 1973. 
Furthermore, the proportion of electronics exports to total exports remained low 
before 1965, peaking at 2.7 per cent, but grew rapidly after that, from 4.9 per cent in
1966 to 12.3 per cent in 1970, and then to 17.2 per cent in 1973.
The growth stage: the age of colour television and the tape recorder
By 1969, colour television had been successfully produced and the spread of colour 
TV in the domestic market encouraged Taiwan’s electronics industry to cover a wider 
spectrum. Colour TVs, tape recorders (produced from 1968), and calculators (from 
1972) were the three major products, leading the growth of Taiwan’s electronics 
industry in the 1970s. Exports of these products signalled the growth of the industry.
The shift from domestic market oriented to export oriented production in the 
electronics industry was not only attributable to changes in the government’s 
industrial policy, as noted in Chapter 3. It was also a result of changes in sales and 
production strategies by foreign multinationals. For instance, American multinationals 
undertook overseas production mainly to take advantage of low local wages, and the 
production lines in subsidiaries were only part of their world-wide global production.2 
Almost 100 per cent of subsidiaries’ products were shipped back to parent firms, 
especially from subsidiaries located in export processing zones. On the other hand, 
the small domestic market changed the strategy of Japanese subsidiaries to an export 
orientation. Unlike American multinationals, they tended to export to a third market. 
In fact, according to the Toyo Keizai (1985; 1992) survey, export to third markets
1 At this stage, foreign capital was mainly attracted by low labour costs. The facilities of the export 
processing zones provided an opportunity to lower management and other costs. For example, no 
tariff was levied on imports and exports (within the zone). Since most electronics firms relied on 
their parent firms to provide key components, many of them preferred to locate production in 
export processing zones.
2 This may have been one reason why most of the American multinationals were investing in the 
production of electronic components and parts instead of products.
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(mainly the US market) was a major motivation, next to seeking low-cost labour, for 
Japanese multinationals to undertake production overseas. Regardless of the origin of 
foreign investment, a larger proportion of production was exported. Since American 
and Japanese multinationals were the two major foreign investors in Taiwan, their 
strategic behaviour certainly changed the market performance of the whole industry, 
as local firms were relatively underdeveloped.
The shift to export-oriented production widened the product market and the 
market for sub-contracting to local components firms, thereby accelerating the 
growth of this industry. The production of colour TVs reached one million sets in 
1978. However, the rapid growth soon came to an end. The industry was heavily 
dependent on the US market, and this began to cause problems after the US 
government imposed import quotas for colour TVs from 1979. In conjunction with 
the extended depression in the world market caused by the oil crises, this let to a 
reduction in total electronics industry exports from Taiwan. The industry faced a 
recession for the first time since its establishment.
The expansion stage: development of the semiconductor and information 
industry
Taiwan’s government realised the potential of the electronics industry in the 
development of the Taiwanese economy as early as the mid-1970s, and the industry—  
especially the semiconductor and information industry— was chosen as a strategic 
industry at that time.3 As part of the industrial policy, the Electronic Research and 
Service Organisation (ERSO) was established in 1974 and its integrated circuits (IC) 
semiconductor model factory was set up in 1977. Both were intended to develop 
more advanced technology for the semiconductor industry.4 The technology for 
producing computer chips was introduced by ERSO, as a result of technological 
cooperation with the American RCA Company. This technology provided the basis 
for the development of Taiwan’s information and semiconductor industry during the 
1980s and 1990s. Nowadays, ERSO possesses the ability to design and produce metal 
oxide semiconductors (MOS), a type of IC commonly used in digital watches, 
calculators, TV games and even toys. Because ERSO had an obligation to transfer 
technologies to private enterprises, its contribution in raising the technological level 
of the semiconductor industry has been extremely significant. Another contribution of
3 For instance, the first four-year plan (1975-79) specified the range of products, the technology to 
be imported, and partners for technological cooperation. The second four-year plan 1979-83, was 
followed by a five-years’ very large scale integration (VLSI) development plan from 1983.
 ^ The semiconductor industry was developed in the early 1960s by the foreign investments of 
General Instruments Co., Texas Instruments Co., and Philips.
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ERSO was to recruit technicians and experts from the United States. The government 
also attempted to develop Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI), a joint project with 
American Overseas Chinese computer companies— Vitellic, Mossel and Quasel— a 
task achieved successfully in 1984. The Taiwan Semiconductor Co. was established in 
1986 to manufacture VLSI.
As well as the effort made to develop technology, the Hsin-Chu Scientific- 
based Industrial Park was established in 1980 to induce foreign investors to transfer 
advanced technology. Industrial policies were designed to provide preferential loans, 
tax deductions, tax holidays, or grants to develop new technology in this industry. 
Meanwhile, the growing demand for electronic products in the world market also 
played a role in encouraging local enterprises to enter the market one after another, 
even though their production was of a relatively small scale. According to the Taiwan 
Electric Appliance Manufacturers’ Association (1987) survey, most of their 
technology came from ERSO, with only a small part from joint ventures with 
American Overseas Chinese. As a result of government efforts in raising the IC 
industry after 1980, the total output of semiconductor products increased from 
NT$31 billion in 1983 to NT$136 billion in 1993, growing at 15.6 per cent per 
annum. This sector is now the third biggest in the electronics industry, next to the 
information and electronics component industry.
The information industry is also a strategic industry. It was developed in 1980, 
growing from the production of terminal monitors and printed circuit boards to 
complete personal computers, to become the largest sector in Taiwan’s electronics 
industry in the second half of the 1980s. Production in this industry captured over 3 
per cent of the world market in 1990. Total output grew from NT$22 billion (6.5 per 
cent of total electronics output) in 1983 to NT$237 billion (24.5 per cent) in 1993, 
and the annual growth rate reached 27.1 per cent, which took this sector to the top of 
the electronics industry. The production of personal computers in 1993 reached 3.6 
million sets (amounting to 10 per cent of world production), 13.3 million monitors 
(51 per cent), 6 million keyboards (49 per cent), 19.7 million mouses (80 per cent), 
0.9 million scanners (55 per cent) and 14.1 million interface cards (83 per cent).
The output and exports growth trends in Taiwan’s electronics industry as well 
as the output growth of manufacturing sector are summarised in Figure 6.2. It shows 
that the electronics industry grew faster, but with more fluctuations than 
manufacturing as a whole between 1962 and 1991. These fluctuations can be 
attributed to the influence of the world economy, especially the US economy, because 
the electronics industry is typically an export-oriented industry and is heavily 
influenced by disturbances in the international market. For instance, during the two oil 
crisis periods (1973-75; 1979-80), growth in this industry fell sharply. The fall in
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production in 1985, on the other hand, was due to the rapid appreciation of NT 
dollar. Figure 6.2 reveals the strongly trade-oriented growth in the electronics 
industry, reflected in the similar trend patterns of production and exports.
Figure 6.2 Output and exports growth of the electronics industry, 1966-1992
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Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Industry o f Free China, Monthly,
Taipei.
Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1993,
Taipei, p. 193
The US market is the most important export market for Taiwan’s electronic 
products, accounting for over 60 per cent of exports in this industry during the 1970s 
and 48 per cent during the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, exports dropped to 30 per 
cent. These figures underscore the vulnerability of Taiwan’s electronics industry to 
changes in the US economy. Nevertheless, the decrease in dependency on the US 
market suggests that the Taiwanese government’s efforts in diversifying the export 
market for the electronics industry have had some success.5
In the import of electronic products, Taiwan became much more dependent 
on Japanese suppliers. The synchronous trend in import and export growth has been a 
critical problem in the development of Taiwan’s electronics industry from the 
beginning. Export growth was accompanied by a growth in imports. This situation 
worsened in the mid-1980s, because of the rapid rise in import prices, mainly due to 
the rise in the price of key components from suppliers with a virtual monopoly. This
5 Because of the huge trade surplus with the United States and the rise in protectionism in that 
country during the 1980s, the Taiwanese government campaigned for diversification of the 
export market to reduce the pressure. European and Japanese markets were promoted, but the 
unfamiliarity with the former and the closeness of the latter made Taiwan’s producers hesitant.
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implies that in Taiwan's electronics industry, there is a relatively small level of value­
adding in products, and there is a technological gap with advanced countries.
A comparison of the performance of foreign subsidiaries and domestic firms
This chronology of Taiwan’s electronics industry development indicates strongly that 
foreign capital functioned as a catalyst in promoting successive rounds of 
development, via its role in introducing and disseminating new technology, 
particularly before the establishment of ERSO.
The electronics industry has the largest foreign capital involvement of all 
Taiwan’s industries, as shown in Table 3.2 of Chapter 3. It accounted for 27 per cent 
of total accumulated foreign capital inflow on an approvals basis between 1952 and 
1992. It also has the highest number of investment projects; 896 cases. The 1986 
census data on Taiwan’s manufacturing sector showed that the average number of 
workers employed by foreign subsidiaries in the electronics industry was 709 persons, 
a much larger figure than in domestic firms (45 persons). They also had higher 
productivity, output per worker being NT$1.3 million higher than that of local firms 
(NT$0.8 million), and output per unit of capital was larger, at NT$6,380. The higher 
productivity indicates a higher gross return on capital for foreign subsidiaries, but not 
necessarily a higher net return, because they also paid higher wages. The high wage 
rate paid by foreign subsidiaries, according to human capital theory, implies higher 
accumulation of human capital among their workers. In addition, on-the-job training 
was a major activity of foreign subsidiaries, promoting the accumulation of human 
capital. The mobility of these trained workers potentially disseminated productive 
techniques and knowledge to local firms.
The higher export ratio of foreign firms was mainly due to intra-firm 
transactions. A higher export ratio might also suggest a lower local procurement ratio 
because of quality requirements. The survey data of the Investment Commission 
shows that foreign subsidiaries, on average, imported 60 per cent of their materials. A 
high export ratio with low local procurement illustrates foreign firms’ strategy in 
international division of labour. This weak linkage to the domestic market might 
hinder the accumulation of skills and techniques. Liu (1987) found that the inflow of 
technology with multinationals— particularly in the case of Japanese multinationals—  
was usually accompanied by restrictions on key components or product market 
segregation in order to hinder the dissemination of technology. These factors might 
have constrained the externalities flowing from foreign firms in the development of 
Taiwan’s electronics industry.
On the other hand, restrictions on components such as speakers, switches, 
transformers, rectifiers and resistors stimulated for domestic producers to develop
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them. This generated a backward linkage effect to the domestic market and 
encouraged the development of the import-substitution components industry in the 
1960s and 1970s. This effort provided a solid basis for the development of the 
information and semiconductor industry in the 1980s. The production of components 
grew faster than other segments of the industry and on average accounted for over 50 
per cent of total electronic products before the 1980s. It was the second largest sector 
in the electronics industry in 1983, valued at NT$56 billion with a share of 16.8 per 
cent in total electronics output. The fast growth of the information and IC industry 
after 1980 increased the demand for parts and accelerated its growth. Output of 
components increased to NT$211 billion and its share of output rose to 21.8 per cent 
in 1993. The major components produced since 1980 are printed circuit boards, 
electricity transformers, electric plugs, and colour tubes.
Table 6.1 A comparison of foreign firms and local firms (NT$1,000)
Foreign Firms (251) Local firms (5862)
productivity 
output per worker 1285.65 840.77
output per unit of capital 6.38 5.88
employees per firm (persons) 709 45
value-added per worker 355.03 247.48
wage rate 15.34 10.94
export ratio (%) 75.18 24.13
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of
China, The Report on 1986 Industrial and Commercial Census, Taiwan-Fukien Area, ROC, 
Manufacturing Sector, Taipei.
In summary, foreign direct investment has made a contribution to the 
production of electronic products, by disseminating technology and knowledge and 
by stimulating the development of components and parts. On the other hand, limited 
linkages to the domestic market might have distorted resource allocation and thus 
deterred development. If the beneficial effects of foreign investment counterbalanced 
the negative effects, then domestic firms are likely to have improved in productive 
efficiency because of new information on production, management, or know-how 
originating from foreign firms. This conclusion can now be tested by undertaking a 
normal quantitative analysis of the productive efficiency effects of foreign investment 
on local firms in the electronics industry.
Stochastic approach to decomposing TFP growth
The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 decomposed TFP growth into a scale effect, a 
spillover effect and an unexplained residual (technological progress). The entry of
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foreign capital clearly increased the benefits from larger scale production in Taiwan’s 
manufacturing sector. Apart from these effects, there are other channels by which 
foreign entry may contribute to the development of domestic industries, such as 
improving the technical efficiency of firms.
Examined from another angle, it is possible to decompose TFP growth further 
into technical progress and changes in technical efficiency. The decomposition of TFP 
in this way can provide more information on the nature of the production technology 
used by firms. As noted by Nishimizu and Page (1982), technical progress and 
technical efficiency are analytically distinct concepts. When there is innovation or 
adoption of new technology, firms make technical progress. A high rate of technical 
progress can accompany a deterioration in technical efficiency, if firms fail to achieve 
mastery of new technology, or they face a quasi-fixed vintage capital problem in their 
cost-minimising behaviour. On the other hand, relatively low rates of technical 
progress may coexist with rapidly improving technical efficiency, if firms put effort 
into leaming-by-doing, improving managerial practice, or gaining from the diffusion 
of new technological knowledge. TFP growth might be misinterpreted if it takes no 
account of technical efficiency changes. Firm-level analysis allows closer examination 
of the impact of foreign firms on local firms by decomposing TFP growth to examine 
changes in technical efficiency.
The hypothesis assumes that foreign direct investment can improve productive 
efficiency in local firms, either through technical progress or technical efficiency via 
spillovers. When local firms adopt new knowledge in the market and improve their 
performance, their productive efficiency is raised, particularly through an 
improvement in technical efficiency. The methodology follows that set out in Chapter 
5, except that here TFP growth is decomposed further to measure the technical 
efficiency of firms.
The first study which attempted to decompose TFP growth rate into 
technological progress and changes in technical efficiency was that of Nishimizu and 
Page (1982). They defined technological progress as the shift in the ‘best practice’ 
techniques production frontier function over time, and established its rate by direct 
estimation using the linear programming techniques of a deterministic translog 
frontier production function. Bauer (1990a), laid out an index number approach that 
explored the relationship between changes in total factor productivity and changes in 
technological progress and technical efficiency. Fan (1991), Lin (1992), and Kalirajan, 
Obwona and Zhao, (1994) examined the relative contributions of input growth, 
technological progress and technical efficiency changes in the mainland Chinese 
agricultural industry, using frontier production analysis. Following these studies, the 
stochastic frontier analysis is employed here, but the dual approach of estimating the
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cost function replaces the primal approach which is commonly used in the above 
studies.
Traditionally, the production function is estimated by regression analysis of 
the relationship between input and output. This kind of analysis represents only the 
‘average’ output level of a given level of inputs for a production unit; intra-firm 
deviations in technical efficiency are excluded. Since technical efficiency generally 
refers to the firm’s ability to produce the maximum possible output from a given 
combination of inputs and technology, regardless of market demand and prices, the 
production function should be able to measure the maximum possible output level 
under the existing technology. This type of production function is called the frontier 
production function.
The frontier production function is commonly assumed and estimated in the 
literature when measuring technical efficiency, such as in Farrell (1957), Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), Schmidt and Lovell 
(1979), Pitt and Lee (1981), Nishimizu and Page (1982), Kalirajan and Flinn (1983), 
Fan (1991), Kalirajan, Obwona and Zhao (1994) and others. Bauer (1990b) 
thoroughly describes the development of and the approaches to the estimation of 
stochastic frontiers. The frontier model can interpret the deviations from a frontier as 
a measure of the efficiency with which economic units pursue their technical or 
behavioural objectives. It is consistent with the underlying economic theory of 
optimising behaviour. The relationship of TFP growth to output growth has been 
demonstrated by Kalirajan, Obwona and Zhao (1994, p. 7), as in Figure 6.3.
Assuming the firm faces production frontier and F2 for periods 1 and 2, 
respectively, if a given firm was technically efficient, output would be y* in period 1 
and y2 in period 2. However, the firm can only produce y{ in period 1 and y2 in 
period 2 due to technical inefficiency in production, hence the output-based measure 
of technical efficiency can be defined, by Farrell’s (1957) definition, as
TE = ^ r ,where 0 < T E < 1  (1)
y
From equation (1), technical efficiency can be expressed by the distance 
between the frontier output and the actual output of a given firm in the graph; that is 
TE1 in period 1 and TE2 in period 2. Change in technical efficiency over time is the 
difference between TE1 and TE2, and technical change is measured by the distance 
between frontier 2 and frontier 1; that is, y2 - y 2 using x2 input levels or y* -y*  
using xx input levels. The input growth between the two periods denotes as Ayx, so 
the total output growth, y2 -  y{ can be decomposed into three components, that is, 
input growth, technical change and change in technical efficiency.
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The decomposition can be mathematically expressed as follows
o  = y2-y i
—A+B+C
=  [>’i ' - . v , ] +[}■,' - y ' l + h j - y i *  ]
= [yl -  y J + [yl -  yl ]+ [y2 -  y l }+[y2 -  yl ] (2)
= [y*-yil+U* -y i‘] - [y 2 - y 2]+[y2 - y l }
= [(y*-yl) - ( y 2 - y 2)]+(y,' -y*)+(y2 - y l )
9 0 0
= TE+TP+ yx
where y2 -  yx = production output growth between two periods 
TE = technical efficiency change
TP = technical progress ( shifts in the production frontier over time) 
yx = changes in output production due to input growth (shifts along the 
production function).
Total factor productivity growth measures output growth after taking into 
account input growth, that is, the changes in technical efficiency over time and shifts 
in technology over time, which can be expressed as follows,
TFP = D - y x 
= TE+ TP
Bauer (1990a) decomposed TFP growth into a change of technical efficiency, 
technical progress, and the scale effect. First, he logarithmically differentiated 
Farrell’s definition of technical efficiency with respect to time to yield,
dlnTE _ d \ n y  ^ y d \n f ( x , t ) d x i d \n f ( x , t )  
dt dt i 3jc- dt + dt
rewritten as
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(3)
•  •  •  x'df (Xi t )  x ,
•  •
where f(x, t )  = TP is the time rate of change in technical progress by shifts in the 
production function, and xt is the ith input. From Chapter 5, the conventional Divisia
index of TFP growth is defined as
TFP = y - F
(4)
# V  W-X:
where F = 2j~7T xi
i c
F is an aggregate measure of observed input usage, wi is the price of the ith input, x{ 
is the use of the ith input, and C is the production cost.
Substituting equation (3) into the definition of TFP growth (equation (4)),
then
Meanwhile, the output elasticity of the ith input and cost share of the ith input are 
defined as follows
e,(*,0 = d/CM)dx{ f {x , tY
and 
Si~ C
Substituting the above definitions into equation (5) obtains
TFP = TE+ f(x,  t) + 1  [et (x, t ) - s t] xt
i
(6)
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Equation (6) decomposes TFP growth into terms related to technical 
efficiency, technological progress, and a term that depends on the degree of the input- 
specific returns to scale and cost inefficiency. It is straightforward to conclude that 
improvement in technological progress and technical efficiency increases TFP growth 
from the first two terms in the equation. As for the last term, when the firm fails to 
produce at minimum cost, the aggregate measure of input usage is a biased measure 
of actual input usage since the observed input shares, not the cost-minimising input 
shares, are employed in the construction of this index. Therefore, the measure of TFP 
growth is shown to depend on changes in production efficiency, technological 
progress, and a residual term which represents the bias introduced in the aggregation 
of inputs using observed input shares.
The decomposition is consistent with the results in Chapter 5. When the 
production of a firm is cost efficient, its production satisfies the requirements of cost 
minimisation, that is the marginal product of ith input is equal to its marginal cost
V .
dxt
Wi
, for all i
then equation (5) can be transformed into
TFP = f(x ',t) + i k /
i L C
which is the same as equation (8) in Chapter 5. From this equation, when constant 
returns to scale and cost efficiency are assumed, TFP growth is equivalent to 
technological progress; but with non-constant returns to scale and cost inefficiency, 
TFP growth is equivalent to technological progress plus a term that adjusts for the 
degree of returns to scale.
A further decomposition of TFP growth into scale effect and cost inefficiency 
is possible when the firm is cost inefficient. As explained in Chapter 5, the use of the 
cost function is more straightforward when incorporating the scale factor, as it is a 
function of output level, rather than the production function. Thus the dual approach 
is employed and decomposed in the following.
In the dual approach, Farrell’s (1957) input-based overall measure of cost 
efficiency is employed, defined as
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c
E = — , where 0 < E < 1 
C
(7)
where C*is the efficient cost given output level and factor prices at time t . Taking 
the logarithm of this efficient cost and differentiating with respect to time, with some 
substitutions yields
E=Ecy( y , w , t ) y + J J— - ^ w i+ C - C  (8)
where e is the cost elasticity of output. Using the definition of TFP growth in 
equation (4), equation (8) is rewritten as
TFP = [ 1 -  e ,,(y , w ,» ] y+ E— c *-  £  ^  (*
I C
i C
( 9)
On the other hand, differentiating the cost function with respect to time derives the 
following equation6
A  ^  WiXi  • , ^  W iX l
C = X—br~xi + X —1— W:
C C
Substituting into equation (9) obtains
6 Since C = X w .jc,-
differentiating with respect to time derives
dC _  dx, _  dw-
—  =  X w , . — L + X u — L 
dt i dt i dt
dividing the whole equation by C,
2 ü i * ± £ i ,  v  x i d w .i w ldC 1------------=  2, — — - — + 2. — —
dt C i C dt ;t. i C dt w,
rewriting as
C = X
C C
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TFP = [ l - £ cy(y ,w , t ) ]y+ k-c*
C C*
( 10)
On the other hand, Farrell defines input-based measures of technical inefficiency as 
the proportional overuse of all inputs, whereas allocative inefficiency is the failure to 
use the least-cost mix of inputs, which means that cost efficiency (equation (7)) can 
be decomposed as E = T • A,  a cross effect of technical efficiency and allocative
efficiency, where T and A are the Farrell input-based measures of technical and
•  •  •
allocative efficiency respectively. This implies E = T+A.  Substituting into equation 
(10) yields the decomposition of TFP growth as
Equation (11) decomposes TFP growth into terms related to the scale effect, changes 
in technical and allocative efficiency, technological progress, and a residual price 
effect term. The last term implies that, when the firm is allocatively efficient, then 
si = s*, and the price effect term is equal to zero. This term is also equal to zero when 
input prices change at the same rate, since 'L(si -s*)  = 0.  The presence of this
residual is because TFP growth is defined as an observable quantity. It is biased by 
relying on observed input usage which is in turn biased by cost inefficiency.
The decomposition from the cost function is also consistent with expectations, 
in that increases in cost efficiency increase TFP growth. In short, the decomposition 
provides tools for assigning the observed changes in TFP growth to the various root 
sources. Furthermore, the decomposition shows that a more complete partitioning of 
the sources of observed TFP growth is derived when the duality is applied.
It should be noted from the above analytical framework that the 
decomposition of TFP growth is underpinned by the concept of the production 
frontier, which assumes that firms can maximise output or minimise costs if, and only 
if, their production is efficient. Alternatively, technical inefficiency is the failure to 
produce maximal output for a given level of inputs, which is generally assumed to be 
efficiency in neoclassical production analysis. In this sense, the neoclassical 
production functions are ‘average’ and unable to provide information on efficiency, 
because symmetric random disturbance is assumed in estimating production functions. 
The differences in interpreting production behaviour induce different specifications on 
production function in the frontier analysis. The development of frontier analysis is 
therefore briefly described in the following.
(ID
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Farrell (1957) was the first to raise the idea of measuring a firm’s technical 
efficiency by employing the production frontier. Since then, this approach has been 
widely accepted and applied empirically in the literature, but with different 
specifications for the disturbance term.
The earliest work on frontiers is called the deterministic frontier approach. 
This idea was developed by Farrell (1957), Farrell and Fieldhouse (1962) and Afriat 
(1972), and tested by Aigner and Chu (1968), F(|)rsund and Jansen (1977) and others. 
The deterministic approach assumes that firms possess the same information on 
production and hence face the same production frontier, whilst technical efficiency 
can be measured by the deviations between actual output and the frontier. The 
production function in the deterministic frontier approach generally takes the 
following form:
y - f  (x)e~u u> 0
where y is actual output, x is the input vector, and u represents technical 
inefficiency. Deterministic approaches can be categorised as follows: deterministic 
nonparameter approach (Farrell 1957), deterministic parameter approach (Aigner and 
Chu 1968), and deterministic statistical frontier approach (Afrait 1972). The first two 
approaches use mathematical programming techniques to compute the parameters, 
and no assumptions are explicitly made about the properties of disturbance. The 
disadvantage of these methods is that the calculated frontier may be warped if the 
data are contaminated by statistical noise.
Unlike these approaches, the statistical frontier approach imposes a statistical 
relationship between observation and the estimated frontier by assuming a statistical 
distribution among those disturbance terms. The distribution of the one-sided 
disturbance has been assumed to have a particular form, for instance, two-parameter 
Beta distribution (Afriat 1972), one-parameter Gamma distribution (Richmond 1974), 
or exponential distribution (Schmidt 1976). The disadvantage of this specification is 
that the regularity conditions for application of maximum likelihood methods are 
violated during the estimation, because the range of the observed random variables 
depends on the parameter being estimated (Greene 1980b). The usual Cramer rule 
cannot be applied to determine the asymptotic distributions of parameter estimates 
and it is not clear how the asymptotic standard error for these estimators can be 
obtained. Under these circumstances, the frontier is not clear after estimation is 
undertaken. Estimates of the deterministic frontier model are not completely 
straightforward when applying maximum likelihood estimation. Another disadvantage
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of deterministic frontier approaches is that these models are extremely sensitive to 
outliers in the data.
In order to ameliorate the problems of deterministic frontier models, the 
stochastic production frontier was developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), 
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). This approach to estimating frontiers uses 
a parametric representation of technology along with a two-part composed error 
term. One part of the composed error term represents statistical noise and is generally 
assumed to follow a normal distribution. The other part represents inefficiency and is 
assumed to follow a particular one-sided distribution, for instance, a half-normal and 
exponential distribution (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977), a truncated normal 
distribution (Stevenson 1980), a two-parameter Gamma distribution (Greene 1990), 
or a four-parameter Pearson family of distribution (Lee 1983).
The specification of this approach is that the output of each firm is bounded 
above by a frontier that is stochastic in the sense that its placement is allowed to vary 
randomly across firms. From an economic standpoint, the frontier itself can vary 
randomly across firms, or over time for the same firm. The one-sided disturbance 
reflects each firm’s deviation from the optimal production. Any such deviation is the 
result of factors under the firm’s control, such as technical and economic inefficiency, 
or the effort of the producer and employees. However, the frontier is stochastic in the 
sense that the frontier with random disturbances presumably captures the effects of 
exogenous shocks—favourable or unfavourable external events such as luck, climate, 
topography and machine performance— which are beyond the control of the firms.
To illustrate this approach, consider a stochastic cost function7
ln Ci = ln C(y,., ) + e, where
£( = w, + v.
where w, is a one-sided disturbance (non-negative for cost frontier) capturing the
effects of inefficiency, which reflects the fact that each firm’s production cost must lie 
on or above its cost frontier (C O ^w ^ + v,.); and vi is a two-sided disturbance
capturing the effects of noise. If a firm uses best practice techniques, but there are 
either measurement errors or the influence of external factors, then the cost frontier is 
C(X , w, )exp(v.); that is, the stochastic cost frontier. Given distributional assumptions
7 The primal approach specifies the stochastic production function taking the following form, 
y — f  {x)e_e where £ = v — u and u > 0
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for the two disturbance terms and assuming that they are mutually independent, the 
model can then be estimated by the maximum-likelihood method.8
Due to the unobservable random disturbance v- and no way to identify the
deviations among firms arising from the stochastic error or technical inefficiency,9 this 
model can only estimate average technical inefficiency for the entire sample. In order 
to overcome this deficiency, Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982), and 
Kalirajan and Flinn (1983), independently suggest the use of either the expected value 
on the estimate of ut given ui + vi, or the mode of this conditional distribution as an 
estimate of ut , to calculate firm-specific technical efficiency. This statistical-type firm-
specific technical efficiency measure is discussed and estimated later. The drawback 
of these estimates is that they are not consistent estimates of w,, because e, contains 
only imperfect information about ui .
A further development of this approach attempts to measure the allocative 
efficiency of the firm.10 Following Farrell’s definition, it is possible to decompose 
economic inefficiency into technical and allocative inefficiency; that is, to rewrite the 
cost frontier in the following form,
ln C- = In C{yi, wi) + In 77s. + In A£. + v,.
where In 77s. is a non-negative term reflecting the increase in costs due to technical 
inefficiency, In AEi is a non-negative term reflecting the increase in costs due to 
allocative inefficiency, and v, represents statistical noise.
8 This model can also be estimated by corrected ordinary least squares (COLS), as in the 
estimation of Bagi and Huang (1983), which uses the moments of residual term in OLS 
estimations to derive the expected value of the residual and then adjusts the intercept term. This 
estimation is easier than maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), but may obtain inconsistent 
estimates.
9 Taking exponential of cost frontier,
C =enyi'Wi)-eVi-eUi
and firm-specific technical efficiency is measured by e
/(j, ,w.)-ev
Since V, is unknown, only the average technical inefficiency of the entire observations can be 
obtained instead of an individual firm’s technical inefficiency.
ie. £ ( e “ ) =  2 (« ° ’‘^ ' ) ( l - F ( a n ) ) .
10 Allocative efficiency can only be estimated by the cost frontier, because the production frontier 
provides no information on the influence of factor price changes on resource allocation.
154
In addition to the development of measuring technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency, techniques to estimate panel data have also been developed to weaken the 
strong assumptions regarding disturbance terms.11 In particular, as argued by 
Jondrow et al. (1982) and Kalirajan and Flinn (1983), the level of an individual firm’s 
technical efficiency cannot be consistently estimated in a single cross-section, but this 
deficiency is essentially resolved with panel data because the statistical noise is being 
observed T times and averaged in the overall residual.
Furthermore, concerns about unrealistic assumptions of the time-invariant 
analysis in many potential applications, particularly over long periods, have led to the 
development of time-varying analysis, such as Sickles, Good and Johnson (1986) and 
Kumbhakar (1990). This is the stochastic coefficient frontier approach. The basic 
framework of this approach is that each firm may apply different methods in 
managing inputs, regardless of the levels of inputs, which lead to different levels of 
output. According to this model, an individual firm’s decision-making leads to 
variations in production response coefficients, which are specific to each firm and to 
each time period for the same firm.
When applying maximum likelihood estimation, it is necessary to derive the 
likelihood function from the assumed distribution of the disturbance terms. Different 
assumptions lead to the estimation of different likelihood functions. However, there is 
a unique specification in this approach of the frontier analysis, that lies in the 
composite disturbances (u, andvf). The composite disturbance model is followed in 
the empirical analysis to derive firm-level TFP growth for Taiwan’s electronics 
industry.
Empirical analysis
This section specifies the stochastic cost frontier to illustrate the use of the 
decomposition of TFP growth. The example is drawn from Taiwan census data on the 
electronics industry for the years 1981, 1986 and 1991.
Model specification
Before introducing frontier analysis, it is necessary to specify an appropriate 
functional form for the production function. This form depends on production 
technology. Some of the most popular functional forms in econometric analysis are 
Cobb-Douglas, Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES), Leontief, and 
Transcendental Logarithmic (translog), among which the translog function is
11 For instance, Ui is independent of factor inputs, or specific distributional specification of Ui .
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characterised by a non-fixed substitution elasticity and is therefore subject to fewer 
constraints than a general logarithm linear model. Flexible functional forms impose 
relatively fewer a priori restrictions on the structure of production. The translog 
function has been frequently used in the empirical literature. Kopp and Smith (1980) 
found also that the more flexible functional form results in more generalised 
estimates.
Moreover, the various flexible models have been most useful in the indirect 
estimation of production structures through the use of cost functions. The cost 
function provides a preferable alternative to the production function for studying the 
structure of production. The cost function assumes that prices and output are 
exogenous, while input demands and total cost are endogenous. The costs model has 
been most frequently applied to regulated industries in which output prices are set by 
a regulatory body rather than the firms themselves (Greene (1980a); Kumbhakar 
(1991)). Alternatively, the behaviour of production indicates that producers minimise 
production costs subject to output, prices and production technology. On the other 
hand, Taiwan’s electronics industry is a typical export-oriented industry with a 
relatively small scale of production, so that local firms are price-takers in the world 
market. It is appropriate then to specify the translog cost function in the study. The 
share equations are also added to form a system in the estimation. The use of a 
system estimation brings together a great amount of information and can provide 
estimates far more efficient than those obtained by the single equation methodology.
The translog system of cost and input share equations that was estimated is 
presented as equation (12) and equation (13). One feature that should be noted in this 
system is that the time variable was not interacted with input prices in order to reduce 
the number of parameters and to lessen the effects of multicollinearity.
InC = ln C(y,wi,t)+  |!+ v
= a 0+ a y lny + X a/lnv^  +<V
+ ^ ß w(ln;y)2+ ^ l A ( W i ) 2
+ X y„ In y In wi + ln VV, In w • + e,
* * j
where C is total cost, y is the level of output, wi is remuneration of factor i, t is the 
time variable, and a ^ ß ^ a n d  y t> are parameters to be estimated.
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By using Shephard’s lemma, a set of factor share equations is derived as 
follows:
Si = a  ■ + X  ß ijln w, +yiy y +@, (13)
The share S. of the zth input in total cost which ensures that the cost-minimising level 
of utilisation of any output is equal to the derivative of the cost function with respect 
to the price of that input.
In order to represent a well-behaved production function, the cost function in 
equation (12) must satisfy three properties: monotonicity; concavity, and 
homogeneity. Monotonicity requires that the estimated cost share in equation (13) be 
positive for each input. Concavity, that is, the cost function is concave in input prices, 
requires that the matrix of second order derivatives (^ ) be non-positive
definite within the range of input prices. Homogeneity means that the cost function is 
homogeneous of degree one in input prices. The symmetry and linear homogeneity in 
input prices permit the following restrictions on the parameters of the cost function in 
equation (12). That is,
2 a,. =1,2,7* = 0,27« = 2,7,,. =2,7,., =2,2,7* =0
,  i i j i  i j
The factor cost shares always sum to unity, which implies that a covariance 
matrix is singular. Hence, to obtain a full-rank covariance matrix, one of the cost- 
share equations has to be dropped for joint estimation.
To specify the translog cost frontier, the estimation requires some 
assumptions about the distributions of error terms. First, the disturbance of cost 
frontier function has two components (ie. e, = v. +w-.): a symmetric component (v.) 
and a one-sided component (w,.). The symmetric disturbance permits random variation
of the frontier across firms, and captures the effects of measurement error, other 
statistical ‘noise’, and random shocks outside the firm’s control, v, is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed as N(0,<j 2v), whereas the one-sided error 
term (ux) captures the effects of inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier. w(. is 
assumed to be distributed independently of v- and to satisfy ux> 0. ux is derived from 
a N (0,g 2u) distribution truncated with zero mode; that is, half-normal distribution is
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assumed here. For simplicity the statistical relationships among the disturbance of 
cost (e) and the share equations (G5,.) are assumed to be independent.12
According to above specification, the density function of \1 and v can 
respectively be written as:
f ( u )
2 u
exP(- T"“ )» u -  0(yf2n)Gu
/(v )= i V 2 ^ : exp(- i )’ - ~ - v -
And the joint density function of (q + v  = e)by convolution formula is given in 
equation (8) of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977):
2 e 2 * eX
/ ( e )  = ----- y ~ exp(-— f)(1 - F  ( - — )),-«><£
(2ti y 2o  2g  g
where a 2 = a 2+ a 2,X = a w/ a v, and F \ - )  is the cumulative distribution function of 
the standard normal random variable. Given the density function, the log-likelihood 
function of the observed random variable may be specified as
n , 2 X*? eXln(lnC|0) = - l n - - « l n a - ^ -  + I [ l - F * ( - — )]
2 7t 2 a  T
where 0 is the parameter to be estimated and is equal to the cost function parameters, 
a 2 andX. The above likelihood function uses only the information present in the cost 
function. Additional information is added by including the share equations.
Under the independence assumption, the joint probability density function 
(p.d.f.) of the three disturbances (w,v,andco) is
12 The relationship among the disturbance in share equations and the non-negative allocative 
inefficiency disturbance in the cost equation has been referred to as ‘the Greene problem’ in the 
frontier literature since it was first noted by Greene (1980a, pp. 104-5). However, as noted by 
Cowing et al. (1983, pp. 68-9), the extra information contained in the covariance between 
equations is small in contrast to the addition of the information changes, the magnitude and /  or 
sign of the estimates by including cost shares. Therefore, it is acceptable to ignore the 
relationship among the disturbances in the cost and input share equations.
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/(e ,,co 1,,cü2,) = / ( e 1)/(co1,,co2j)
where Z =
$11 $ 12  
- $ 1 2  $ 2 2-
= /(e ,)(— —rrexp(—i[(Du co2l] E - '[ ^ ] )
(27t x y 2 2 C02i
the variance-covariance matrix for the share disturbances, and
/ ( e  ■) is the p.d.f. derived above. The likelihood function for the system can then be 
written as
n 2
lnL(lnC,5p52,0 ) = -«lna + —In—-n\n2n
+
nin|l| co^
0>2i-
Derivation of the likelihood function allows the model to be estimated by 
maximum likelihood techniques in which the estimators are asymptotically efficient. 
The maximum likelihood estimates are computed with GQOPT13 which is a general 
purpose numerical optimisation computing package. The program employed the 
iterative Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm, and also provides the inverse of the 
Hessian of the log-likelihood function, where the Hessian is calculated from analytical 
second derivatives, evaluated at the converged maximum. Asymptotically, the 
Hessian is equivalent to the information matrix, thus yielding asymptotical standard 
errors for each of the parameter estimates.
Estimation results
The defined translog cost model is estimated using cross-section and time series data 
on the establishment of firms in Taiwan’s electronics industry. Data on 135 domestic 
electronics firms for the years 1981, 1986 and 1991 were obtained from 
manufacturing surveys conducted by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics of the Republic of China. The sample size totals 405 observations.14
The whole system contains six variables: total costs, output, time, prices of 
energy, labour and capital. Time variables are set at 1 for 1981, 6 for 1986, and 11 for
13 GQOPT was developed by R. Quandt of Princeton University in USA.
14 At first, there were 1110 observations with complete reports in all desired variables. Firms with 
less than five workers were omitted— these firms generally reported misleadingly, and with some 
outliers— and so 405 observations remained.
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1991. Output is the value of the production of each firm for each year. Total costs are 
equal to the sum of expenditures for energy, labour and imputed expenditures for 
capital services. Fuel expenditures were obtained directly from the census data, while 
fuel prices were obtained from Taiwan's Commodity Price Statistics Monthly. The 
price of energy was weighted by the prices of fuel and electricity with their value 
shares as the weights. Labour expenditures are the annual sum of wage expenditure, 
pensions and benefits. Average yearly wage rates are defined as total labour 
expenditure divided by the number of employees. Capital price is calculated in the 
form of a Divisia index based on the book value of land, plant, machinery and 
equipment, and transportation equipment, with the imputed capital service price.15 
Total cost is the aggregation of total labour, capital and energy expenditure for each 
firm in each period. Shares of factor inputs are directly calculated as expenditure to 
total cost. The two share equations included in the system are capital and labour 
shares; the energy equation was dropped to obtain the non-singular matrix in 
estimation.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the frontier function 
are summarised in Table 6.2.16 All but three ( ß KL, ßyy,and ß yL) of the parameter 
estimates are statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. Note that the 
estimated parameter of technological progress, a 7, is positively and significantly 
different from zero which means that technological progress decreases at a rate of 
0.1237 per sampling period (that is, every five years). This does not mean that there 
was no technological progress in Taiwan’s electronics industry over the past fifteen 
years but that the sources of technological progress include adjustment costs in 
adapting or developing new technology, which raise the cost of production. Since 
electronic products are recognised as products with relatively short market cycles and 
the products of local firms generally embody popularised, non-frontier technology in 
the world market, these firms seek to accommodate increasingly competitive 
pressures in the world market by the establishment of a quick and flexible production 
line. This kind of production system obviously increases the firm's adjustment costs in 
production, partly due to the cost of holding extra stocks of materials. These 
adjustment costs probably dominate all other factors of the residual— technological
Appendix 6. A describes the derivation of capital service price and expenditures.
16 The initial value of maximum likelihood estimation is derived as follows. First, assuming the 
residual of equation (13) is normally distributed and its parameters estimated by the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) method, these estimated coefficients are taken as the initial value for the 
non-linear equation (15). The error sum of squares in OLS is taken to be the initial value of (7. 
In addition, 03 ü takes the standard error of the estimates for the two share equations. X  is 
randomly assumed to be equal to 0.85 and 03-= -0.152 ( a value approximately equal to the 
square root of the multiplication of 03 u).
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progress— and result in the negative parameter in estimation here. The rise of output 
quality may also induce the negative technological progress. Unfortunately, no price 
or quantity data is available for measuring output quality changes here.
Table 6.2 Maximum likelihood estimation parameter estimates
Parameters* Estimates Asymptotic T-ratio
intercept 8.5933 0.9742D+2
0.6015 0.7225D+2
P a 0.0516 0.2542D+1
(X K 0.3692 0.3960D+2
P « 0.0652 0.2227D+1
P  M L 0.0329 0.1700D+1
a Y 0.6262 0.2452D+2
ßry -0.0216 -0.9882D+0
P l X -0.0084 -0.1409D+1
Prjc -0.0346 -0.5307D+1
a T 0.1237 0.2258D+2
X 1.6050 0.5892D+1
a 2 0.5870 0.1372D+2
® u 0.0058 0.1029D+4
® 22 0.0202 0.1033D+4
® 1 2 -0.0342 -0.4538D+7
Note’. The parameters are stipulated by equation (12).
The coefficient of a y (= 0.6262) suggests that local electronics firms, on 
average, exhibit strong economies of scale. The estimates of a  L and a  K denote the 
extent to which the cost function varies with the two input prices. The positive 
estimates for these parameters imply that production cost increases with increases in 
input prices. The own-share elasticity is positive in ß ^  and ß ^ , and negative in 
ßyy. The former two estimates are significant for capital and labour elasticity 
respectively, but insignificant for output elasticity. The positive but insignificant 
estimate of ß ^  (significant at the 90 per cent level) implies that the value share of 
labour (capital) increases with the price of capital (labour).
The decomposition of TFP for each firm is derived from the estimated cost 
frontier function, listed in Appendix 6.B. The calculation of scale, cost efficiency and 
the price effect follows the definition in the previous section, and the measure of TFP 
growth is constructed by summing the scale, cost efficiency, technological progress 
and price effect.
The TFP growth rate was different across firms. There was one more firm 
with negative TFP growth in 1986 (92) than in 1991 (91). The rate of TFP growth
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increased for 68 of 135 firms between 1986 and 1991, but decreased for 67 firms. 
Negative TFP growth can be mainly attributed to negative technological progress. 
The mean values of the decomposition of TFP for each period are reported in Table 
6.3. Average TFP growth for 1986 was 0.1290, but -0.0518 in 1991 a result of larger 
fluctuations in the scale effect and price effect. The standard deviation for the scale 
effect and price effect in 1986 are 0.804 and 0.2128 respectively, but only 0.3779 and 
0.0752 in 1991. In addition, a great deal of variation on TFP growth across firms is 
observed in 1986 when compared with 1991. The results reflect the fact that there 
was restructuring and upgrading in Taiwan’s electronics industry during these years, 
due to the liberalisation of the market.
Table 6.3 TFP decomposition (mean value)
TFP growth Scale effect Efficiency effect Technological progress Price effect
1986 0.1290 0.2300 0.0158 -0.1237 0.0068
1991 -0.0518 0.0589 0.0117 -0.1237 0.0013
Total 0.0386 0.1444 0.0138 -0.1237 0.0040
The electronics industry is the largest in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, so it 
is obvious that the dramatic changes in the economic environment in 1986, as 
mentioned in Chapter 5, would affect it significantly. In fact, rapid growth in labour 
costs encouraged lower end or labour-intensive production in the industry to relocate 
to other sites, such as Malaysia, Thailand and China in the mid 1980s. This led to a 
tremendous outward investment to these countries. Electronics dominates other 
industries in terms of outward investment, either by number of projects or value of 
investment.
From Table 6.3 the scale effect appears to be the most significant source of 
TFP gains, much of the increase in TFP being the result of expansion in the size of 
production. The relationship between these two variables was tested by applying 
Spearman’s rank correlation statistics. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
was applied to test the relation for 1986, 1991 and the whole sample. The coefficients 
were 0.9076, 0.9166 and 0.9109 respectively. All coefficients are highly significant 
suggesting that the hypothesised relationship between TFP growth and scale effect 
can be accepted. Firms with higher TFP growth generally enjoyed more expansion in 
the scale of their operations.
Although no clear evidence is available to prove the expansion of scale in 
operations is a result of the demonstration effect from the inflow of foreign capital, as 
described earlier, foreign subsidiaries tended to introduce new technology, broaden
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information channels, or enhance marketing to domestic firms. All of this seems to 
have helped domestic firms to accumulate knowledge about markets or products 
which they would not have acquired otherwise. Foreign capital inflow may have 
thereby played a role in encouraging domestic firms to enlarge their operations.
On the other hand, technological progress was the dominant negative factor in 
TFP growth for all firms. Negative TFP growth can be attributed mainly to the 
decrease in technological progress. This indicates that adjustment cost is a heavy 
burden on domestic firms. It also suggests that local firms faced competitive market 
pressures. The price effect is only a minor factor in TFP growth. The Spearman 
correlation coefficients suggest a weak relationship between TFP growth and the 
price effect (0.1950, 0.3197 and 0.2573 in each sample group, respectively). The 
hypothesis of no relationship between these two variables can be accepted.
The calculated efficiency effect varied rather more evenly across firms than 
did other factors.17 The most efficient firm in 1986 gained 0.3649 of efficiency effect, 
and 0.3111 for 1991; the corresponding figures were -0.1717 for 1986 and -0.2042 
for 1991 for the least efficient firms. The mean value of the efficiency effect for firms 
in 1991 was 0.0117, while it was 0.0158 for 1986. The downward trend indicates 
that, on average, firms in 1991 exhibited less efficiency in managing their production 
costs compared with 1986. A majority of firms (115) nonetheless improved efficiency 
growth between 1986 and 1991. These two results indicate that there was a large 
dispersion in efficiency across firms in 1986 compared with 1991. It seems that the 
more liberalised economic environment in 1991 created a better functioning market 
for both products and factors, for all firms, increasing market competitiveness and 
forcing firms to put effort into reducing unnecessary expenditures in production. 
Since cost efficiency measures an effect which is under the control of firms, the 
results indicate that firms can employ strategies to improve their performance, for 
instance, improving managerial techniques, reducing personnel expenditure, or 
allocating resources more efficiently. No matter what strategies firms adopt, this 
suggests a potential channel by which foreign firms’ spillovers can be delivered, 
because foreign firms might bring new approaches to management and resource 
allocation. Through learning-by-watching or labour turnover, domestic firms can gain 
new information and techniques, thereby improving their efficiency.
The efficiency effect is also significantly correlated with TFP growth. The 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were 0.6075, 0.6263 and 0.6109 
respectively. The results reveal that greater cost efficiency was achieved by firms with
There is a method other than Farrell's (1957), for defining cost efficiency. This statistical 
approach basically utilises the parameter estimates of the frontier function. This statistical 
analysis is summarised in Appendix 6.C.
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higher TFP growth. This suggests that spillovers from foreign firms on TFP growth 
probably led to the improvement in cost efficiency.
In other works, Pitt and Lee (1981), and Chen and Tang (1987), identified 
three sources of technical efficiency— age, size and ownership, in the Indonesian 
weaving industry and in Taiwan’s electronics industry. Since older firms have had 
more time to learn and become experienced in their operations, they become more 
efficient; and large firms are often considered more efficient than small firms because 
of economies of scale and the leaming-by-doing effect. As for ownership, foreign 
firms adopting labour-intensive techniques in developing countries will operate at 
below maximum efficiency and thus local participation could improve efficiency via 
their knowledge of the domestic market. This earlier estimation examined only 
domestic firms in the electronics industry, so neither the testing of the ownership 
variable nor testing the correlation between foreign entry and local firms’ 
performance is possible.
As for the other two factors, only the size factor is significantly correlated 
with cost efficiency in Taiwan’s electronics industry. The Spearman’s rank correlation 
between the efficiency effect and age of a firm was insignificant and negative for all 
three sample sets. That age of firm had no explanatory power in respect of cost 
efficiency can probably be attributed to the short product-cycle for electronics. The 
results illustrate that improvement in efficiency is closely related to the expansion of 
operations, but is unrelated to experience in production. Since firms could increase 
their output by either increasing the number of workers or by improving labour 
quality, determination of which factor affected efficiency needs further examination 
and more detailed data. However, the relationship between the growth of number of 
employees and the efficiency effect for each time period was not significantly 
correlated, suggesting that a higher productive efficiency could be gained with or 
without an increase in workers, and that an increase in cost efficiency might therefore 
be ascribed to an improvement in labour quality. The results emphasise the 
importance of labour mobility, because it is the most efficient and quickest way of 
recruiting skilled labour and increasing productivity in a short period.
The available data provide no information by which to measure labour quality 
changes, except labour productivity growth. Even though it is not satisfactory, as 
noted in Chapter 5, to use labour productivity growth as an index for labour quality 
changes, it is the only choice available here. When testing the correlation between 
labour productivity growth (defined as the growth of output per worker) and 
efficiency growth, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were 0.6996, 0.6936 
and 0.6736, respectively. The significant coefficients suggests that the hypothesis of 
labour quality improvement can be accepted. Although no data were available to
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measure labour mobility among firms, the training activities and labour turnover of 
foreign subsidiaries has been recognised as one of the most effective means of quickly 
evening up the labour quality. The test results imply that there were spillovers via 
labour mobility which improved efficiency in production.
Technicians or workers in Taiwan’s electronics industry formerly employed by 
foreign subsidiaries frequently exploited their entrepreneurship, beginning small 
businesses after a few years’ learning and training. With minor modifications, they 
applied the technology acquired through their experience in foreign firms to develop 
local capacity to produce differentiated products and establish their own 
competitiveness in the market. In general, the size of these businesses was small at 
first, because it was difficult for them to access the financial market. Financial 
constraints limited their investment in R&D, and they had to acquire new technology 
from outside their firms to make progress. The most common and efficient way for 
them to acquire new technology was to recruit trained personnel from the market, 
mainly from foreign subsidiaries. These circumstances are consistent with the results, 
which reveal an insignificant age effect and significant economies of scale and labour 
quality effects in the improvement of cost efficiency.
In summary, the firm-level decomposition of TFP growth leads to conclusions 
similar to those in Chapter 5, namely, that the size of operation contributes 
significantly to TFP growth both in firm-level and for industrial level analysis. 
However, this analysis also demonstrates that the efficiency effect contributed to TFP 
growth in Taiwan’s electronics industry. The examination of the sources of cost 
efficiency reveals strong correlation with scale factors and labour productivity 
growth, and no significant relationship with the age of a firm. The decomposition of 
TFP growth provides more evidence of the existence of spillovers in Taiwan’s 
electronics industry beyond the scale factor— which was the principal source of 
productivity improvement identified in the previous chapter.
Conclusion
This review of the development of Taiwan’s electronics industry reveals significant 
demonstration effects from the establishment of foreign subsidiaries. These effects 
accelerated the development of the electronics industry through technology diffusion, 
even though the industry attempted to pursue independence in technology 
development after its early rapid growth. The ability to pursue technological 
independence can also be attributed partly to the contribution of foreign direct 
investment in constructing a solid industrial foundation for this industry.
Decomposition of TFP growth provides evidence of the existence of spillovers 
resulting from the presence of foreign capital. Stochastic cost frontier analysis was
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used to measure the effect of technical efficiency and technological progress. Use of 
the frontier method is increasingly widespread, not only because of its ability to 
interpret the efficiency of firms, but also because it is consistent with economic theory 
that states that optimising behaviour is the objective of firms. A composite 
disturbance specification is assumed in the frontier model: a symmetric random 
specification caught those factors which firms cannot control and a truncated (half) 
normal disturbance which firms can try to improve.
The most flexible functional form, the translog cost function, was used in the 
empirical study. In addition, the share equations were also included to form the 
system estimation to provide additional information. The maximum likelihood 
technique was applied to estimate this non-linear translog cost system.
The empirical results provide evidence of the existence of spillovers through 
the effect of an improvement in labour quality on cost efficiency in production. Better 
labour quality can be achieved in many ways; for instance, though education, 
leaming-by-doing, or labour turnover. Education has long-term effects which need a 
longer time series analysis to examine thoroughly. Leaming-by-doing results in better 
technical efficiency, as can labour mobility, particularly when accompanied by a 
positive and significant scale effect. The opportunity of leaming-by-doing comes from 
expansion of the market which, in turn, can be attributed to the beneficial effect of 
foreign direct investment—providing information and knowledge about relevant 
markets. An improvement in cost efficiency implies that local firms caught up to 
foreign firms, and their negative technological progress represents the effort they put 
into adjusting technology.
Here, as elsewhere in the literature, the existence of spillovers can only be 
indirectly identified. However, the firm-level analysis makes clear that local firms 
improved cost efficiency over time and there was a trend towards a shrinking of the 
technological gap between local and foreign firms. These results extend the 
conclusions from earlier studies based on cross sectional analysis. They suggest that 
foreign direct investment does indeed generate spillovers to the domestic market 
which were quite significant in the Taiwanese electronics industry.
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7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The spillover effects of foreign direct investment have been discussed extensively in 
the literature. When foreign firms undertake overseas investment, they not only 
provide capital that is scarce, especially in less developed countries; they also bring 
superior technology and information which are desired by host countries. Besides 
these direct contributions, the entry of foreign firms may also generate externalities, 
including increased competition, human capital accumulation, accelerated technology 
transfer, and linkages to domestic markets. Obviously these externalities can improve 
the productive efficiency of indigenous firms. Hence, the inflow of foreign capital can 
be considered as a source for upgrading technical know-how and narrowing the 
technological gap between local firms and foreign firms. It may be possible for local 
firms to catch up with foreign firms in terms of technological capabilities if the 
spillovers are strong enough. For these reasons, there has been a long history in many 
developing countries of stimulating foreign direct investment, for instance, by means 
of highly protective trade barriers and preferential financial treatment.
On the other hand, traditional economic models, such as the North-South 
model, the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, and economic development models, tend to 
neglect these benefits. The explanation for this is twofold. First, it is almost 
impossible to quantify externalities because there are too many channels through 
which benefit is generated and no easily measurable economic phenomena whereby 
they can be accurately represented. The gains to the host country depend on the 
technological gap between foreign firms and local firms, labour quality, the degree of 
competitiveness in the market, and the capacity and willingness of indigenous firms to 
adapt new technology. In general, a narrower technological gap, higher labour 
quality, intense market competition, and aggressive adoption of new technology 
encourage larger spillovers to host countries. All these are highly qualitative factors 
and their character underlines the difficulty in empirically identifying the scale or 
importance of spillover effects.
Another reason for neglect of spillover effects in the literature is that most 
models concentrate on analysing the response of the host country to the benefits of 
spillovers. The reaction of foreign firms in the presence of spillovers has been 
ignored. The lack of consideration of this issue increases the difficulty of designing a 
model because part of the picture is missing. For instance, foreign firms facing the 
threat of technological catch-up are likely to behave strategically in transferring 
technology.
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This thesis has attempted to rectify this deficiency in the literature by 
incorporating the responses of foreign firms to the spillover effects, and by empirically 
testing the existence of externalities via analysis of productivity. The major findings 
relating to the strategic behaviour of foreign firms are as follows.
First, protective tariff barriers may be ineffective in attracting the inflow of 
foreign capital if spillover effects are likely to be large. When there are spillover 
effects, foreign direct investment is always beneficial to the recipient country and host 
governments generally wish to attract foreign direct investment and extract the largest 
possible benefits in order to accelerate economic development. At the same time, the 
decision of foreign firms as to whether to undertake foreign investment or to export 
to a country depends not only on tariff policy in the host country; if foreign firms 
foresee that local firms might catch up with them, they may prefer to continue to 
export, instead of investing in the target market, to avoid losing the competitive 
advantage of technologies and information. High tariff policy alone may not be a 
sufficient inducement to attract foreign investment if spillover effects are large, and if 
alternative str ategies are feasible.
Secondly, in the presence of spillovers, the best strategic response by foreign 
firms in maintaining their competitive power in a host market is to transfer technology 
continually. Since the profits of foreign firms are lower when benefits are leaked to 
local firms— and are even lower when local firms put effort into utilising externalities 
— dynamic technology transfer is likely to be the best way to maintain a competitive 
edge and avoid being overtaken by local firms in the host market.
The nature and prevalence of spillovers explains both the interest of 
developing countries in attracting foreign investment and the way in which the 
strategic behaviour of foreign firms multiplies those benefits.
The strategic behaviour of foreign firms outlined here is premised on the 
existence of spillover effects. But there are few studies of spillovers in the literature 
because of both conceptual and data problems in identifying them. Thus the second 
part of the thesis sought to test for the existence of spillovers. The tests use 
Taiwanese data to investigate the contribution of foreign direct investment to the 
Taiwanese economy, particularly through establishing the existence of spillovers.
The success of the Taiwanese government in attracting foreign capital during 
the past four decades can be attributed to the effort that the government put into 
establishing an attractive investment environment for foreigners, including stabilising 
the foreign currency and the financial market, liberalising trade, and establishing 
export processing zones in order to lessen search, plant and other pre-operational 
costs for overseas investments. Creating a good investment climate and a liberalised 
market appear to have been effective methods of inducing foreign direct investment in
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Taiwan. Chapter 3 confirmed that the penetration of foreign direct investment, on 
average, contributed to Taiwan’s economic development by providing technology, 
creating job opportunities, compensating for capital and foreign exchange shortages, 
and assisting in industrial restructuring. The argument in Chapter 3 provided some 
evidence that foreign subsidiaries adopted new strategies after 1980 in respect of 
employment, technology, material sourcing and marketing, in the face of growing 
competition by local firms.
The process of catching-up by local firms provides indirect evidence of the 
existence of spillovers as a result of foreign entry. If the performance of foreign 
subsidiaries is indistinguishable from that of local firms, the impact of foreign direct 
investment is likely to be limited. Chapter 4 detailed the significance of the differences 
in the performance of foreign firms over local firms.
Foreign ownership does influence performance. Foreign-owned firms are 
much larger in size, they are export-oriented, they have higher labour productivity, 
and they use more capital-intensive technology than their local counterparts. The 
higher level of their labour productivity might be attributable to the relatively capital- 
and skill-intensive technology they employ and their greater technical efficiency in 
production. The data in Chapter 4 demonstrated the potential for spillovers from 
foreign firms to Taiwan’s economic development.
The effects of foreign direct investment on local firms were then analysed 
systematically. Spillovers arise from the fact foreign subsidiaries may serve as an 
effective force for competition; they impel higher technical efficiency, and they may 
speed the transfer of new technology in the host market. Total factor productivity 
therefore appears to be an appropriate index for representing the improvement in 
productive efficiency due to spillovers. TFP growth is measured by output changes 
after taking into account the changes in factors input. Alternatively, TFP growth 
emerges as a residual in measuring the contribution of factor inputs growth to output 
growth. The unexplained changes in output derive from technological progress, 
technical efficiency, labour quality changes and other qualitative changes in 
production processes. Since spillovers can improve the productive efficiency of local 
firms through improving labour quality changes, increased competitiveness, 
technological progress and technical efficiency, the measurement of TFP growth is 
probably the best index whereby to measure these externalities. The hypothesis of the 
empirical study is that the growth of total factor productivity is a function of the 
presence of foreign capital.
The empirical study set out in Chapter 5 led to four main conclusions. The 
entry of foreign capital is positively correlated with increased productive efficiency 
across industries in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. The growth in the stock of
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foreign capital is a relatively unimportant factor compared with output growth. The 
entry of foreign firms appears to push local firms to operate in a more efficient 
manner, technologically or technically, thereby raising productivity. The adjustment 
costs in adapting new technology or the costs of the exit of inefficient firms may be 
detrimental to productivity growth.
Two methods were employed to decompose TFP growth and examine its 
sources. One methodology included the stock of foreign capital, representing the 
scale of spillovers and the degree of penetration of foreign firms, as a dependent 
variable in the cost function in deriving the decomposition. TFP growth was 
decomposed into a scale effect and a foreign penetration effect. This method was 
applied in industrial level analysis of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector.
The first methodology produced three main findings. Foreign direct 
investment has an ambiguous effect on productivity. Enlargement of the size of 
operation is a dominant factor in explaining productivity growth for the majority of 
Taiwan’s industries. The results indicate that scale economies are associated with 
foreign direct investment in contributing to productivity growth. The stock of foreign 
capital in the host market, defined as the aggregation of foreign capital from each 
firm’s book value, cannot alone explain productivity growth.
Two weaknesses in this analysis need to be underlined. Spillover effects are 
not contemporaneous with the stock of foreign capital in the market, and their 
diffusion across industries is varied. A longer rime-series analysis of each industry is 
needed to obtain more accurate results. In addition, the variable of stock of foreign 
capital probably needs to be redefined as depreciation rates and capital utilisation 
rates could not be taken into account when the stock of foreign capital is defined as 
the accumulated book value of foreign capital, as in this study. Hence, a better 
indicator to represent the stock of foreign capital is necessary in future research.
The second methodology was developed by Bauer (1990). Production frontier 
analysis was employed to further decompose TFP growth into a scale effect, 
technological progress effect, technical efficiency effect and price effect. This method 
was applied to test the potential for catching-up by local firms in Taiwan’s electronics 
industry.
There were three main findings from this firm-level analysis. Local firms 
improved their cost efficiency over time and there was a trend towards shrinking of 
the technological gap between local and foreign firms. Cost efficiency in local firms 
was the result of the improvement in labour quality. Labour quality changes were 
obtained through the leaming-by-doing effect and the mobility of skilled labour, and 
foreign direct investment contributed importantly in both ways. Apart from this 
indirect evidence of spillovers, the study also found that indigenous firms put effort
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into adapting and learning new technologies, or know-how by high adjustment cost or 
potential output quality changes.
In summary, the thesis provides some evidence of spillover effects from 
foreign direct investment in the Taiwan economy, particularly in the electronics 
industry. There is also evidence of the way in which local firms catch-up to foreign 
firms in terms of technological and productive efficiency and pose a competitive 
threat to them through this process.
Policy implications
These findings indicate that foreign direct investment contributed to the development 
of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector and particularly the electronics industry. This might 
suggest that developing countries should adopt preferential policies, such as tax 
advantages, subsidies or related financial inducements, to attract the inflow of foreign 
capital and extract maximal spillover effects. Preferential foreign direct investment 
policy is certainly welcomed by foreign firms, but it also leads to distortions in 
resource allocation and reductions in the national welfare of the host economy. If 
foreign firms were able to extract the entire value of techniques transferred to host 
markets, there would be no need for any intervention by the host government. The 
trade-off relation between distortions and spillovers is a crucial issue for policy 
makers, particularly in evaluating the magnitude of spillover effects. This may be one 
reason for the similarity of the preferential terms for foreign direct investment policy 
offered by many developing countries. An alternative policy concentrating on the 
creating of a favourable investment environment is, more generally, to be preferred.
Foreign direct investment policy in Taiwan has succeeded in attracting foreign 
capital inflow and utilising spillover effects in the past. The findings here suggest that 
Taiwan’s success was not by chance, and can be attributed to the establishment of a 
favourable investment environment, in particular the effort put into raising labour 
quality.
Good labour quality has commonly been appraised as the most decisive factor 
in motivating foreign direct investment. In Taiwan, much effort was directed to 
accelerate the accumulation of human capital, especially through education and 
vocational training.
There was an effort by individuals to accumulate knowledge through 
schooling. This effort reduced the level of illiteracy in the population from 42 per cent 
in 1952 to 7 per cent in 1990. The ratio of the population in higher education 
increased from about 2 per cent in the 1960s to 11 per cent in 1990; the ratio of those 
in secondary education rose from 10 per cent in 1960 to 46 per cent in 1990. Formal
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schooling is an investment in human capital and is designed to satisfy long-term 
demands in the labour market.
Entrepreneurs exerted themselves in developing and exploiting
entrepreneurship and training programs. Many Taiwanese started their own 
businesses. There was a rapid growth in the number of firms and a very high 
percentage of small firms in the manufacturing sector. The rush of indigenous firms 
into the market increased competition which in turn pushed firms to explore and 
absorb all sources of information, technology, know-how and marketing, and to 
improve efficiency. Foreign firms demonstrated the best ways to reduce information 
costs for those local firms willing to watch and learn. Enterprises also developed 
training programs. Many private enterprise training programs were incorporated into 
vocational schools, particularly before 1974, when training programs were sponsored 
by the National Vocational Training Fund and financed by a payroll tax of 1.5 per 
cent.
The Taiwanese government established an educational infrastructure and a 
favourable investment environment through education subsidies, vocational training, 
and preferential loans to businesses which developed training programs. The per 
capita cost of students below junior high school level was below NT$40,000 in 1990- 
91, and NT$66,000-78,000 for senior high school and vocational school, but up to 
NTS 190,000 for university and college students. The greater per-capita investment 
for higher level of education provides incentives to pursue higher education, and 
shows that Taiwan has invested heavily in education. Investment in education is an 
investment for the economy. Vocational training, on the other hand, provides 
opportunities for unskilled labour to acquire skills, or re-training required for job- 
shifting.
Education and vocational training are two major sources of human capital 
accumulation. These investments are not only fundamental to the improvement of 
labour quality, their complementarity also accelerates human capital accumulation. 
The differences between vocational training and education are twofold: vocational 
training supplies the immediate needs of the labour market, while education satisfies 
labour demand in the long run. Vocational training includes general and specific 
training, but education involves only general training. The training provided by private 
enterprise is generally referred to as specific training, yet the dissemination of this 
knowledge diminishes its specificity. Labour mobility is then a major channel for 
transferring knowledge and increasing the productivity of the recruiting firm. Labour 
mobility from foreign to local firms is thus an important source of spillover effects.
It is not clear whether the amount and the allocation of investment in 
education in Taiwan provides an appropriate model for other developing countries,
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but it appears that there has not been a major deficiency of either high-level or manual 
skills during the course of Taiwan’s development. More specifically, the pattern of 
vocational training adopted by Taiwan— a mixture of public and private enterprise 
sponsored training, and on-the-job training— seems to have worked well. A large 
increase in supply of professional, technical, and skilled labour was achieved within a 
short period. High labour quality improves efficiency in adapting technology from 
foreign firms, and thus encourages shrinkage of the technological gap between local 
and foreign firms, and with the other countries.
Since vocational training addresses more immediate changes in the labour 
markets, vocational training schemes need to keep pace with market demand. A 
crucial issue for policy makers is to manage and utilise sources of information on the 
labour market, such as distribution, kind of occupation, unemployment, size of firm, 
number of employees, wages, working hours and labour mobility in the labour 
market, otherwise a surplus of particular skills may be created. The establishment of a 
thorough information network related to the labour force and the labour market can 
reduce the search costs for either employers or employees and improve the efficiency 
of the allocation of workforce. In addition, the redundant investment in training can 
be avoided and even replace a new training program which accelerates human capital 
accumulation. As a consequence, a favourable labour market is established to reduce 
the risk of foreignness in the host country and to attract foreign direct investment.
As in the case of any research, the present work has limitations. The main 
limitations arise from gaps in the data. The current study does not clearly distinguish 
the sources of efficiency improvement in local firms. Labour quality changes should 
improve the cost efficiency of firms, but leaming-by-doing and adapting new 
technology could also increase productive efficiency. Although all of these factors can 
be attributed to foreign firms’ training, demonstrating and transferring activities, being 
able to quantify the statistical significance of each factor would help in obtaining a 
better understanding of the nature and magnitude of spillover effects and in 
constructing a more satisfactory variable for measuring such effects in empirical 
study. One method would be to conduct a survey of both local and foreign firms to 
obtain data on skilled labour turnover, the learning ability of the domestic firms, the 
technological gap between foreign and local firms, and the process of technology 
transfer from foreign firms, all of which would complement the findings of this study.
Taiwan has often been referred to as an example of successful economic 
development. The inflow of foreign direct investment certainly played a significant 
role in promoting the prosperity of the economy. Foreign firms created employment 
for the surplus labour force released from the traditional agricultural sector, and also 
introduced into Taiwan’s economy new technologies, technical know-how and skills.
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This thesis also provides evidence of the external benefits from the entry of foreign 
capital and the process whereby catching-up technologically is facilitated by foreign 
direct investment. Research on spillover effects from foreign direct investment is still 
only in its infancy and many important issues, of course, remain unexplored.
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Appendix 5.A The derivation of conventional TFP index 
Assuming the existence of a linear homogenous production function:
Q = F(K9L,T)
where Q refers to the output, K and L are the capital and labour inputs, and T is time, 
representing the technical changes. Assuming that technological progress is Hicks- 
neutral, then the above equation can be rewritten as:
Q = A(T)F(K,L)
Totally differentiating the logarithm of this equation with respect to time, and 
assuming conditions of producer equilibrium and constant returns to scale, then :
dlnQ
dT
d \nK d\nL
dT
+ S j
where sT = d\nA(T)/dT,  and sk and s, are the value shares of capital and labour. sT 
is referred to as the index of TFP growth.
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Appendix 5.B Data sources
The data required for measuring total factor productivity for each industry in
Taiwan’s manufacturing sector 1961-86 are the values of the two inputs, capital and
labour, value-added and total output for each industry.
The sources of time series data on relating variables for each industry are:
(1) Series of real net fixed capital stock (excluded land)
Source:
• Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China, The Trend in Multifactor Productivity o f Industrial 
Sector, Taiwan Area, Republic of China, 1992, Taipei.
Data construction:
• As some data vary in coverage for different industries, appropriate adjustment 
has been done. (For instance, the precision equipment industry and 
miscellaneous manufacturing industries are combined into one industry). Ln 
total, 17 industries are estimated.
(2) Working hours
Source:
• Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China, Yearbook of Earning and Productivity Statistics, Taiwan 
Area, Republic of China, 1992, Taipei.
Data construction:
• In order to obtain consistent data series for each industry, the chemical 
materials, chemical products, and plastic products industries have been 
combined into one industry, and the precision equipment and miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries into one industry.
• Working hours = employees on payrolls of manufacturing 
establishments*average monthly working hours* 12 (* = multiply)
(3) Value-added and total output (current price)
Source:
• Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China, Gross Domestic Product and Factor Incomes by Kind of 
Activity, each year, Taipei.
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Data construction:
• The chemical materials, chemical products and plastic products industries 
have been combined into one industry, and the precision equipment and 
miscellaneous manufacturing industries into one industry, to arrive at 17 
manufacturing industries.
• Value-added = gross domestic product minus intermediate inputs
(4) Wholesale price index
Sources:
• Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China, Commodity Price Statistics Monthly in Taiwan Area of 
The Republic of China, 1974, 1977, 1983, 1988 and 1992, Taipei.
• Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan Provincial 
Government and Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Commodity Price Statistics Monthly in Taiwan Area of The Republic of 
China. 1970, Taipei.
• Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan Provincial 
Government, Commodity Price Statistics Monthly o f Taiwan Province, 1967, 
Taipei.
Data construction:
• 1976 is the base year for all data series. Nominal value-added is deflated by 
whole price index to yield real value-added for each industry.
(5) Labour and capital shares of manufacturing
Sources:
• Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China, The Trend in Multifactor Productivity of Industrial Sector 
—  Taiwan Area, Republic of China, 1992, Taipei.
• Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China, Gross Domestic Product and Factor Incomes by Kind of 
Activity, each year, Taipei.
Data construction:
• Labour and capital shares for 1978-86 are compiled from the first data source, 
whilst 1961-77 are compiled as follows:
Since the total of capital and labour shares equals 1, the only 
calculation to the share is to calculate the percentage of labour. The 
percentage share for capital can be derived by 1 minus the percentage share of 
labour.
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Based on above framework, the total cost can be defined as:
Total cost = Nominal Output (PQ)
= Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - Indirect Tax + 
Subsidy
For simplicity, the labour compensation refers to compensation for 
employees as shown in the national income account (the second data source). 
This definition modifies the calculation done in the first data source, where 
labour compensation is defined as the adjusted compensation for employment 
population, ie. compensation for employees plus the average compensation 
per person multiplied by the difference of number of employment population 
and number of employees.
The percentage share for labour is then derived by dividing the labour 
compensation into the total cost (nominal output).
• The precision equipment industry and miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
have been combined into one industry. A total of 17 industries is estimated.
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Appendix 5.C Stock of foreign capital (NT$1,000)
Food Textile Clothing & 
footwear
Timber Pulp & 
paper
Leather & 
fur
1975 319316 1707001 466654 137308 124409 50321
1976 454378 2160108 528304 330337 120525 59163
1977 486309 2509544 564384 276097 183648 64619
1978 526526 2608844 614444 299024 222931 62196
1979 938084 2680917 712725 456833 260109 62146
1980 1010142 3003275 828133 427651 257875 75165
1981 930963 3231564 869949 433835 258211 108388
1982 1168537 3152510 802990 568152 273512 104743
1983 1340175 3631406 876959 409682 321742 82300
1984 2069172 3154683 904311 466523 459814 134650
1985 2275812 3317722 947401 492917 475583 186727
1986 2496816 4316244 958675 462206 637692 156894
1987 2528095 3920654 1208710 517176 823341 143524
1988 4058515 4816459 606828 478121 505351 156020
1989 4571023 5225832 779854 480586 624483 142500
1990 5714085 4102771 856571 393934 762275 208473
1991 5633564 4188455 941962 573681 1084799 213080
1992 5866563 4505189 614391 490263 1121036 123262
Plastic & 
rubber
Chemical Minerals Metals Machinery Electronics
1975 554836 1582874 522983 701646 866239 5349239
1976 671347 2097745 499320 820603 1107951 6287604
1977 748695 2670335 561631 912946 1404658 7387519
1978 1022154 3997589 556150 1180029 1544024 8620400
1979 1111689 6280317 426626 1486119 1857899 10013902
1980 1426373 7144876 507716 1757690 2280326 11802320
1981 1689251 7824130 643538 2020962 2371879 13436160
1982 1925561 7307503 1167404 2116368 3774702 15086711
1983 2158243 6891157 1170085 2718197 3086946 17547468
1984 2182614 9250185 1368429 3226640 4731827 21555064
1985 2562725 10269363 1381653 4723365 4801154 24198771
1986 3077998 11274318 1873655 4043419 7211870 28205073
1987 3464841 13661840 1981788 6397305 11221707 35764878
1988 2578112 16512810 2422769 7154143 11783757 31052941
1989 4701832 24666975 2682483 9214598 13121630 38023185
1990 6231325 29526828 2860174 11053594 13608679 47465660
1991 4432255 33839287 3139536 13677262 16700784 48774882
1992 4115319 29750205 2884962 13634041 17231262 48379949
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Note', industry classifications:
Food = food and beverage processing industry 
Textile = textile industry
Clothing & footwear = garment and footwear industry 
Timber = lumber and bamboo products industry 
Pulp & paper = pulp and paper products industry 
Leather & fur = leather and fur products industry 
Plastic & rubber = plastic and rubber products industry 
Chemical = chemical industry 
Minerals = non-metallic minerals industry 
Metals = basic metals and metal products industry 
Machinery = machinery equipment and instrument industry 
Electronics = electronics and electric appliances industry 
Source: Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1975-1989, Taipei, Taiwan.
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Appendix 5.D Linkage of value-added to total output measured TFP growth
The relationship between total factor productivity measured by value-added and total 
output is as follows:
Suppose A represents the TFP measured by total output, A is defined as
dlnA = d \ n Y - S Kd \ n K - S Ld \ n L - S Md \ n M - S Ed \ nE  (1)
where Y is the level of total output, M  is the material input and E is the energy 
input. On the other hand, let B represent the TFP measured by value-added (the 
factor inputs include only capital and labour), B is defined as
where V is the level of value-added, a  is the value share of labour to value-added 
(a  = W /V) ,  and 1 -  a  is the value share of capital to value-added (1 -  a  = R / V ) .
Since total output is value-added plus intermediate inputs, changes in level of 
output are thus equivalent to the weighted changes in value-added plus weighted 
changes in intermediate inputs. Therefore
where Sv is the share of value-added to total output (Sv = V / Y ). Rearranging 
equation (3) and substituting into equation (2) yields
d\nB = d \ n V - ( l - a ) d \ n K - a d \ n L (2)
Y = f (V ,M ,E)
d ln Y = Svd ln V + SMd ln M + SEd ln E (3)
d\nB = d ln Y -  SM ln M  -  SE ln E 
~Sv
- ( \ - a ) d \ n K - a d \ n L  (4)
Dividing equation (1) by equation (4),
d\nA _ d \ n Y - SKd \ n K - SLd ln L - SMd ln M - SEd ln E 
d \ n B ~  d 1°Y - SMd ln M - SEd ln E (5)
Multiply Sv to denominator and numerator on left hand,
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din A _ Sv[d \ nY -S Kd \ n K - S Ld \ n L - S Md \ n M - S Ed\nE] 
d\nB d ln Y -  SMd ln M -  SEd ln E -  Sv (1 -  a  )d ln K -  Svcnd ln L
As Sv = V /F ;( l - a )  = /? /y ;a  = ^ /y ,i tm e a n s  
Sv( \ - a )  = R / Y  = SK and Sva = W / Y  = SL
Substituting into equation (6) derives
din A 
dlnB
<1
TFP growth measured by level of output is proportionately smaller than that 
measured by value-added, and the proportion is equal to the share of value-added to 
level of output.
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Appendix 5.E Share of foreign employment by industry
Food Textiles Apparel Leather Lumber Pulp & Chemical
paper products
Non-
metallic
Metal Machin Electron 
ery ics
1976 4.69 8.79 21.82 16.48 7.36 1.93 13.81 11.70 9.09 14.06 60.13
1977 5.16 9.78 20.52 11.62 6.76 2.60 13.23 9.67 8.76 18.31 55.54
1978 5.11 9.51 18.79 12.10 6.29 3.36 13.10 9.26 8.23 19.41 51.56
1979 4.93 12.82 19.14 9.92 5.26 3.26 13.31 10.07 7.81 21.73 53.59
1980 4.57 12.14 18.97 8.43 3.78 3.47 12.64 10.17 7.50 20.19 49.08
1981 4.22 11.99 16.09 8.87 3.88 3.18 12.24 9.68 6.84 18.01 49.61
1982 3.87 9.79 13.05 7.45 2.25 2.74 11.17 7.98 5.33 17.69 46.98
1983 3.64 9.18 13.39 4.80 2.03 2.02 11.53 7.72 5.22 17.90 47.08
1984 3.73 8.85 12.14 4.95 2.32 1.93 10.30 8.24 5.04 18.57 38.74
1985 3.80 6.92 10.87 5.67 1.62 2.18 8.60 9.69 5.17 15.72 36.57
1986 4.20 7.00 9.22 4.74 1.64 2.92 7.96 7.23 4.91 18.48 35.82
1987 4.04 7.33 6.46 4.99 1.29 2.96 8.89 7.33 5.10 20.00 33.75
1988 4.96 7.79 7.02 4.19 1.04 2.70 8.34 8.65 5.44 20.21 29.28
1989 5.26 8.66 7.18 4.90 1.14 2.93 8.96 8.84 5.89 19.44 30.05
1990 6.48 8.59 6.71 4.53 1.26 6.36 13.41 8.84 6.65 19.63 29.21
1991 8.04 9.24 6.98 5.75 1.04 7.21 15.06 8.48 6.56 19.17 28.80
Source: (i) Calculated from the survey data of Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, 1975-1989, Taipei, Taiwan.
(ii) Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of 
China, Yearbook of Earning and Productivity Statistics, Taiwan Area, Republic of 
China, 1986, 1992. Taipei.
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Appendix 6.A The derivation of capital service prices and capital expenditure
The service price of capital is measured by using the method originally described by 
Christensen and Jorgenson (1969). In calculating the service price of capital, the rate 
of depreciation for plants is taken to be 0.513, and for machinery and equipment, 
0.1325. Both figures are used by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) in constructing 
capital data for the US manufacturing industry. The rate of depreciation for 
transportation vehicles is taken to be 0.2537, which is taken from Hulten and 
Wykoff’s (1981) estimate of the rate of economic depreciation for trucks, buses and 
truck trailers. The rate of depreciation for land is assumed to be zero.
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Appendix 6.B TFP decomposition
(1) TFP decomposition (1986)
7irm TFP Growth Scale
Effect
Efficiency
Effect
Technological
Effect
Price
Effect
1 0.0343 0.1071 0.0900 -0.1237 -0.0392
2 -0.3396 -0.1807 -0.0767 -0.1237 0.0415
3 -0.2024 -0.1854 0.0461 -0.1237 0.0606
4 0.0052 0.0808 0.0355 -0.1237 0.0126
5 -0.1212 0.0662 -0.0672 -0.1237 0.0035
6 -0.1669 -0.1038 0.0776 -0.1237 -0.0170
7 -0.1394 -0.0312 0.0198 -0.1237 -0.0044
8 -0.2706 -0.1553 -0.0461 -0.1237 0.0545
9 0.0477 0.1859 0.0434 -0.1237 -0.0579
10 0.0390 0.4547 0.0784 -0.1237 -0.3704
11 -0.3652 -0.1488 -0.0942 -0.1237 0.0016
12 -0.2533 -0.1113 0.0453 -0.1237 -0.0636
13 -0.0799 0.1007 -0.0743 -0.1237 0.0175
14 1.5501 1.4110 0.0655 -0.1237 0.1973
15 0.0489 0.1574 0.0136 -0.1237 0.0016
16 -0.2335 -0.1036 -0.0087 -0.1237 0.0025
17 -0.2529 -0.1383 0.0192 -0.1237 -0.0102
18 0.0183 0.1627 -0.0452 -0.1237 0.0245
19 -0.0933 -0.0075 -0.0287 -0.1237 0.0667
20 0.7367 0.7993 0.0797 -0.1237 -0.0186
21 0.0371 0.1828 -0.0283 -0.1237 0.0063
22 -0.1787 -0.0953 0.0074 -0.1237 0.0329
23 -0.3581 -0.1948 -0.0138 -0.1237 -0.0258
24 -0.1531 -0.1031 -0.0158 -0.1237 0.0895
25 0.0995 0.3059 -0.0520 -0.1237 -0.0307
26 0.1024 0.0090 0.1296 -0.1237 0.0875
27 -0.2170 -0.0932 -0.0401 -0.1237 0.0400
28 -0.6071 -0.2792 -0.1244 -0.1237 -0.0798
29 0.0247 0.1494 0.0020 -0.1237 -0.0029
30 -0.2074 0.0633 -0.0102 -0.1237 -0.1369
31 2.1811 2.2116 0.1636 -0.1237 -0.0703
32 -0.0124 0.1976 0.0055 -0.1237 -0.0917
33 -0.2736 -0.2158 -0.0186 -0.1237 0.0845
34 -0.0860 0.0605 -0.0821 -0.1237 0.0593
35 1.0600 1.1645 0.1550 -0.1237 -0.1358
36 -0.1821 -0.0424 0.0207 -0.1237 -0.0367
37 -0.4585 -0.2480 -0.1437 -0.1237 0.0569
38 1.0890 0.6875 0.0507 -0.1237 0.4745
39 -0.4763 -0.2859 -0.0490 -0.1237 -0.0177
40 -0.1765 -0.1304 0.0615 -0.1237 0.0162
41 -0.1266 -0.2049 0.1285 -0.1237 0.0735
42 -1.3093 -0.0594 0.0823 -0.1237 -1.2085
43 -0.3271 -0.1618 -0.1039 -0.1237 0.0623
44 0.6476 0.6697 0.1186 -0.1237 -0.0171
45 -0.4860 -0.2743 -0.0537 -0.1237 -0.0344
46 0.4582 0.4590 0.1857 -0.1237 -0.0629
47 -0.1783 -0.0165 0.0884 -0.1237 -0.1265
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48 - 0.2500 - 0.1228 - 0.0076 - 0.1237 0.0041
49 - 0.3185 - 0.2074 0.0157 - 0.1237 - 0.0031
50 - 0.3982 - 0.2334 - 0.0598 - 0.1237 0.0187
51 0.3749 0.1341 0.0665 - 0.1237 0.2980
52 0.0493 0.2226 - 0.0334 - 0.1237 - 0.0162
53 0.5532 0.5995 0.0826 - 0.1237 - 0.0052
54 - 0.4001 - 0.0778 - 0.1676 - 0.1237 - 0.0310
55 - 0.2136 - 0.0765 0.0705 - 0.1237 - 0.0839
56 1.9771 1.9827 0.1551 - 0.1237 - 0.0370
57 - 0.0900 - 0.0481 0.0681 - 0.1237 0.0137
58 - 0.1684 - 0.1290 0.1255 - 0.1237 - 0.0411
59 0.1134 0.1108 0.0153 - 0.1237 0.1110
60 - 0.4864 - 0.2762 - 0.0190 - 0.1237 - 0.0675
61 - 0.2879 - 0.1036 - 0.0767 - 0.1237 0.0161
62 - 0.5196 - 0.2923 - 0.1674 - 0.1237 0.0638
63 0.0868 0.0955 0.1593 - 0.1237 - 0.0443
64 - 0.1973 - 0.0597 - 0.0053 - 0.1237 - 0.0086
65 - 0.2616 - 0.1699 0.0540 - 0.1237 - 0.0220
66 - 0.1839 - 0.0237 0.0062 - 0.1237 - 0.0427
67 - 0.0733 0.1520 0.0282 - 0.1237 - 0.1298
68 - 0.0287 0.0839 0.0391 - 0.1237 - 0.0280
69 - 0.0058 0.0458 0.0185 - 0.1237 0.0537
70 0.0432 0.1173 0.0264 - 0.1237 0.0232
71 - 0.2988 - 0.1246 - 0.0435 - 0.1237 - 0.0071
72 0.0121 0.0615 0.0569 - 0.1237 0.0175
73 0.2201 0.2910 0.0504 - 0.1237 0.0024
74 - 0.7701 - 0.2813 - 0.2042 - 0.1237 - 0.1609
75 0.7706 0.7446 0.0626 - 0.1237 0.0872
76 - 0.3029 - 0.2069 0.0089 - 0.1237 0.0188
77 0.3240 0.3732 - 0.0201 - 0.1237 0.0946
78 - 0.3958 - 0.2110 - 0.0263 - 0.1237 - 0.0348
79 - 0.3340 - 0.1515 0.1248 - 0.1237 - 0.1836
80 0.0710 0.1789 0.0525 - 0.1237 - 0.0367
81 1.6049 1.6865 0.0499 - 0.1237 - 0.0077
82 - 0.1609 - 0.0800 0.0444 - 0.1237 - 0.0016
83 0.0071 0.0422 0.0938 - 0.1237 - 0.0053
84 - 0.3998 - 0.2082 0.0555 - 0.1237 - 0.1234
85 - 0.2749 - 0.1911 0.0324 - 0.1237 0.0075
86 - 0.2174 - 0.0963 0.0367 - 0.1237 - 0.0342
87 - 0.0662 - 0.1269 0.0314 - 0.1237 0.1531
88 0.1549 0.1409 0.0774 - 0.1237 0.0603
89 - 0.3072 - 0.1656 0.0183 - 0.1237 - 0.0362
90 0.7598 0.7489 0.3111 - 0.1237 - 0.1765
91 - 0.4488 - 0.2617 - 0.0589 - 0.1237 - 0.0045
92 0.7998 0.7509 0.0831 - 0.1237 0.0894
93 - 0.3127 - 0.1326 - 0.1175 - 0.1237 0.0611
94 0.0153 0.1275 0.0263 - 0.1237 - 0.0148
95 0.5261 0.4552 0.0164 - 0.1237 0.1782
96 - 0.1356 - 0.0199 - 0.0676 - 0.1237 0.0756
97 - 0.1770 - 0.1408 0.0855 - 0.1237 0.0020
98 - 0.3344 - 0.0652 - 0.1434 - 0.1237 - 0.0021
99 - 0.1352 - 0.0416 - 0.0146 - 0.1237 0.0447
100 0.7734 0.6432 0.1444 - 0.1237 0.1095
101 - 0.2580 - 0.1558 0.0138 - 0.1237 0.0078
102 1.2936 1.0643 0.1223 - 0.1237 0.2307
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103 - 0.2980 - 0.1949 0.0131 - 0.1237 0.0075
104 - 0.1128 - 0.0330 0.0517 - 0.1237 - 0.0078
105 - 0.2255 - 0.1273 - 0.0274 - 0.1237 0.0529
106 - 0.5049 - 0.2214 - 0.0978 - 0.1237 - 0.0620
107 - 0.1634 - 0.1173 0.0770 - 0.1237 0.0006
108 - 0.3255 - 0.2712 - 0.0012 - 0.1237 0.0706
109 - 0.3895 - 0.1855 - 0.0181 - 0.1237 - 0.0621
110 - 0.2891 - 0.0683 - 0.1426 - 0.1237 0.0455
111 - 0.0699 0.0181 0.0113 - 0.1237 0.0244
112 - 0.3636 - 0.2579 - 0.0292 - 0.1237 0.0472
113 - 0.0486 - 0.0843 0.0732 - 0.1237 0.0862
114 - 0.1151 - 0.0136 0.0964 - 0.1237 - 0.0743
115 - 0.1726 - 0.2063 0.0152 - 0.1237 0.1422
116 - 0.1710 - 0.1414 0.0263 - 0.1237 0.0678
117 0.1489 0.1520 0.0527 - 0.1237 0.0679
118 - 0.2497 - 0.1222 0.0164 - 0.1237 - 0.0202
119 - 0.3505 - 0.2243 - 0.0126 - 0.1237 0.0100
120 - 0.1786 0.0073 - 0.0372 - 0.1237 - 0.0250
121 - 0.3341 - 0.1866 0.0071 - 0.1237 - 0.0309
122 0.9213 1.0237 0.0383 - 0.1237 - 0.0171
123 - 0.1605 - 0.0896 0.0508 - 0.1237 0.0020
124 - 0.2655 - 0.0994 0.0007 - 0.1237 - 0.0431
125 - 0.2678 - 0.2104 0.0112 - 0.1237 0.0551
126 0.0467 0.4722 - 0.1160 - 0.1237 - 0.1858
127 - 0.0757 0.0630 0.1069 - 0.1237 - 0.1219
128 - 0.1713 - 0.0511 0.0155 - 0.1237 - 0.0120
129 - 0.3301 - 0.0726 - 0.1154 - 0.1237 - 0.0183
130 - 0.4108 - 0.1078 - 0.1468 - 0.1237 - 0.0326
131 - 0.0429 0.0256 0.0244 - 0.1237 0.0309
132 - 0.0698 0.0262 0.0578 - 0.1237 - 0.0301
133 1.2835 1.2605 0.0274 - 0.1237 0.1193
134 - 0.2283 - 0.1013 0.0056 - 0.1237 - 0.0089
135 0.0675 0.0831 0.0901 - 0.1237 0.0181
:ontinued
188
(2) TFP decomposition (1991)
"irm TFP Growth Scale Effect Efficiency
Effect
Technological
Effect
Price
Effect
1 0.0151 0.1389 0.0127 -0.1237 -0.0127
2 -0.5956 -0.1493 -0.0266 -0.1237 -0.2959
3 -0.0631 -0.1812 0.0717 -0.1237 0.1702
4 -0.2369 -0.0888 -0.0109 -0.1237 -0.0135
5 -0.1087 -0.0077 0.0346 -0.1237 -0.0118
6 -0.0855 -0.0787 0.1461 -0.1237 -0.0292
7 -0.0897 0.1794 -0.1000 -0.1237 -0.0454
8 -0.3836 -0.2479 -0.0098 -0.1237 -0.0023
9 -0.0059 0.1029 -0.0038 -0.1237 0.0188
10 -0.1584 0.0357 -0.0898 -0.1237 0.0194
11 -0.1903 -0.0471 -0.0435 -0.1237 0.0240
12 -0.4907 -0.1916 -0.0919 -0.1237 -0.0835
13 0.6354 0.6032 0.1645 -0.1237 -0.0086
14 6.4273 6.2959 0.1564 -0.1237 0.0986
15 -0.2339 -0.0777 -0.0160 -0.1237 -0.0165
16 -0.4007 -0.2424 0.0090 -0.1237 -0.0435
17 -0.1344 0.0404 -0.0260 -0.1237 -0.0251
18 1.3755 1.5667 -0.0351 -0.1237 -0.0324
19 -0.1754 -0.0223 0.0528 -0.1237 -0.0823
20 0.6383 0.5426 -0.0047 -0.1237 0.2240
21 -0.3536 -0.1888 -0.0645 -0.1237 0.0234
22 -0.2667 -0.0148 -0.1717 -0.1237 0.0435
23 -0.0853 0.0567 -0.0103 -0.1237 -0.0080
24 -0.5912 -0.2306 -0.1468 -0.1237 -0.0901
25 0.2348 0.0439 0.1162 -0.1237 0.1985
26 0.0236 0.1716 -0.0916 -0.1237 0.0674
27 1.4590 0.3987 0.0626 -0.1237 1.1214
28 -0.4155 -0.2245 -0.0867 -0.1237 0.0194
29 0.1341 0.3111 -0.0421 -0.1237 -0.0113
30 -0.2352 -0.1261 0.0216 -0.1237 -0.0070
31 -0.2454 -0.0584 -0.0255 -0.1237 -0.0378
32 -0.6337 -0.2845 -0.0447 -0.1237 -0.1808
33 -0.4242 -0.2927 -0.0709 -0.1237 0.0631
34 1.2010 1.3294 0.0198 -0.1237 -0.0245
35 0.1565 0.2964 0.0000 -0.1237 -0.0163
36 1.4960 1.0456 0.3649 -0.1237 0.2092
37 -0.3856 -0.2066 -0.0714 -0.1237 0.0161
38 0.6867 0.1059 0.1488 -0.1237 0.5557
39 -0.2028 -0.1617 0.0355 -0.1237 0.0471
40 0.0874 0.3134 -0.0909 -0.1237 -0.0115
41 1.5561 1.6178 0.0872 -0.1237 -0.0252
42 -0.2906 -0.1508 -0.0393 -0.1237 0.0232
43 0.1414 -0.0112 0.1634 -0.1237 0.1129
44 -0.3888 0.0009 -0.0460 -0.1237 -0.2200
45 1.0872 1.1200 0.0166 -0.1237 0.0744
46 -0.2568 -0.0615 -0.0317 -0.1237 -0.0399
47 -0.7898 -0.0817 0.0238 -0.1237 -0.6082
48 -0.3588 0.0709 -0.1512 -0.1237 -0.1548
49 4.8256 4.9678 0.0953 -0.1237 -0.1138
50 -0.3279 -0.0860 -0.1526 -0.1237 0.0344
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51 - 0.4070 - 0.1586 - 0.1597 - 0.1237 0.0350
52 - 0.4349 - 0.1229 0.0974 - 0.1237 - 0.2856
53 0.4998 0.5273 0.0965 - 0.1237 - 0.0003
54 0.0057 0.0395 - 0.0316 - 0.1237 0.1215
55 0.0032 0.1242 0.0110 - 0.1237 - 0.0082
56 - 0.2584 - 0.1770 0.0472 - 0.1237 - 0.0049
57 - 0.0597 - 0.0337 0.0954 - 0.1237 0.0023
58 1.0178 1.0718 0.0540 - 0.1237 0.0157
59 - 0.0840 - 0.0096 0.0743 - 0.1237 - 0.0251
60 - 0.3836 - 0.2273 - 0.0214 - 0.1237 - 0.0112
61 1.1492 0.2056 0.2110 - 0.1237 0.8563
62 1.6744 0.8549 0.2124 - 0.1237 0.7308
63 0.4423 0.3686 0.1070 - 0.1237 0.0904
64 - 0.3674 - 0.2487 0.0057 - 0.1237 - 0.0008
65 2.5350 2.7801 0.2757 - 0.1237 - 0.3971
66 0.0883 0.1666 0.0769 - 0.1237 - 0.0316
67 0.2994 0.3773 - 0.0026 - 0.1237 0.0484
68 0.0647 0.1341 0.0691 - 0.1237 - 0.0148
69 - 0.2077 - 0.1074 0.0663 - 0.1237 - 0.0430
70 - 0.3024 - 0.1566 - 0.0131 - 0.1237 - 0.0090
71 0.2215 0.3224 0.0053 - 0.1237 0.0175
72 - 0.3932 - 0.0790 0.0351 - 0.1237 - 0.2256
73 - 0.1472 - 0.0489 0.0533 - 0.1237 - 0.0280
74 - 0.2458 - 0.1526 0.0256 - 0.1237 0.0050
75 0.5405 0.4440 0.0558 - 0.1237 0.1645
76 0.3706 0.3592 - 0.0310 - 0.1237 0.1661
77 0.0717 0.1329 0.0097 - 0.1237 0.0528
78 - 0.0370 0.0777 - 0.0012 - 0.1237 0.0102
79 - 0.3602 - 0.2585 - 0.1329 - 0.1237 0.1550
80 - 0.2227 - 0.0835 0.0057 - 0.1237 - 0.0211
81 - 0.4591 - 0.2530 0.0420 - 0.1237 - 0.1244
82 - 0.1721 - 0.1039 0.0469 - 0.1237 0.0086
83 0.4746 0.5465 0.0314 - 0.1237 0.0204
84 - 0.0875 - 0.0013 0.0813 - 0.1237 - 0.0437
85 - 0.0175 0.2731 0.0614 - 0.1237 - 0.2282
86 - 0.0878 0.0226 0.0244 - 0.1237 - 0.0111
87 - 0.1799 - 0.0010 - 0.0536 - 0.1237 - 0.0016
88 - 0.5722 - 0.2910 - 0.1496 - 0.1237 - 0.0078
89 - 0.4533 - 0.1883 - 0.1847 - 0.1237 0.0435
90 0.0024 0.1878 0.0805 - 0.1237 - 0.1423
91 - 0.3199 - 0.1040 - 0.1277 - 0.1237 0.0356
92 - 0.2135 0.0083 - 0.0394 - 0.1237 - 0.0587
93 - 0.4728 - 0.1773 - 0.1207 - 0.1237 - 0.0511
94 - 0.1621 - 0.0456 - 0.0431 - 0.1237 0.0503
95 1.8991 1.9985 0.0948 - 0.1237 - 0.0705
96 - 0.1666 0.0243 - 0.0346 - 0.1237 - 0.0326
97 - 0.3170 - 0.1219 - 0.1057 - 0.1237 0.0343
98 - 0.1760 - 0.0824 0.0330 - 0.1237 - 0.0030
99 - 0.1163 0.0149 0.0414 - 0.1237 - 0.0489
100 0.1116 0.0687 0.1069 - 0.1237 0.0597
101 - 0.1648 - 0.0517 0.0446 - 0.1237 - 0.0341
102 - 0.2675 - 0.0346 - 0.0806 - 0.1237 - 0.0285
103 - 0.2119 - 0.0996 0.0294 - 0.1237 - 0.0180
104 - 0.1656 - 0.0911 0.0846 - 0.1237 - 0.0354
105 - 0.5144 - 0.2740 - 0.0619 - 0.1237 - 0.0547
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106 - 0.3757 - 0.1834 - 0.0148 - 0.1237 - 0.0538
107 - 0.0296 0.0342 0.0276 - 0.1237 0.0323
108 - 0.3539 - 0.2075 - 0.0090 - 0.1237 - 0.0137
109 - 0.1832 - 0.0765 - 0.0314 - 0.1237 0.0484
110 0.3599 0.3734 0.0912 - 0.1237 0.0190
111 - 0.4250 - 0.2491 - 0.0754 - 0.1237 0.0233
112 - 0.0323 0.1077 0.0204 - 0.1237 - 0.0368
113 - 0.1151 - 0.0548 0.0553 - 0.1237 0.0081
114 - 0.0835 0.0633 - 0.0027 - 0.1237 - 0.0204
115 - 0.0932 0.0004 0.0272 - 0.1237 0.0030
116 - 0.1023 - 0.1753 - 0.0245 - 0.1237 0.2212
117 0.1112 0.1553 0.0928 - 0.1237 - 0.0131
118 0.0548 0.1181 0.0345 - 0.1237 0.0259
119 - 0.3114 - 0.1386 - 0.0306 - 0.1237 - 0.0185
120 - 0.0666 0.0315 0.0287 - 0.1237 - 0.0031
121 - 0.3452 - 0.2706 - 0.0571 - 0.1237 0.1062
122 - 0.3040 - 0.1641 - 0.0039 - 0.1237 - 0.0123
123 - 0.4879 - 0.1810 - 0.0850 - 0.1237 - 0.0982
124 1.4661 1.4904 0.0815 - 0.1237 0.0179
125 - 0.2875 - 0.0479 - 0.0847 - 0.1237 - 0.0312
126 - 0.0560 0.0812 - 0.0053 - 0.1237 - 0.0082
127 - 0.1478 - 0.0933 0.0477 - 0.1237 0.0216
128 0.0852 0.1842 0.0495 - 0.1237 - 0.0248
129 0.3231 0.3416 0.1268 - 0.1237 - 0.0216
130 - 0.2684 - 0.1141 - 0.0351 - 0.1237 0.0045
131 - 0.1929 - 0.2168 0.1425 - 0.1237 0.0052
132 - 0.1302 - 0.0136 0.0328 - 0.1237 - 0.0257
133 - 0.2685 - 0.1089 0.0128 - 0.1237 - 0.0487
134 - 0.2086 - 0.1310 0.0674 - 0.1237 - 0.0213
135 0.8151 0.8365 0.0835 - 0.1237 0.0188
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Appendix 6.C Estimation of technical efficiency
From the studies of Aigner et al. (1977), Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt 
(1982) and Kalirajan and Flinn (1983), the following can be analysed by the estimates 
of the maximum-likelihood method.
First, the ratio of the two errors of w, and vi (ie. X) is 1.6050, which implies
that the one-sided error w., which represents technical inefficiency, dominates the
^ 2
symmetric error v, , which represents pure randomness. If defining 5 = —r Ji—7 , the
<*u + G V
value of 8 is 0.7204. This variable means that about 72 per cent of the discrepancies 
between the observed cost and the maximal (frontier) cost are due to technical 
inefficiency. In other words, the extra expenditure of observed cost from the frontier 
cost is primarily due to factors which are beyond the control of the firms.
Secondly, the expected value of the inefficiency can be calculated from the 
estimates of X andG . The mean technical inefficiency is guJ(2/ti ) as in Aigner, et al.
(1977). The estimates of c u = 0.4228 and thus the estimated average technical 
inefficiency is 0.5299, indicating about 53 per cent technical inefficiency.
Thirdly, it is possible to measure firm-specific technical efficiency by using the 
estimate of the expected value of conditional on e (= u + v) or the mode of the 
condition distribution as the point estimator for u . The conditional density of ui given 
£ is the ratio of the joint density function of (m,e ) to density function of £ , which 
can be written as
From this density function, the expected value of u condition on £ is derived,
where /  and F represent the standard normal density and cumulative density function 
respectively, while the mode of the conditional distribution is the minimum of w* and 
zero, which can be written as
A  2
This looks like the density of N (w*,g*2) with w* =
M(u|e) = u* if £ > 0; 
= 0 if £ < 0
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By substituting the estimated data into the above expected value equation, 
firm-specific technical efficiency can be measured. Instead of presenting the technical 
efficiency for every individual firm, the frequency distribution is presented below.
E ffic ie n c y  interval F requ en cy
1981 1 9 8 6 1991
0 .1  - 0 . 2 1 0 0
0 .2  - 0 .3 1 2 1
0 .3  - 0 .4 9 8 8
0 .4  - 0 .5 21 2 2 23
0 .5  - 0 .6 33 3 6 33
0 .6  - 0 .7 3 8 35 4 2
0 .7  - 0 .8 16 18 23
=  1.0 16 14 5
T otal ob servation s 135 135 135
The closer the efficiency level is to 1, the higher the technical efficiency of 
the firm. A quite high percentage of firms maintained their technical efficiency at 
about the 0.5 to 0.7 level. The efficiency level was dispersed across a wider range in 
the early years. As a whole, the results from the two methods are similar.
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